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Abstract 
 
 
In the last few decades we can find a whole spectrum of different, sometimes even 
contradictory understandings and interpretations of what is modernism and modernist 
architecture. It is still not clear whether it was just a brief turmoil that took place in the 
period between the World Wars and is long gone, was it interrupted by postmodernism in 
the seventies, or is it still one active process. This makes the cognizance of modernism 
inconsistent and ambiguous, and many contemporary architects and thinkers find this as 
an open and acute question. In order to clarify and determine the true agendas of 
architectural modernism it is necessary to rethink and reexamine its very foundations. 
 
This dissertation is a new investigation and interpretation of what is modernism in 
architecture and how it can be identified. Charged with the experience of the twentieth 
century, it reveals and explores the obscure nature of the post-humanist subject/object 
relationship in arts in general, as well tries to find its equivalence in the contemporary 
architecture. 
 
It will be argued that at the beginning of the twenty-first century the architecture 
represents, more than ever before, the dominant medium and vehicle for both theorizing 
and embodiment of modernism. 
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Abstrakt 
 
 
V posledních desetiletích jsme svědky řady různých, občas dokonce i protichůdných, 
porozumění a interpretací modernismu a moderní architektury. Nejsme si ani zcela jisti, 
zda to bylo jen krátké bouřlivé období mezi válkami, které je už dávno za námi, nebo zda 
bylo přerušeno až post-modernismem v sedmdesátých letech, anebo je to stále probíhající 
proces. Takovýto stav má za následek nekonzistentní a nejednoznačné chápaní 
modernismu a mnozí současní architekti a myslitelé považují toto za otevřenou a palčivou 
otázku. Za účelem vyjasnění a definování agendy architektonického modernismu je nutné 
přezkoumat a přehodnotit jeho samotnou podstatu. 
 
Tato disertační práce se věnuje zkoumání a interpretaci toho, co je modernismus v 
architektuře a jakým způsobem může být identifikován. Na základě zkušeností z 
dvacátého století tato práce odhaluje a zkoumá obskurnost post-humanistického vztahu 
mezi subjektem a objektem v umění a pokouší se najít jeho ekvivalent v současné 
architektuře.   
 
V tezi bude argumentováno, že na začátku dvacátého prvního století architektura 
představuje, více než kdykoliv předtím, dominantní médium a prostředek teoretizování i 
ztělesnění modernismu.  
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“Unhappily those marvelous places, railway stations, from which one sets out for a 
remote destination, are tragic places also, for if in them the miracle is accomplished 
whereby scenes which hitherto have had no existence save in our minds are about to 
become the scenes among which we shall be living, for that very reason we must, as we 
emerge from the waiting room, abandon any thought of presently finding ourselves once 
more in the familiar room which but a moment ago still housed us. We must lay aside all 
hope of going home to sleep in our own bed, once we have decided to penetrate into the 
pestiferous cavern to which we gain access to the mystery, into one of those vast glass-
roofed sheds, like that of Saint-Lazare into which I went to find the train for Balbec, and 
which extended over the eviscerated city one of those bleak and boundless skies, heavy 
with an accumulation of dramatic menace, like certain skies painted with an almost 
Parisian modernity by Mantegna or Veronese, beneath which only some terrible and 
solemn act could be in progress, such as a departure by train or the erection of the 
Cross.”1 – Marcel Proust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Marcel Proust, Within a Budding Grove, (London: Vintage Books, 2005), pp. 256-257 
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Introduction: Apologia for Unhappy Conscience of 
Architecture 
 
 
The following dissertation intends to explore, rethink, and reinterpret some of the 
fundamental principles and elements of modernism, and tries to perceive them as 
essential qualities of the contemporary architecture. In this sense, the thesis renders 
modernism as one continuing and sill active paradigm which constitutes and manifests 
itself throughout the past hundred years, although not always clearly. It will be argued 
that for architecture this entire period is one permanent struggle to define and establish its 
modernist agenda and to clarify its character in this context. It will also be argued that at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century architecture represents, more than ever before, 
the dominant medium and vehicle for both theorizing and embodiment of modernism. 
 
First, let us briefly determine what we understand by the word ‘modernism’, and why 
there is any need for its reexamination. Modernism, in historically defined sense, marks 
its beginnings at the end of nineteenth century, culminates in the second and third decade 
of the twentieth century, and ends with the Second World War.  It encompasses a set of 
cultural tendencies and an array of associated art movements that, in a very radical way, 
reacts to the turbulent state of society at the time. However, this is only a narrowed and 
simplified meaning of the word. In the last few decades we can find the whole spectrum 
of different, sometimes even contradictory understandings and interpretations of this 
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term. Here, I would rather define modernism as an aesthetic expression of one severe and 
radical break with several centuries ruling humanism – “the break”, as Frederic Jameson 
says, “[which] becomes the period in its own right.”1  
 
The humanism is essentially determined by the Cartesian dualism, the subject/object split, 
where the subject becomes the intending manipulator of the object and conscious 
originator of meanings and actions. The subject is an authoritative agent, centralized and 
unique; while the object is a passive instrument observed and understood only by another, 
to whose command it is subjected. The crisis of humanism occurs when these roles begin 
to change and the subject/object relation becomes not so clear and consistent.  
 
Modernism can be defined as a new paradigm, one new body of knowledge or what 
Michel Foucault would specify as a new episteme,2 which replaces humanism by the 
critique of anthropocentric attitude and by the fundamental displacement of subject (man) 
out of the center of his physical world. This changed subject/object relationship causes 
one major and dramatic crisis of man; the crisis of determining his purpose and position 
in the world of objects that surrounds him, and therefore the crisis of his identity. As 
Ortega y Gasset says, “While the tiger cannot cease being a tiger, cannot be detigered, 
man lives in the perpetual risk of being dehumanized.”3 Modernism is a state where the 
subject is no longer the master of the game and where man has to struggle to conceive the 
reality which would recognize and reflect this condition. 
 
In this sense, the beginning of such kind of struggle, such transformation of 
consciousness, might be recognized around 1850, with Baudelaire and Poe – those 
“heralds of modernism”4, as Theodor Adorno would describe them – and reaches its 
climactic stage during the 1920s. However, it does not end shortly after that, as it is 
                                                 
1 Frederic Jameson, The Modernist Papers, (London: Verso, 2007), p. 26 
2 See Michal Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences  
3 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture and Literature, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p.190 
4 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, (London: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2004), 
p. 176 
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generally considered, instead it continues its endeavors, in one form or another, up to the 
very present.  
 
The main generator of this radical change is the feeling of discomfort, which finds its 
aesthetic manifestation in the loss of representational reality, loss of order, disintegration 
of the familiar, dislocation of the meaning, discontinuous narrative, fragmentation, 
alienation, delirium. And while the arts, like literature, painting, film, music, and others, 
find the right means to express all these phenomena, architecture is always haunted by the 
old demons of humanism, never being able to fully and openly consider and pursue the 
possibility of the world without man as its ultimate subject and master. Architecture 
always has to accommodate man and to obediently serve his comfort and demands.  
 
This condition leaves the architecture of modernism as one inconsistent and ambiguous 
cognizance; one unfulfilled promise, or what Habermas calls “an unfinished project.”5 
Many contemporary architects and thinkers find this as still open and acute question.  In 
this regard, Rafael Moneo claims, “Modern architecture, had never been fully executed, it 
had never come to incarnate the true spirit of modernity...” 6 We are in the state of 
uncertainty and vagueness unable to clearly define our position and priorities. As Rem 
Koolhaas says, “The irony is that we still don’t know if Postmodernism was the end of 
Modernism or just an interruption. Was it a brief hiatus, and now we are returning to 
something that has been going on for a long time, or is it something radically different? 
We are in condition we don’t understand yet. “7 
 
In order to clarify and determine true agendas of architectural modernism it is necessary 
to rethink and reexamine its very foundations. In the words of Peter Eisenman, “...the 
theoretical paradigms that have defined the interiority of architecture until now may need 
to be reconsidered in order to accommodate many possible previously untheorized and 
                                                 
5 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Modernity: An Unfinished Project’, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of 
Modernity: Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discurse of Modernity, Maurizio Passerin 
d'Entrèves (edited by); Seyla Benhabib (edited by), (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 38 
6 Rafael Moneo, Theoretical Anxiety and Design Strategies in the Work of Eight Contemporary Architects, 
(Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2004), p. 147 
7 Rem Koolhaas, quoted in Nicolai Ouroussoff, ’The New, New City’, The New York Times, (June 8, 2008) 
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unauthorized futures, as well as many possible revisions of the past.”8 Anthony Vidler 
also speaks about the urgency for reevaluation of these essential postulates: “we would 
need to seriously reevaluate the sacred cows of modernity, whose work has become, too 
quickly, canonical, in order to detect the internal inconsistencies, the still-open questions 
lurking behind their monographical facades.“9 
 
This dissertation is an investigation and interpretation of what is modernism in 
architecture and how it can be identified. Charged with the experience of the twentieth 
century, it reveals and explores the obscure nature of the post-humanist subject/object 
relationship in arts in general, and tries to find its equivalence in the contemporary 
architecture. 
 
In the light of the new understanding of what are the essential priorities and qualities of 
modernism, we could, in a different way, perceive and evaluate the entire ontogenesis of 
architecture in the last century, with the particular regard to those projects commonly 
labeled as failures. Therefore, this thesis also might be thought of as a certain amnesty for 
‘mistakes’ of modernism; an apologia for one century of ‘impersonal’, ‘meaningless’, 
‘bore’, and above all ‘inhuman’ architecture –  an apologia for its unhappy conscience. 
 
The dissertation is divided into three parts, with the conclusion to follow. The first part, 
‘Dialectic of Discomfort’, introduces and delineates modernism as one entirely new 
paradigm. The chapter begins with Nietzsche and his explicit break with metaphysics of 
humanism, here noted as one symbolic turning-point, and continues with Heidegger and 
Vattimo who emphasize the meaning and proportions of this break. After this small 
philosophical introduction, the thesis intents to explain how the end of humanism reflects 
on architecture. Here, it is necessary to determine two basic things.  First, it is important 
to find a common fund, one mutual denominator, inherent to all art forms of the time. The 
thesis explores the new position of subject in some of the most representative works of 
the well acclaimed artists –such as Baudelaire, Joyce, Sartre, Cézanne, Picasso, Malevich, 
                                                 
8 Eisenman, Peter, Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings 1963 – 1988, (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2004), p. xi 
9 Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: The 
Mit Press, 2008), p. 199 
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Rothko, Man Ray, Vertov, and others – and by that it establishes the general notion of the 
main qualities and agendas of modernist art. Secondly, it is relevant to define in what 
measure these qualities and agendas are present in architecture, and to clearly and 
unambiguously distinguish them from the old heritage of humanism. The persistent 
intention to understand and present modernism as just another style in one continuous 
process of humanism, will be shown in one brief journey through the theoretical 
interpretations of modern architecture, from the first generation of historians (Pevsner, 
Giedion, Hitchcock) to some contemporary thinkers. As an opposition to this kind of 
understanding of modernism, it will be presented Le Corbusier’s Notre Dame du Haut – 
the project that, by using the same instruments of modernism as all other modern arts, 
puts architecture out of the humanist discourse and makes perfect example of the 
embodiment of the new metaphysics. 
 
The second part, ‘Utopia vs. Delirium’, examines the manifestations of modernism in the 
large scale urban projects. It juxtaposes two radically different models with entirely 
opposed approaches to the very same problems of the time. The first model is an idealistic 
and utopian approach of the European avant-garde, analyzed here through some of the 
most radical projects by Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer. The second model is utterly 
pragmatic, but at the same time, chaotic and delirious development of Manhattan. Neither 
of them is treated as modernism per se, but rather it is looked for the qualities and 
instruments that would reveal the subject/object relationship which they create, and in 
that way define their true agendas. It will be argued that these two models generate the 
mechanisms for the development of the modern metropolis, which reaches its culmination 
in recent accelerated growth of Chinese cities.  
 
The third part, ‘Reinventing Modernism’, deals with the condition in architecture at the 
beginning of twenty-first century and reveals how the work of the most important and 
influential architects of today is part of, and even contributes to, one coherent narrative of 
modernism. As an example of such work, theoretical strategies and design processes in 
some of the most interesting projects of three architects, Peter Eisenman, Rem Koolhaas, 
and Sou Fujimoto, will be presented and reinterpreted, in regard with analyses made in 
previous two parts. All three of them explore and render the hidden and obscure agendas 
of the contemporary society in one innovative and daring way. Their work will be 
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analyzed in terms of how they use the instruments of modernism and in which way they 
reinvent and extend the meaning and potential of these instruments. We can find that their 
projects reveal some essential and constituent elements of the new paradigm and in that 
way position the contemporary architecture on one common platform with other modern 
arts, making the unique and meaningful cognizance of modernism.  
 
To make the aims and intentions of this dissertation more clear and to illustrate it in a 
more explicit and picturesque way, let me use the allegory from one beautiful film by 
Louis Buñuel, The Exterminating Angel (El ángel exterminador), from 1962.  A group of 
upper-class people attending the dinner party in the bourgeois saloon at one lavish 
mansion. They are all polite, generous and with perfect manners. The atmosphere is 
solemn and everything seems comfortable and serene. But as the evening go on, they 
slowly begin to realize that something is not quite right. They become aware that they 
cannot leave this saloon. No matter what they do or how much they try, they cannot cross 
the doorstep of the room. The absurdity is that in the reality there is nothing that stops 
them to exit. The doors are wide open, and everything is perfectly the same as when they 
entered the room a few hours earlier. There is no physical barrier, no logical reason that 
holds them inside. They are all captivated by some unknown invisible force, which is 
beyond their power or comprehension. At the same time, no one outside this mansion is 
able to get in. Everyone stops at the entrance of the courtyard. It is as if there are two 
parallel worlds which do not belong to the same reality. In order to exit one world and 
enter the other, one has to surmount a gap; that mysterious in-between space, from the 
doorway of the saloon to the street-gate. This space is actually the gap between two 
metaphysics – the old metaphysics of humanism that ceased to exist and the metaphysics 
of new age. To pass from one paradigm to the other is the ultimate and harshest 
challenge, even if there are no visible obstacles and constraints which prevent such 
venture.  
 
In the same way as this group of people from Buñuel’s film, the architecture was 
imprisoned by the old paradigm of humanism, to a greater or lesser extent, almost for the 
whole twentieth century. The intention of this dissertation is first to recognize and accept 
the existence of this mysterious uncanny space, depict and render its borders, make it 
visible, and then to enter into it and try to explore it and understand it. It is necessary for 
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man to confront with the obscure objects – these “monstrously unfamiliar” objects10, to 
use Baudrillard’s term – which are there waiting to be encountered. The thesis also 
intends to reveal what man has to do and in what way he has to change himself to be able 
to step into this space and safely exit on the other end.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art, (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), p. 101 
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1.    Dialectic of Discomfort 
 
 
 
„Twice two makes four is a cocky young man who stands with hands on hips, 
barring your path and spitting. I admit that twice two makes four is an excellent 
thing, but if we are to give everything its due, twice two makes five is sometimes a 
very charming thing too.“1 – Fyodor Dostoyevsky 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Notes from the Underground, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), p. 
25 
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1.1.  God is dead, but man isn't doing so well himself 
 
 
— Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning 
hours, ran to the market place and cried incessantly: "I seek God! I seek 
God!"— As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around 
just then, he provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose 
his way like a child? asked another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he 
gone on a voyage? emigrated?— Thus they yelled and laughed.  
     The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them with his eyes. 
"Whither is God?" he cried. "I will tell you. We have killed him—you and I! All 
of us are his murderers! But how did we do this? How could we drink up the 
sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we 
doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? 
Whither are we moving? Away from all suns? Are we not plunging continually? 
And backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still any up or 
down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the 
breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually 
closing in on us? Do we not need to light lanterns in the morning? Do we not 
hear nothing as yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do 
we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition?—Gods, too, decompose! 
God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!  
     “How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was 
holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under 
our knives,—who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean 
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ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to 
invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not 
become gods simply to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater 
deed; and whoever is born after us—for the sake of this deed he will belong to a 
higher history than all history hitherto!"  
     Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his listeners: and they, too, 
were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to the 
ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. "I have come too early," he said 
then; "my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still 
wandering—it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder 
require time; the light of the stars requires time; deeds, though done, still require 
time to be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the 
most distant stars—and yet they have done it themselves."  
     It has been related further that on the same day the madman forced his way 
into several churches and there struck up his requiem aeternam deo. Led out and 
called to account, he is said always to have replied nothing but: "What after all 
are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchers of God?" 1  
                                                                                             — Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
The twentieth century could not be better announced! Like a sad clown in the darkness of 
a circus tent, illuminated by a single ray of light, while standing before audience, 
welcoming them and promising something yet unseen and unimaginable, the author of the 
above quoted paragraph prophetically introduces us into the play that we are still living.  
The three words in the absurd inclination remain in our ears as a mantra and echo again 
and again, ruthlessly separating one world that ceases to exist and another that is about to 
come. Word ‘God is dead’ are pronounced for the first time by a Nietzsche’s Madman in 
the third book of The Gay Science (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft - "la gaya scienza"), in 
1882. For Nietzsche this becomes the essence of a doctrine that he impeccably develops 
until the end of his life. This doctrine reaches its culmination in the book Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for All and None (Also sprach Zarathustra: Ein Buch für Alle und 
Keinen), published in 1885, and unfinished main work The Will to Power (Der Wille zur 
Macht). Although absurd and a bit theatrical, these words have decisive influence on the 
                                                 
1  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1974), pp. 181-182 
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future course of Western philosophy. They are presented here as an announcement of the 
creation of one radically different world, and man’s search for his own place in it.  
 
At the beginning let us examine the true meaning of these words. First of all, they are not 
denying God, neither saying that there is no God at all. Also, they never meant that 
Nietzsche believed in an actual God who first existed (even lived!) and then suddenly was 
killed in a literal sense (“we have killed him” 2), or died because of his pity for man.3  
Equally foolish would be to claim that God is alive! They are not referring to Christianity 
or Christian God in the strict sense of the word, although they are in direct relation with 
it.  Then, what is the meaning of these words and what is Nietzsche trying to tell us?   
 
According to Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche uses the terms ‘God’ or ‘Christian God’ to 
designate the suprasensory world in general. It is Plato’s world of Ideas – a true base of 
the whole western thinking. By speaking of the death of God, Nietzsche is actually 
proclaiming the death of metaphysics.  He speaks about the end of philosophy as we 
know it, and about the necessity of creating a new one. Here by the term metaphysics I do 
not mean a doctrine, let alone only one particular discipline of philosophy, but rather the 
whole world of suprasensory that involves Ideas, God, the moral law, the authority of 
reason, progress, culture, and which essentially determines and directs our sensual world.  
Nietzsche speaks about radical schism between sensual and suprasensual. The world that 
we live in is utterly changing, a man slowly loses his previous role in it. The two-
millennia-old metaphysic of the old world becomes useless. Dead.  
 
In the essay Nietzsches Wort ‘Got Ist Tot’, published in Holzwege in 1950, Heidegger 
writes: „In the word ’God is dead’ the name ’God’, thought essentially, stands for the 
suprasensory world of those ideals which contain the goal that exists beyond earthly life 
for that life and that, accordingly, determines life from above, and also in a certain way, 
                                                 
2  Ibid., p 181 
3  “God is dead: of his pity for man hath God died.” , from Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A 
Book for All and None, (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Edition Limited, 1997),  p. 87 
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from without.“4 In the same essay Heidegger further writes: „The pronouncement ‘God is 
dead’ means: The suprasensory world is without effective power. It bestows no life. 
Metaphysics, i.e., for Nietzsche Western philosophy understood as Platonism, is at an 
end. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as the countermovement to metaphysics 
and that means for him a movement in opposition to Platonism.“ 5  
 
Nietzsche uncompromisingly presents things as they are. According to his believe it is 
necessary to create a completely new order of values that will be able to find a meaning in 
the changes that are coming and are inevitable. He demands activity and first of all 
thinking! Any metaphysical thinking has to be ontology – otherwise it is worthless. Effort 
is needed to reach self-consciousness in which man would have his essence. The very 
metaphysics of the old world tranquilizes man in coziness of his bare existence and 
stagnation. For Nietzsche that metaphysics is the harshest enemy of thinking, and there is 
no longer ontology in it. He asks man to bury all previously adopted perceptions of 
himself, and to abandon the mind that has been celebrated for centuries. His metaphysics 
is the metaphysic of new values; spiritual columns ready to bear the weight of a new age.   
 
Heidegger identifies this crisis of metaphysics with the crisis of humanism. If we 
understand humanism as a perspective that places a man in the center of the world and 
considers him the master of being, how is it possible that the death of God causes the 
crisis of man?  For Heidegger, humanism is a synonym for metaphysics. Humanism 
exists only as an outgrowth of metaphysics. The position established centuries ago, of 
man as the central subject, is greatly jeopardized. Heidegger wisely notices that that kind 
of metaphysic, with man in its center, cannot survive.  
 
Gianni Vattimo, while analyzing Heidegger’s understanding of metaphysics, in his book 
The End of Modernity (first published in 1985) notices „[...] metaphysics may survive as 
such only insofar as its ‘humanistic’ nature (meaning its reduction of everything to the 
human subject itself) remains hidden from view. When the reductive nature of 
                                                 
4  Martin Heidegger, ’ The Word of Nietzsche: “God Is Dead” ‘, The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1977), p. 64 
5  Ibid., p. 61 
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metaphysics instead makes itself explicit, as – according to Heidegger – happens in the 
work of Nietzsche (in the notion of Being as the will to power), metaphysics has arrived 
at the moment of its decline, and with it – as can be seen every day – humanism has also 
arrived at the moment of its decline. For this reason the death of God, which is at once the 
culmination and conclusion of metaphysics, is also the crisis of humanism. To put it 
another way, humanity maintains its position as the ‘centre’ of reality, as the current 
notion of humanism suggests, only through reference to a Grund that verifies this role. St 
Augustine argues that the God knows the human subject more intimately than that subject 
knows itself, but this argument has never been a real threat to humanism; on the contrary, 
as can be historically demonstrated, it has served rather as a means of support for the 
latter”6 
 
From this we clearly see that Nietzsche, as the first radically non-humanistic thinker of 
our epoch, speaks of the death of God in order to destroy man’s illusion about his own 
subjectivity. Exclusivity of central position of human in this world is no longer tenable. 
No matter how painful it may be, it is necessary to confront it as soon as possible. The 
humanism, as we know it until that point, is not capable to answer to the demands of the 
new age.  
 
It is important to notice that for Heidegger the crisis of humanism is (not by accident) 
very closely related to modern technology. For him, technology represents the cause of 
the global process of dehumanization, which implies the decay of humanist ideals of 
culture in favor of forming a man on the basis of productive capability.  With increase of 
technological objectivity, human’s subjectivity dissolves.   
 
Gianni Vattimo recognizes two different understandings of this crisis. According to the 
first, it is necessary to prepare the terrain so that subject could take again the central 
position. This concept essentially does not bring to question the traditional humanism. It 
only endeavors to preserve it in new conditions of modernism. Vattimo calls it a 
nostalgically-restoring tendency. Second, much more radical theory, does not perceive 
                                                 
6  Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1988), p. 32-33 
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technology as a threat but rather as a challenge. Technology paves its road over the 
wracks of forms that represent the dawn of humanism. Referring to that, Vattimo further 
writes:  “The new conditions of life created, above all, by the structure of modern city are 
depicted as an uprooting of man from his traditional setting, or, we might say, from his 
basis in the organic community of village, the family, and so on. In this process of 
uprooting, even the well-defined and reassuring horizons of form itself crumble; so that, 
in a certain sense, the stylistic revolt appears as but one aspect of a larger process 
implicating an entire civilization.”7  Vattimo perceives Heidegger as the most radical 
proponent of this opinion. For him, technology does not cause the crises of humanism 
because the triumph of rationalization subverts humanistic values. It causes the crisis of 
humanism because technology, in representing the embodiment of one new metaphysics, 
calls humanism to an act of overcoming (Verwindunng).   
  
With their strong critique of subject, Nietzsche and then Heidegger start a new search for 
the meaning of man in contemporary society; a search for his new role, in which the goal 
is not to continue a technological dehumanization, nor to unconditionally surrender to the 
seductive glitter of its mechanisms, thereby allowing imposition of the very world which 
those mechanisms pronounce as reality. A man has to change his perception of himself so 
that he would not become a victim of modern processes, which he alone has started.  
 
Unfortunately, there is no quick and easy way out.  As Slavoj Žižek says, referring to 
Heidegger’s ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics, “the only real way to break the metaphysical 
closure is to ‘pass through it’ in its most dangerous form, to endure the pain of 
metaphysical nihilism at its most extreme, which means that one should reject as futile all 
false sedatives.”8 God is dead and man has yet to face the bitter struggle for its own 
survival, and deal with the uncanniness and discomfort of this hostile new reality.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7  Ibid., p.36 
8 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subjec: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 2008), p. 6 
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1.2.  Make It New 
 
 
 “Man wends his way through forests of symbols  
   Which look at him with their familiar eyes.” 
                                   – Charles Baudelaire, Correspondences 
 
 
The man is not prone to changes. Especially with the matters that have existed for 
centuries and which represent an integral part of his identity, his understanding of 
himself, which defines his place in the world and his relationship with the things that 
surround him. Any kind of novelty or distortion of the usual order causes anxiety and 
restlessness in the least. The man strives to get in to the most comfortable position, and 
then to keep it as long as possible. In this pursuance, he develops through time the intense 
anthropocentric comprehension of reality. He becomes the measure of all things and all 
things exist only for him. In one such world, it is impossible to imagine the meaning 
beyond of what belongs to man; the extent of his view defines the borders of the world. 
However, at one point changes happen and man has to face the music. It becomes more 
and more obvious that the old order of things no longer exists and that is necessary to 
stand in front of the mirror and clearly see the face of the person in it. The price for such 
venture is by no means insignificant: it means the end of all comfort.  
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Nietzsche’s harsh critique of subject, uncompromisingly and surgically precisely raised 
the most sensitive questions of the new age, and made a kind of explosion that left man in 
distortion impossible to ignore further on. In the beginning of the twentieth century, this 
radical turnover was manifested in all fields of human doing. All of a sudden, a whole 
array of various tendencies and movements, with the insatiable need to end the existing 
conventions and practices, starts to develop. The search for the man’s new role and his 
pre-evaluation becomes necessity and obsession. This eruption of creations makes the 
new episteme of the epoch, one completely new paradigm – the change which in essence 
is much more radical than all the preceding ones, even having in mind the transition from 
the Middle Ages to the Renaissance.  
 
At the beginning of his La conquête de l'ubiquité, Paul Valery writes: “Our fine arts were 
developed, their types and uses were established, in times very different from the present, 
by men whose power of action upon things was insignificant in comparison with ours. 
But the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and precision they have 
attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, make it a certainty that profound changes 
are impending in the ancient craft of the Beautiful. In all the arts there is a physical 
component which can no longer be considered or treated as it used to be, which cannot 
remain unaffected by our modern knowledge and power. For the last twenty years neither 
matter nor space nor time has been what it was from time immemorial. We must expect 
great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts, thereby affecting artistic 
invention itself and perhaps even bringing about an amazing change in our very notion of 
art.” 1 
 
As in earlier epochs, the change of the spirit of the time is best felt by the artists. And it 
can be said that they are the first to take over the burden of facing the new age. Their 
sacrifice is not the minor one –- it is the sacrifice which their predecessors never had to 
even consider. They have to alienate themselves from the society and speak the language 
which is new and incomprehensible. They renounce their centuries-long role of the 
entertainers, the role of ones bringing something beautiful to this world, embroidering it 
and making it more bearable and comfortable. In that way, they willingly give up comfort 
                                                 
1 Paul Valery, Aesthetics, ‘The Conquest of Ubiquity’ (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 225 
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and commodity, brought by the popularity and favor of the wide audience seeking for 
entertainment. At the same time, they renounce their role of educators and along with this 
the comfort and all privileges of the reputation and acknowledgments of academic 
institutions and elites of the system. Instead all of this, they turn to self-salvation, or at 
least, purely and simply, to the cultivation of their own existence. They enter into the 
darkest and most intimate parts of their own consciousness in order to face all the fears 
and desires. They challenge the borders of the new world and examine the relationship 
with the objects with which they have to share this world. 
 
The necessity of one’s own exile and alienation, which is only ostensibly voluntary, can 
be seen already with Baudelaire in the middle of the nineteenth century. Even before his 
book Fleurs du mal was published, he had been perfectly aware that he wrote the book 
which from the very beginning had little prospect of becoming an immediate popular 
success. His manner of presentation cannot be called realism. It shows one purposely 
distorted imagination at work. Baudelaire speaks the language which is illogical, 
incomprehensible and contradictory. He introduces one entirely new hero, flâneur, which 
can hardly be perceived as subject. Flâneur is a man without the name and although 
surrounded by bunch of busy people on crowded pavements, he remains invisible and 
lonely. He represents the integral part of the city; he is an object, which along with 
streets, buildings, arcades, and passages, makes something what we call the urban life of 
metropolis. Baudelaire erases what is considered to be the distinct line between subject 
and object, and by that he moves the man out of the comfortable place of the master of 
being and introduces him to one unknown and mysterious world, where the old values, 
hierarchies, and principles do not exist anymore. In this world there are no safe shelters 
and commodities of the home. Encountered with this vast no man’s space, flâneur begins 
his never-ending and meaningless wanderings, and at the same time he starts the 
construction of the ultimate obsession of the twentieth century – the phenomenon of the 
metropolis.  
 
The weakening cause of man as a subject, Walter Benjamin sees it in the disappearance of 
man’s aura, or to put it more precisely, in the dispersion of his aura on the world of 
material objects. “Experience of the aura rests on the transposition of a response common 
in human relationships to the relationship between the inanimate or natural object and 
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man. The person we look at, or who feels he is being looked at, looks at us in return. To 
perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in 
return.”2 This phenomenon becomes the central point of Baudelaire’s poetics. His whole 
work is impregnate with a certain feeling of discomfort, one hidden fear, which like a 
shadow or a specter squirms through his poetry and which can no longer be escaped from.   
 
This feeling is one of the first acknowledgments and testimonies on the weakening of the 
man’s soul and progressive strengthening of the matter. “The greater Baudelaire’s insight 
into this phenomenon, the more unmistakably did the disintegration of aura make itself 
felt in his lyrical poetry. This occurs in the form of symbol which we encounter in the 
Fleurs du mal almost invariably whenever the look of the human eye is invoked. (That 
Baudelaire did not follow some preconceived scheme goes without saying.) What is 
involved here is that the expectation roused by the look of the human eye is not fulfilled. 
Baudelaire describes eyes of which one is inclined to say that they have lost their ability 
to look.” 3 Man gradually equalizes himself with the objects; objects are looking at man in 
the same way as man is looking at objects.  
 
The reasoning subject, which at least from the Renaissance systematically and 
analytically explores and explains the natural world, is severely shaken by this sudden 
turn of the events. His field of perception can no longer offer the integrity; objects seem 
to distort and almost arbitrarily enter and leave the narrative. In that way, they constantly 
deny any kind of established meaning. The literature from the period of the end of the 
ninetieth and the beginning of the twentieth century is one valuable witness of this 
turmoil. Following the path of Baudelaire, many works depict a man full of doubts and 
dilemmas in the face of an unimaginable future; a man who becomes surrounded by the 
objects whose history he can hardly recognize and even have less control over them.  
 
The explicit demonstration of this state of spirit is offered by Sartre in his first novel 
Nausea (La Nausée). The main protagonist – in this case named Antoine Roquentin, but 
who can be any modern man, because this one is by no means different than any other – 
becomes completely obsessed, no matter how absurd it may sound, with the inconsistency 
                                                 
2 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken books, 2007), p. 188 
3 Ibid., p. 189 
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of inanimate objects. He is no longer capable of perceiving the objects around himself in 
the usual way through their function, but rather as autonomous units with their own will 
and with the attributes of subject. These objects exist independently from the role 
assigned to them by man and from the properties by which they are defined. “Objects 
should not touch because they are not alive. You use them, put them back in place, you 
live among them: they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it is unbearable. I am 
afraid of being in contact with them as though they were living beasts.“4 Antoine 
becomes completely possessed by these feelings and experiences them as ‘nausea’. 
“Objects are not made to be touched. It is better to slip between them, avoiding them as 
much as possible. Sometimes you take one of them in your hand and you have to drop it 
quickly. [...] Then after that there were other Nauseas; from time to time objects start 
existing in your hand.“5 To him, nausea is a state caused by the turn of events which 
radically change the previous hierarchy of relationships, and thus dispute and question his 
(man’s) own existence. He can no longer see himself as the main hero even in his own 
life. The objects around him exist in the same way he does; and their right to exist is the 
same as his. “All these objects . . . how can I explain? They inconvenienced me; I would 
have liked them to exist less strongly, more dryly, in a more abstract way, with more 
reserve.“6 At the same time as the objects come to life, the people around him start to lose 
the qualities of subject. They lose their faces and personalities, and become mere matter 
in space, without their own will, intention, or consciousness. “A little while ago, just as I 
was coming into my room, I stopped short because I felt in my hand a cold object which 
held my attention through a sort of personality. I opened my hand, looked: I was simply 
holding the door-knob. This morning in the library, when the Self-Taught Man came to 
say good morning to me, it took me ten seconds to recognize him. I saw an unknown face, 
barely a face. Then there was his hand like a fat white worm in my own hand. I dropped it 
almost immediately and the arm fell back flabbily.“7 The exchange of roles between 
subject and object, announced earlier by Baudelaire, is more than obvious. This becomes 
the source of deep uneasiness and anxiety. The modern man can no longer be happy; he is 
                                                 
4 Paul Sartre, Nausea, (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1964), p. 10 
5 Ibid., p. 122 
6 Ibid., p. 127 
7 Ibid., p. 4 
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doomed to the search for that one place that is really his, which belongs to him, and in 
which he will once again feel the comfort of the humanism, the warmth of home.   
 
One of the greatest modern homeless is certainly James Joyce. The outcast from his own 
country at his own will, alienated and alone, Joyce represents the true paradigm of the 
new man. He puts one challenging and almost impossible task before himself – to find 
one new Ireland, one new Dublin, truly identical to the real one but at the same time 
limited only to metaphysical existence. In his quest, he turns to a myth that can be 
understood as a way of controlling, of ordering, and of giving a shape and significance to 
the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary life. But, Joyce 
does not stop here. The myth has much deeper meaning for him. It is a space preceding 
the very construction of the psyche or the subject itself, the ego, personality and the like – 
the space of pre–individualistic. It is a zero degree of human existence per se, a starting 
point to a new convergence of values, the convergence necessary to put an end to the 
violent disintegration of values. This is the primary mission of modernism – the lyric 
embodiment of the new myth that will no longer be based on old heroes and models, 
which lost their function and relevance in the contemporary society; the myth which will 
give a new meaning and a new role to man. 
 
Joyce’s Ulysses is the book that better than any other depicts the essence of the new 
paradigm brought by modernism. This novel, which can be called ‘the new testament of 
metaphysics’, makes clear parallel with its predecessor, ‘the old testament’, Homer’s 
Odyssey. By following Homer chapter by chapter, Ulysses deconstructs the generally 
accepted ‘world picture’ (or Weltbild in Heidegger’s meaning of the word), liberates it 
from mystification and the burden that man is no longer able to carry, and reduces it to its 
essence which becomes the base for the creation of the new spirit. Joyce’s Dublin 
becomes the whole world. This world is no longer bathed in the light of the warm 
Mediterranean sun, and painted with the colors of azure seas. There is no endlessly far 
and unreachable horizon, which hides never seen landscapes and never experienced 
adventures. Our present, our sprit of the time, are the obscure streets of cold and rainy 
Dublin; one world already well known and small, too small, already seen and ordinary, 
without any magic and supernatural beings, rational and objective. Man is no longer 
Odysseus that sails through wondrous archipelagos, but only Ulysses, average, passive, 
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and lonely, outcast in his own home, full of fears and unfulfilled desires, and which 
wanders through alleys and passages of the urban anti-natural landscapes. These 
landscapes are pure result of human labor. Everything, including seemingly natural grass, 
trees, our own bodies, is finally produced by human beings. The main theme of both 
Homer’s and Joyce’s stories is the search for the lost home. But unlike Homer’s, Joyce’s 
search is no longer a sublime and extraordinary battle of epic proportions which 
inaugurates the ideals and challenges the limits, but the universal quotidian of the epoch, 
the quotidian taken from an average prewar life. 
 
What makes Ulysses so important and one of the cornerstones of modernism lies in what 
happens beyond the narrative itself. Joyce’s form of the novel is absolutely unique and 
yet unseen. Ulysses is a grandiloquent naturalistic recording. The entire plot takes place in 
the course of eighteen hours of one day (June 16th 1905) and makes text of 
approximately 800 pages, which can be read in eighteen hours of uninterrupted reading. 
Therefore, it can be said that the plot itself takes place in the real time. It is the 
denaturalization of naturalism; a complete deconstruction and disruption of subject in 
smallest pieces, which are then exposed in their raw and primordial appearance without 
any prejudice or higher moral instance. Each of eighteen chapters or episodes is written in 
style different from the previous and in different literary technic (narrative, catechism, 
monologue, enthymemic, peristaltic, dialectic, hallucination, etc)8. Juxtaposing various 
technics enables for Joyce to perceive from various perspectives in order to reach one 
objective position. He deprives life of its central and unique viewpoint and replaces it 
with an infinite number of viewpoints. But Joyce does not only use this method as a tool 
in the function of the story. What is more important, he uses it to criticize the essence of 
style as such; he disputes the meaning of style and exceeds its limits. He overcomes style 
as the unique way of expression of individual and presentation of his perception of the 
world. There is no Joycean style. He is one of the first modern artists to recognize that 
style is less a mark of writer’s personality than a reflection of approved linguistic practice 
of a given historic period. Styles, like persons, are interchangeable. This brings in 
question the role of the author himself. His personal touch is less and less visible in the 
piece he creates. Ulysses is the book that very wittily provokes us to give serious 
                                                 
8 Stuard Gilbert’s diagram;  James Joyce, Ulysses, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000) p. xxiii  
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consideration to the possibility that anybody could have written it. Joyce himself often 
indicates such possibility, claiming that if our words are scarcely our own, then neither 
are our plots, which can be borrowed from Homer, who may never have existed. In one of 
his letters he writes, “I am quite content to go down to posterity as a scissors and paste 
man for that seems to me a harsh but not unjust description.”9 This ‘scissors and paste 
man’ metaphor has more than prophetic meaning in the twentieth century.10 
 
Herman Broch believes that with Joyce’s overcoming of styles the new possibilities are 
open and different relations are established, which might lead to one new quality. 
“Viewed technically, Joyce’s stylistic agglomeration is an experiment whereby the 
subject is lighted up first by one and then by another style, in order to exhaust its 
possibilities completely and to obtain from it the highest measure of reality, or rather of 
super-naturalistic reality. Of course this cannot be compared with the musical scherzo 
which develops a theme in diverse stylistic manners, for here – and the concept of style 
generally assumes its proper significance only in such surroundings – the subject has 
grown out of the style, and only through effect and counter-effect of this kind is reality 
created which is the inner reality of the world. For everything significant comes into 
being as a result of reflection and symbols, and the original, genuine things are to be 
found quite as frequently at the end as at the beginning of the row of mirrors. Through 
recognition of these point – in these connection recognition is a technical one – may be 
explained the fact that, in a case of Joyce, all problems of style are eventually brought 
under the domination of language.”11   
 
Here, Broch very clearly notices the supremacy of language over style. This diversion of 
formal relationship may be the key for understanding the essence of Joyce’s novel. 
Ulysses offers Dublin as the allegory of the world; Dublin’s history is the metaphysics of 
mankind, and its final product and the result is the autonomous whole represented by 
Bloom. He is no longer the subject “I”, the initiator and agent of endless processes and 
                                                 
9 James Joyce, in a letter to George Antheil, Januray 3 1931, Letters I, p. 297 
10 It is certanly no coincidence that Walter Benjamin’s greatest ambition was to produce a work consisting 
entirely of quotations.  
11 Hermann Broch, Geits and Zeitgeist: The Spirit in an Unspirituaal Age, (New York: Counterpoint, 2002), 
pp. 74-75 
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changes, but quite definite object called Bloom – ultimately the general “I”, or simply the 
human. Hardly anything more... However, what Joyce does here is much more complex. 
He is not the writer who simply places the object under observation and does nothing but 
describes it. Joyce introduces a new protagonist on the scene, the ultimate narrator – the 
language. In the moment when subject weakens and is being exiled from the center of all 
actions, the language is one who takes his role and, as Broch puts it, “creates a unity of 
representational object and representational means, in the most far reaching sense of the 
word, a unity which sometimes gives the impression that the object has been overpowered 
by language, and language by the object, to the point of utter exhaustion, but which 
nevertheless remains a unity, avoiding all superfluous padding as well as all superfluous 
epithet.”12 
 
The language becomes the absolute; it is raised to the level of the researcher and 
interpreter of the existence. Even the title of the novel announces a diversion: Odysseus, 
the hero that guides us through Homer’s epic, gets his own double, the new guide Ulysses 
– the language itself. The very first word is at the same time changed and the same: the 
manifesto which demands that all unrepeatable must happen again, and shows that all that 
once has existed equally exists today and has never existed at all. This is only the first 
indication of Joyce’s play of reification and dereification which impregnates the whole 
novel. In this play, Mr Leopold Bloom is not the conscious originator of meaning and 
actions, but rather a manipulated object without his own will, and like Homer’s Odysseus 
in the land of the Sirens, he sails tied to the mast of his ship unable to change the course. 
The integrity of the personality is denied to the protagonists of the novel and they are 
inexorably atomized and broken down into their most minimal unites. They become 
‘Miss voice of Kennedy’, ‘Miss gaze of Kennedy’13, fragmented to the infinite number of 
miniature existences which appear and disappear in space. Subject is entirely cast out 
from the narrative. Joyce abolishes the character’s ‘point of view’ and thus makes the 
radical depersonalization which removes the author itself from the novel. In this way, he 
also breaks the connections with the reader. What remains is the materiality of the 
medium itself - the book. The entire novel is filled with voices and thoughts which do not 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 81 
13 James Joyce, Ulysses, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000), p. 337 
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belong to any of the protagonists, but neither to the author. It is as if the book itself 
speaks, thinks, and notes the observations and appearances which do not have any 
importance for the story or for the reader. These notes are sometimes even senseless and 
they make confusion if we try to interpret them or give them any kind of meaning. It is 
the language without the speaker or receiver. The language is self-sufficient, it exists 
without subject – it is that subject. This is well noticed by Frederic Jameson who, in one 
of his analyses of Ulysses, writes: “the ground on which the depersonalized textualization 
of the narrative of Ulysses takes place [is] what one is tempted to call a kind of ‘autistic 
textualization’, the production of sentences in the void, moments in which the book 
begins to elaborate its own text, under its own momentum, with no further need of 
characters, point of view, author or perhaps even reader:” 
 
Mr Bloom reaches Essex bridge. Yes, Mr Bloom crossed bridge of Yessex. To 
Martha I must write. Buy paper. Daly’s. Girl there civil. Bloom. Old Bloom. 
Blue Bloom is on the rye.14 
 
Love loves to love love. Nurse loves the new chemist. Constable  14A loves 
Mary Kelly. Gerty MacDowell loves the boy that has the bicycle. M.B. loves a 
fair gentleman. Li Chi Han lovey up kissy Cha Pu Chow. Jumbo, the elephant, 
loves Alice, the elephant. Old Mr Verschoyle with the ear trumpet loves old Mrs 
Verschoyle with the turnedin eye. […] You love a certain person. And this 
person loves that other person because everybody loves somebody but God 
loves everybody.15 
                        
“The point I want to make about passages like these, and they are everywhere in Ulysses, 
is that ‘point of view’ theory does not take on them, nor any conceivable notion of 
Implied Author, unless the IA is an imbecile or a schizophrenic. No one is speaking these 
words or thinking them: they are simply, one would want to say, printed sentences.”16 
 
                                                 
14 James Joyce, Ulysses, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000), p. 336 
15 Ibid., p. 433 
16 Frederic Jameson, The Modernist Papers, (London: Verso, 2007), p. 148 
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In the same way as the characters of the novel are fragmented into pieces, the whole 
Ulysses is only one fragment, a single-day book, one insignificant usual day in the life of 
a few insignificant people in one provincial town. It is the fragment by no means 
important and with no reason to be remembered – but still one that exists. It exists 
independently of our will (or even in spite of it) and it is a part of the whole which goes 
beyond our perception and reason. We are not in the position to perceive the meaning; it 
is not recognizable, as if it is not even meant for us. The language that speaks up – the 
‘printed text’ as Jameson calls it – abounds with an immense length and burden of 
references which we are simply not able to process. These segments are too vast, or rather 
they contain varieties of sentences, facts, tones, sounds, too numerous to be organized in 
the mind into one single unity. Even on the simplest question, as ‘Did he fall?’, that can 
be answered shortly by yes or no, Joyce replies with the torrent of information and facts 
which make the impression of the artificial exactness and completely disables any kind of 
familiarization or identification with the characters and events: 
 
“Did he fall? 
By his body’s known weight of eleven stone and four pounds  in avoirdupois 
measure, as certified by the graduated machine for periodical selfweighing in the 
premises of Francis Froedman, pharmaceutical chemist of 19 Frederick street, 
north, on the last feast of the Ascension, to wit, the twelfth day of May of the 
bissextile year one thousand nine hundred and four of the christian era (jewish 
era five thousand six hundred and sixtyfour, mohammedan era one thousand 
three hundred and twentytwo), golden number 5, epact 13, solar cycle 9, 
dominical letters C B, Roman indication 2, Julian period 6617, MCMIV.” 17 
 
This kind of text that produces an objective representation based mutely on facts and 
independent of anything human alienates the reader and makes him feel needless and 
unwanted. The information is presented without a hierarchy of values and it is necessary 
to make a huge effort in order to distinguish what can be considered as important. But do 
we have any guarantee that there is something important at all? The fact that the text is 
written does not necessarily mean that it is intended to be read. In this sense, it disputes 
its predetermined function. And while the Sartre’s hero, who struggles with the 
                                                 
17 James Joyce, Ulysses, (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2000), pp. 779-780 
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unbearable nausea caused by the inconsistency of inanimate objects, is always within the 
framework of narrative, for Joyce that framework does not exist. His work is not based on 
the representation of being but, in a way, it is the being itself. The object that is in front of 
us – the book, the language – has the last word, not the author. That object sometimes 
observes us, but sometimes it has better things to do and observes something else.  At the 
same time, it refuses to be put in the position of being observed. In that way, it deprives 
us of the right to be the observer, thus, the subject. We are all, willingly or not, doomed to 
the coexistence with the objects that are beyond our perception of reality and that exist 
independently of our will. They can refer to us, but also to ignore us. Their existence is no 
longer necessarily related to ours. The brute facticity of the world suddenly becomes 
alive. What Joyce is presenting here is ‘a true presence’. The presence that does not 
always implies man. This is an act of a radical and painful decentering of subject, or 
consciousness in general, beyond the humanist horizon. Ulysses causes a deep uneasiness 
in the reader. It brings us into the position of discomfort. Precisely this is the ultimate 
outcome and the true essence of the work, for which Joyce, not without the bitterness, 
claims: “If Ulysses is not fit to read, life is not fit to live.”18 It is the paradigm of 
modernism par excellence.  
 
It is of the great importance that this newly established dialectic, which entirely differs 
from the Cartesian model, is inaugurated through art. The poetry, and here I mean art in 
general, is the best mean for man to define his inner world and to position himself in the 
outer world in which he lives. Hermann Broch finds this a substantial issue and 
emphasizing the importance of Homer, as one safe ground on which we have to return 
and rely on: “If the current epoch has no longer a value center firmly anchored on a 
theologically based philosophy and ethic, and which could raise language to the level of 
reliable, binding communication, then language itself must become the mystic value 
center. […] At the center of every culture is its theology. But at its beginning is its poetry; 
thus Homer stood at the cradle of Greek civilization, creator of its language, builder of its 
                                                 
18 Joyce to Kathleen Murray, on hearing of her mother’s estimate of the novel; interview with Kathleen 
Murray; quoted in Patricia Hutchins, James Joyce’s World, p.139; cited in Ellmann, James Joyce, 1959; 
1965 Edn., p.551. 
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myths, poet and philosopher. And in its hand he held the seed of the future.”19 For Broch, 
the myth is the final knowledge of the human soul embodied in a lyric expression. The 
return to the myth – as the primal poetic form which contains all human knowledge about 
man and nature – enables the creation of the frames for one new metaphysical order 
which truly reveals the ultimate human existence.  
 
Even more powerful and destructive earthquake than the one in literature occurred in 
painting. Here, the collapse of one episteme, of one cognizance of the world, and radical 
shift to the new is most brutally and vividly expressed. The painting is the oldest known 
mean of representation. If we want to find the first signs of the expression of the human 
spirit; the remembering of his experiences; and the first ordering of the metaphysical 
ideas into a kind of epistemology, we would have to go back much further than Homer, 
up to the Upper Paleolithic (around 35 000 BC), and enter into the Chauvet Cave to look 
at the magnificent drawings on the cave-walls. These drawings are the first known poetry. 
This is the beginning of the communication that is beyond the limits of time, which is 
both the witness and the active agent in the forming of the consciousness. Since that time, 
the image is talking to us, it is telling a story. The whole world of man is told in stories; in 
colors and shades, as a means for understanding and creating of the reality in which he 
lives. Through the time, the image becomes the absolute master of narrative. Even 
literature learns from the painting how to describe, how to narrate.  
 
This craft of storytelling trough visual representation, in which the featured stories are 
directed to the eye of the observer, reaches its highest peak in the Renaissance. In this 
period the painting becomes the body of knowledge, the all-knowing container of 
doctrines that mirrors the reality and produces the representation of something that we 
might call the truth.  In order to illustrate this narrative character of painting – thorough 
which is manifested the position of man at the time – we can use as an example one 
interesting literary description, written by José Saramago, of the famous woodcut by 
Albrecht Dürer (fig.1.1). This woodcut depicts probably the most common theme not 
only in the Renaissance but in the whole history of painting – the scene of the crucifixion 
                                                 
19 Hermann Broch, Geits and Zeitgeist: The Spirit in an Unspirituaal Age, (New York: Counterpoint, 2002), 
pp.. 57-58 
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of Jesus Christ. Saramago ingeniously perceives the narrative quality of this Dürer’s 
work, and treats it exactly as a story which can easily be read if we only carefully observe 
the woodcut.  
                          
"The sun appears in one of the upper corners of the rectangle, on the left of 
anyone looking at the picture. Representing the sun is a man's head that sends 
out rays of brilliant light and sinuous flames, like a wavering compass in search 
of the right direction, and his head has a tearful face, contorted by spasms of 
pain that refuse to abate. The gaping mouth sends up a cry we shall never 
hear...beneath the sun we see a naked man tied to a tree trunk with a cloth 
around his loins to cover those parts we call private, and his feet are resting on a 
piece of wood set crosswise, to give him support to prevent his feet from 
slipping, they are held by two nails driven deep into the wood. Judging from the 
anguished expression on the man's face and from his eyes, which are raised to 
heaven, this must be the Good Thief. His ringlets are another reassuring sign, for 
it is well known that this is how angels and archangels wear their hair, and so it 
would appear that the repentant criminal is already ascending to the world of 
heavenly beings. Impossible to say whether the trunk is still a tree that has been 
arbitrarily turned into an instrument of torture while continuing to draw 
nourishment from the soil through the roots, insomuch as the lower part of the 
picture is covered by a man with a long beard. Richly attired in loose, flowing 
robes, he is looking upward but not toward heaven. This solemn posture and sad 
countenance must belong to Joseph of Arimathaea, because the only other 
person who comes to mind, Simon of Cyrene, after being forced to help the 
condemned man carry his cross, as was the practice when these executions took 
place, went about his own affairs, thinking more of a business transaction that 
called for an urgent decision than of the sufferings of a miserable wretch about 
to be crucified. Joseph of Arimathaea is that affluent and good-hearted man who 
donated a grave for the burial of the greatest criminal of all, but this act of 
generosity will be to no avail when the time comes to consider his beatification, 
let alone canonization. All he has on his head is the turban he always wears 
outdoors, unlike the woman in the foreground of the picture, whose hair hangs 
all the way down her back as she leans forward, enhanced by the supreme glory 
of a halo, in her case one edged with the finest embroidery. The kneeling woman 
must be Mary, because, as we know, all the women gathered here have that 
name, with one exception, she who is also called Magdalene. Anyone viewing  
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  1.1 Albrecht Dürer, Crucifixion, c. 1495, (The British Museum, London) 
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this picture who knows the facts of life will swear immediately that this is the 
woman called Magdalene, for only someone with her disreputable past would 
have dared appear at such a solemn occasion wearing a low-cut dress with a 
close-fitting bodice to emphasize her ample bosom, which inevitably draws the 
lewd stares of passing men and puts their souls at grave risk of being dragged to 
perdition. Yet the expression on her face is one of contrition, and her wilting 
body conveys nothing other than her sorrowing soul, which we cannot ignore, 
even if it is hidden by tempting flesh, for this woman could be completely 
naked, had the artist so chosen to portray her, and still she would deserve our 
respect and veneration. Mary Magdalene, if that is her name, is holding to her 
lips the hand of another woman, who has collapsed to the ground as if bereft of 
strength or mortally wounded. Her name is also Mary, second in order of 
appearance but undoubtedly the most important Mary of all, if the central 
position she occupies in the lower part of the picture has any significance. Apart 
from her grieving expression and limp hands, nothing can be seen of her body, 
covered as it is by the copious folds of her mantle and by a tunic tied at the waist 
with a coarsely woven cord. She is older than the other Mary, which is reason 
enough, although not the only reason, why her halo should be more elaborate, at 
least that is what one would conclude in the absence of more precise information 
about the privileges of rank and seniority observed at that time. Considering, 
however, the enormous influence of this iconography, only an inhabitant of 
another planet, where no such drama has ever been enacted, could fail to know 
that this anguished woman is the widow of a carpenter named Joseph and the 
mother of numerous sons and daughters, although only one of her children was 
decreed by fate, or whoever governs fate, to achieve a little renown during his 
life and a great deal more after his death. Reclining on her left side, Mary, the 
mother of Jesus, rests her forearm on the hip of another woman, also kneeling 
and also named Mary, who might well be the real Mary Magdalene although we 
can neither see nor imagine the neckline of her tunic. Like the first woman in 
this trinity, she lets her long tresses hang loose down her back, but to all 
appearances they are fair, unless it is only by chance that the pen strokes are 
more delicate here, leaving empty spaces between the locks and thus allowing 
the engraver to lighten the tone. We are not trying to prove that Mary Magdalene 
was in fact blond, but simply point to the popular belief that women with blond 
hair, whether it be natural or dyed, are the most effective instruments of sin. 
Mary Magdalene, who, as everyone knows, was as wicked a woman as ever 
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lived, must have been blond if we accept the opinion held, for better or worse, 
by half of mankind. It is not, however, because this third Mary has skin and hair 
fairer than the first that we suggest, despite the damning evidence of the first's 
exposed bosom, that the third is the Magdalene. What confirms her identity is 
that this third Mary, as she distractedly supports the limp arm of the mother of 
Jesus, is looking upward, and her enraptured gaze ascends with such power that 
it appears to elevate her entire being, it is a light that outshines the halo already 
encircling her head, a light that overpowers every thought and emotion. Only a 
woman who has loved as much as we believe Mary Magdalene loved could 
possibly have such an expression, it is she and no other, and thus we rule out the 
woman standing beside her. This is the fourth Mary, … “ 20 
 
Saramago is not telling us anything new, he is not saying anything more than it is already 
presented on the painting. In this sense, he remains entirely in coherence with Dürer. The 
whole painting is one story with many characters, each of them with its own biography, 
with its motives and interests. And in the same way as their faces and figures delineated 
on the woodcut are the parts that form one visual composition, everyone of them 
illuminates and adds some segments of the story, and makes of it one coherent narrative. 
Each piece and each detail of the woodcut is in the function of this story. They are all 
organized hierarchically around one privileged central nucleus, one luminous hero, so that 
it would be no doubt who is the bearer and the main protagonist of the story. The entire 
scene is subordinated to his dominance, and through this dominance the unity of the 
whole visual field is established. 
 
The only person of greater importance than the hero of this story is the one standing 
against that woodcut and to whom this story is actually dedicated. The ultimate 
destination and purpose of this whole scene is the viewer. He is the true hero and the 
higher law. There is irresistible feeling that everything shown on this woodcut actually 
happened only in order to be told. It cannot even be imagined that one of presented 
characters is hidden, and thus unclear, or partly out of the frame. This would undoubtedly 
be the mistake of the narrator. It is even less possible that someone who does not belong 
to this event suddenly appears, someone who is not one of the protagonists, has no role in 
                                                 
20 Jose Saramago, The Gospel According to Jesus Christ, (Orlando: Harcourt Books, 1994), pp. 1-4 
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it, and happens to be there by accident. Not even the main figure, Jesus Christ, is free. He 
cannot be anywhere, cannot be displayed in the profile view, or slightly obstructed by 
someone – even he has to obediently play the assigned role, and all that only in order to 
make the viewer enjoy the full comfort. 
 
During several centuries of humanism, painting passes through the phases, and has the 
parallel or even identical route as philosophy. 21 In this sense, it could be said that it 
evaluates. At the end of the thirteenth century, Giotto puts the whole world in the 
perspective, and in that way inaugurates one of the main postulates of humanism: clearly 
determined ‘point of view’. Quattrocento brings painting of the bulk. The scenes are full 
of bodies and objects depicted in the same plane and with the same level of details, while 
the perspective is the only instrument that establishes the visual hierarchy. The 
Renaissance introduces the composition as the new element for creating the geometrical 
idea of unity. And then chiaroscuro comes into scene. The objects lose their primacy and 
become subordinated to one higher force that unites them: the magic of the light. The new 
hierarchy is established, based on the play of light and shadow. The dominance of the 
light over the objects is even more enhanced with the appearance of Velázquez. He 
creates one single line of vision which follows the ray of light and around which he 
revolves the forms and objects. That line of vision does not necessarily point at 
something, nor has a clearly defined direction. The bulk becomes flattened and does not 
fix the light, but by letting it floating, it forms the most immediate object: hallow space. 
After the objects lose their volume and become surfaces, painting itself tends to become 
planimetric. The figures become less and less recognizable and the painters, instead of 
painting what they see, paint more and more their experience of seeing. What is important 
is the impression; the subjective experience of the world and not its universal reality.  
 
From this we can see that from the time of Giotto to the end of the nineteenth century the 
role of the subject is continuously getting stronger. Over the time, the painting more and 
more subordinates to man. It starts with the objects from the external world and slowly 
approaches to man’s inner world, to his feelings and impressions. The painting goes 
                                                 
21 Jose Ortega y Gasset analyses the parallel between the philosophy and painting. In his essay On Point of 
View in the Arts, from 1949, he speaks about relations Dante – Giotto, Descartes – Velasquez. 
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through many transformations during this centuries-long journey.  But even though these 
transformations are very radical in the sense of form, coloring, themes, and even the role 
of the main hero obviously changes – first that hero is bulk, volume and body, than it is 
symmetry and composition, then light and shadow, then hallow space, and finally the 
personal impressions and sensations – what undoubtedly unifies all this phases is their 
unique relation to the viewer. No matter who is the hero on the painting, he is always in 
the function of the narrative and exists only in the frames of that narrative. All these 
depicted worlds, with all their wealth, always reduce to one single point – the point of 
view. Exactly this is the true essence of humanism. The painting is here only for us; it 
teaches us, it entertains and comforts us, it takes us on adventures, it shows us unseen 
places, it speaks instead of us what we would not dare to say, it hides and keeps our most 
intimate secrets, it records for us and remembers. The observer is the one who enjoys all 
the comfort of this world and his pedestal can never be called into question. The painting 
is here only the medium of narration. 
 
And then comes the shift, we will not exaggerate if we say, of epistemological 
proportions. Paul Cézanne is the first one that disputes the supremacy of the unique 
viewpoint. He introduces one more point which slightly moves the eye of the viewer and 
overlaps the two views at the same time. This results with two slightly different 
simultaneous visual perceptions – one nose-close and other few meters away – which can 
never fold together in one unified hierarchical visual experience.22 With these shifted 
viewpoints, Cezanne allows the truth of two different views at the same time. The 
dominance of the single viewer is destroyed; the central subject is finally decentered. 
 
Going beyond Cezanne, Picasso approaches his subject from many more imagined 
angles, combining various viewpoints until the final image is scarcely recognizable.23 For 
him, the truth exists only as the total sum of perceptions; the sum of views, of which each 
separately is insufficient and false. In this sense we can also understand his thesis that art 
is the lie which enables us to realize the truth. In his most characteristic paintings, he 
                                                 
22 Also known as Cezanne’s binocular vision. 
23 It is important to notice that at same time Albert Einstein, with his Special Theory of Relativity from 
1905, destroys the long-held belief that basic quantities of measurement were absolute and unvarying. He 
demonstrates that they depend on the relative position of the viewer.  
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breaks the closed form of an object and exhibits its fragments – nose, ear, mustache, etc. – 
in the Euclidean planes. As we have already seen in the examples of Joyce (Miss gaze of 
Kennedy, Miss voice of Kennedy), the fragments exist entirely independently from the 
whole and from the contexts of which they should be a part of.24 Here, man cannot be 
understood as a whole – he becomes the sum of the fragments; the sum of his actions for 
which he bears the moral responsibility. And at the end, these actions make him, or do not 
make him, a man.  From this we can see that the humanistic perception of man as one 
universal value is radically disturbed. Man cannot hide himself behind his name or status. 
His each step is subjected to suspicion and his final outcome is highly uncertain. Man can 
no longer be entrusted with the great duty of carrying the center of the world in his eye.  
 
Desertion of the clearly defined image about the final recipient; desertion of this higher 
instance – the one that everything is addressed to and that represents the main purpose of 
the work itself – is more than obvious in Picasso’s painting. In the same way as Joyce’s 
sentences do not consider a possible reader but articulate the narrative of the adventures 
of Syntax, Picasso’s characters are not anthropomorphic figures, but rather catalogs of 
nouns; fragments with narrative coherence that cannot, unlike more representational 
Renaissance paintings, be conveyed in the everyday language. It is almost impossible to 
imagine how Saramago’s description of Picasso’s Crucifixion (fig.1.2) as an introduction 
to the story of Jesus Christ would look like. It would be absurd to conceive one logical 
narrative from this painting, mostly because it belongs to one different metaphysical 
reality, the reality which disputes the very essence of the narrative. Although both Dürer 
and Picasso refer to the same historic event, and both respect some general knowledge 
about that event, and even both use the same medium (flat wooden surface, with similar 
dimensions), their languages are incompatible. These are the languages of two different 
paradigms. Picasso does not contradict Dürer at any moment. He neither disputes that this 
event really happened, nor he claims that it happened differently, as did so many authors 
in the past, always bringing some new understandings and new interpretations.  What he 
says, however, is that this event happened entirely independently from us and regardless 
of whether we will remember it or understand it. The main difference between these two 
                                                 
24 Questioned on her attitude toward modern art, Gertrude Stein once remarked, “I like to look at it. That is, 
I like to look at the picture part of it; the other parts interest me much less.”  
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approaches is that Picasso actually does not address us, the viewers. He is not telling any 
story, and therefore not even Saramago can follow up with his story, as he does with 
Dürer. 
      
 
         1.2 Pablo Picasso, Crucifixion, 1932 
 
And while Picasso at least retains the formal analogy with the paintings from the period 
of humanism and thus maintains the illusion of some form of narrative, there are 
tendencies emerging on the scene which even more radically alienate painting from its 
original aim of representing the object, and inaugurate the absolute abstraction. Hermann 
Broch interprets this rejection of materiality as the main essence of the time, a true 
zeitgeist: “now whether Expressionism was searching for purely emotional motives, that 
is, objectless emotions in the subject, in order to raise them to the position of what was in 
fact the original object of painting; whether Futurism strove to seize the object 
cinematographically in purely functional movement as representing dissolution of the 
spatial world; or whether Cubism simply initiated the search for the abstract object which 
he hoped to discover in a fixed set of laws governing the painter’s craft and the formation 
of space – it was in each case a matter of replacing the accidental, empirical object by one 
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whose deepest roots would reach into the logical as well as into the Platonic idea, all of 
which was consequence of the action of the Zeitgeist.”25  
 
Kazimir Malevich is certainly one of the most determined and relentless destroyer of all 
bounds with humanism. He puts himself before the task of creating one entirely new 
spirituality, which does not only reject the representational but also leads to the state of 
the complete absence of the object. In one of his very provocative essays, he writes: “I 
transformed myself in the zero of form and emerged from nothing to creation, that is, to 
Suprematism, to the new realism in painting – to non-objective creation.”26 What is here 
crucially important is that this ‘zero of form’ does not only refer to some previous period 
of the culture or civilization, but to the nature as such. ‘The non-objective’ form and ‘pure 
plastic painting’, introduced later by Mondrian, has the intention of having absolutely no 
resemblance to the world of nature, and thus, to the materialistic spirit of the previous 
periods. The duty of the artist is to create always and only the new. According to 
Malevich, Dürer is nothing but the clerk that makes the inventory of nature’s property; 
some fancier of zoological, botanical and archaeological collections.27 And any carved-
out pentagon or hexagon is a greater work of sculpture than Venus de Milo or David.28 
Unlike the impeccable portraits of Renaissance, playful scenes of Baroque, or sentimental 
landscapes of Impressionism, man cannot find anything familiar in Malevich paintings, 
nothing already seen, nothing what he could perceive as his own, or what he could 
identify with his own experience and memory. These paintings are the fragments of the 
world that is not his. Man is suddenly captivated in that world and wanders lost and 
confused, hopelessly searching for something that he can recognize as a home. In that 
world, forms are deprived of all meaning and content, they are not representing anything. 
But, most importantly, they possess life and right to individual existence. Each form is 
free and, in a way, the world for itself. Before these paintings, man feels as Sartre’s hero 
                                                 
25 Hermann Broch, Geits and Zeitgeist: The Spirit in an Unspirituaal Age, (New York: Counterpoint, 2002), 
pp. 83-84 
26 Kazimir Malevich, Ot kubiazma I futurizma k suprematizmu. Novyj zivotopisnyj realizam, Moskva, 1915, 
quoted from Dokumenti za razumevanje ruske avangarde, (Beograd, Geopoetika, 2003), p. 96; my 
translation 
27 Ibid., p. 102 
28 Ibid., p. 101 
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who no longer can rely on his own perception of reality and who is forced, by the 
inconsistency of inanimate objects, to even doubt and question its own existence.  
 
The black square on the white background29 creates a desert; the desert that waits for its 
obelisks and which is the new home of the metaphysics of one age that is coming. Only 
there it is possible – as Dada teaches us – to destroy the deceptions of man made by 
reason and to recover the natural and unreasonable order. Only there man can reach that 
zero-ground where he finally confronts with its delusions and where he starts to adjust 
himself to the world that surrounds him. In this Malevich’s desert, to paraphrase 
Spengler, the last Rembrandt self-portrait will cease to exist even though the painted 
canvas will remain untouched: there will be no eye which understands such formal 
language.30 The new age demands a new seeing. The protagonists and characters of the 
new creations are colors, and as you move through the museum and look at one painting 
after another, the main heroes prove to be the blue, green, yellow… There is no human 
face or figure on these paintings. The human body is no longer the measuring unite: 
transcendental signifier, sign before all other signs, object above all other objects, by 
which everything is measured and understood. Man is reduced from ‘the measure of all 
things’ only to ‘the measure of all tailors’. 31 
 
There is one less known but extremely important drawing by Mark Rothko – which I 
would dare to call his personal manifesto32 – that very expressively renders this radically 
different perception of man. It is the new interpretation, or the update, of the famous 
canon of proportions, Leonardo’s homo vitruvianus (fig. 1.3, 1.4). According to Rothko, 
the stress on the rationality, measurement, and proportion – set within the theoretical 
foundations established by Leonardo – highly jeopardized the very authenticity of the late 
Middle Ages creations, which are mostly laden by the myth. This drawing, from Rothko’s 
Composition Book, is one very direct confrontation with Leonardo’s homo vitruvianus 
                                                 
29 In 1915, Malevic created the series of first non-objective paintings, of which Black Square is one. 
30 Paraphrased from Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West; 1918; also quoted by El Lissicky at the 
beginning of Proun, 1921 
31 The pharaphrase of Jean Arp words, pronaunced at the first public presentation of Dada, in Zurich, 1916. 
32 The same year when this drawing is made (1949) Rothko begins to paint his famous floating rectangles 
paintings. 
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that becomes an act of almost physical destruction. In Rothko's drawing, the organization 
of the human body according to the normative use of proportion becomes unrecognizable. 
Leonardo’s figure is replaced by the planes. The form and proportion is replaced by the 
distortion of the figurative with almost furious hatching. For Rothko, the perfection that 
Leonardo accomplishes on his drawing are only the lines of the cage of man’s rationality 
in which lies his imprisoned imagination. This cage has to be broken, even by force. The 
juxtaposing of these two drawings very explicitly demonstrates the triumph of the 
abstraction over the human matter by – to use Ortega y Gasset’s metaphor – “presenting 
the strangled victim.”33 We could say that Rothko, in the spirit of the Dadaists, replaces 
the limitations of human rationality with some higher irrationality.   
 
 
1.3 Leonardo da Vinci, homo vitruvianus,        1.4 Mark Rothko, drawing after Leonardo’s  
      c. 1490                                                              homo vitruvianus, 1949 
 
The ‘Vitruvian man’ is no longer in the center of the perfect circle. The ideal proportion, 
symmetry, and harmony are no longer the contours of his home. He enters into the world 
which is not measured by his image and where he has no power to control his own 
                                                 
33 Jose Ortega y Gasset, The Dehumanisation of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture and Literature, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 23 
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destiny. The conscious awareness of himself in space and time ceases to exist; all borders 
of the real are broken, the unconscious is open, nothing is firmed and fixed, and anything 
is possible. Ratio – that ultimate guardian of comfort – has lost all authority, and man is 
forced into one permanent struggle in which he must repeatedly determine the borders 
between the animate and inanimate, the real and unreal. And most importantly, once more 
he has to face the most difficult task of all: he must define the meaning of its own 
existence.  
 
There is one letter by Joan Miró that offers a perfect illustration of this disturbed state of 
mind, especially noticeable among artists. It is written as a monologue and addressed to 
painter’s friend, Yvon Taillandier. “For me, an object is alive. This cigarette, this box of 
matches – they contain a secret life more intense than that of many human beings. When I 
see a tree, I get a shock, as though it were something that breathes, that talks. A tree is 
also something human. […] This bottle, this glass, a big stone on a deserted beach – these 
are immobile things, but they unleash tremendous movements in my mind. I do not feel 
that when I see a human being moving around like an idiot. People who go swimming at 
the beach and who move round touch me much less than the immobility of a pebble. 
(Immobile things become enormous, much more enormous than things that move.) 
Immobility makes me think of vast spaces that contain movements that do not stop, 
movements that have no end. As Kant said, it is a sudden irruption of the infinite into the 
finite. A pebble, which is a finite and immobile object, suggests to me not only 
movement, but movement that has no end. In my paintings, this translates into the 
sparklike forms that leap out of the frame, as though from a volcano.”34 In another place 
in the same letter, Miró indentifies the feeling of discomfort as the main driving force of 
his work: “It’s a struggle between myself and what I am doing, between myself and 
canvas, between myself and my discomfort. This struggle excites and inspires me. I work 
until the discomfort goes away.”35  
 
                                                 
34 Joan Miró, Selected Writings and Interviews, edited by Margit Rowell, (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 
1992), p. 248 
35 Ibid., p. 249 
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One of the reasons why painting immerges into the abstraction so expansively and 
thoroughly is also the appearance of one new medium, first known as daguerreotype and 
later: photography. If the old endeavors of painting to reproduce the nature realistically as 
much as possible were not rejected and abandoned, the photography would be the 
ultimate mean of art which enables to everyone, without any effort, crafts, and 
knowledge, to reach the mastery of Dürer and Leonardo. However, this new medium 
waits for a long time until it gets into hands of the true masters that can really test its 
potential and use it as the instrument for embodiment of the spirit of the time. Only with 
the appearance of the Dada movement, photography evolves into an art form with the 
clear aesthetic expression independent from the painting, and becomes one of the main 
weapons in reexamining and reevaluation of all values in the contemporary society.  
 
In order to strongly influence man’s consciousness, Dadaists go further than the simple 
provocation of the viewer. They want to reach him in the most direct and explicit way, 
they want to insult him, humiliate, and infuriate. In one of his essays, Walter Benjamin 
writes, “From an alluring appearance or persuasive structure of sound the work of art of 
the Dadaists became an instrument of ballistics. It hit the spectator like a bullet, it 
happened to him, thus acquiring a tactile quality.”36 Photography finds the way to speak 
that precise language. If we look Man Ray’s Marquise Casati (fig. 1.5) we certainly 
cannot get impression that it treats the viewer in the manner of humanism – as one 
privileged hero whom it has to please and obey – but at the same time it is not indifferent 
to him and it does not ignores him. On the contrary, it is in a direct conflict with the 
viewer; we could even say, in a certain war. It seems as if the portrait refuses to be 
observed, as if it has some centrifugal force which does not allow the gaze to remain on 
it. It is impossible not to notice the strong doze of aggression toward the viewer. Looking 
at this photography, the feeling of discomfort is so intense that it almost causes the 
physical pain. At the same time, it possesses an irresistible hypnotic attraction which does 
not let us to simply turn around, leave, and forget all about it. The face of the young 
marquise, like Odysseus' Sirens in the bay, allures our gaze again and again, only to reject 
it in the very next moment.  
                                                 
36 Walter Benjamin, ’The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Illuminations (New York: 
Schocken books, 2007), p. 238 
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            1.5 Man Ray, Marquise Casati, 1922 
 
Man Ray’s films also communicate with the audience in the similar way. His L’étoile de 
mer, from 1928, is almost entirely shot through diffused and textured glass and the frames 
are distorted and randomly out of focus. In this way it is made perfectly clear to the 
viewer that he is not some privileged higher instance which is here to judge or to enjoy. 
On the other hand, we cannot say that this viewer is totally rejected and ignored.  
Occasionally sharp images and fragments, which remotely indicate some story, are there 
only to repeatedly remind the viewer that he is needless; that he is there only by accident, 
trapped in someone else’s dream, and that he is witnessing something that should be none 
of his business at all. There is no coherent narrative, only bunch of situations 
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accompanied by the text in which the protagonists are also treated as objects without the 
higher agenda or meaning.  
 
The appearance of the film made the possibility to see the reality with one different eye – 
with the eye that is not human and that is able to deconstruct this reality into the smallest 
pieces. According to Benjamin, this new circumstance leads to the true explosion of our 
perception, after which our quotidian cannot remain the same: “Our taverns and our 
metropolitan streets, our offices and our furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our 
factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this 
prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst 
of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling.”37 These 
ruins, where now we ‘calmly and adventurously’ travel, are the remains of the old 
metaphysics.  In order to perceive them entirely, our human eye is not enough. We need 
someone else to look instead of us, some new arbiter of the truth.  
 
Dziga Vertov, the unforgettable Russian film director, sees in the film camera one live 
human eye. For him, the camera (hence the machine) is not only alive like man, but it has 
certain advantages over him. It is obvious that the nature reveals itself to the camera in 
one different way than to the human eye. The eye of the camera, Kino-glaz, is not limited 
by man’s subjective perception; it observes all objects with no ambition to understand or 
explain them. The kino-glaz does not see the difference between the animate and 
inanimate, between the important and unimportant, and does not perceive the time as 
something irreversible and irretrievable which necessarily has to move from the past to 
the future. Film is the mechanism of the ultimate equalization of subject and object – it 
treats them both in the same way with no distinction. The camera does not recognize any 
moral category that man pretends to have. It is the ultimate mean of dehumanization.   
 
Vertov presents film Man with a Movie Camera – the film without the screenplay, film 
set, actors, and even without the intertitles that would give any kind of clarification of the 
film – as an experiment for creating one absolute language. And from the beginning it is 
                                                 
37 Walter Benjamin, ’The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, Illuminations (New York: 
Schocken books, 2007), p. 236 
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quite clear that everything is subordinated to this language. In the first scenes, the film 
itself shows its own opening: the audience enters into the movie theater, takes its seats, 
the reels are being set into the movie projector, and the lights fade. Even this indication of 
the narrative disappears with the first image on the screen. From that moment on, there is 
no trace of any narrative. We are invaded by the images in which people and objects are 
nothing more than the recorded light; the appearances without their own will. They are 
changing on the screen with no logic or sense and their motion and stillness contributes to 
the dynamic and rhythm of the film. However, the film is not just a document, but it has 
its own immanent agenda and it subordinates everything to this agenda, and thus shapes 
the reality. Space and time are fractured in the way that was previously unthinkable to the 
human eye. 
 
As is the case with Joyce’s novels, the author is not the subject, the main observer or 
interpreter. On the contrary, he is only one of the objects of observation. The film 
constantly follows its own cameraman. In many moments we see him with the camera 
how he shoots the scene which was already shown a few seconds ago. The author himself 
is locked within the discourse and does not have control over his own work. The public is 
also within this discourse, and we occasionally see them in the movie theater how they 
react to the same scenes that we are watching as well. The film, therefore, is not 
necessarily dependent on neither the author, nor the viewers. It is more likely that they are 
those who are subordinated to the language of film. They are only one of many elements, 
and the film can do quite well even without them. Here we could remember the innocent 
‘Ulysses’ gaze’ captured on mythical undeveloped reels of the very first film shot by the 
Manaki brothers; the gaze which is neither generated nor experienced by the subject. 38 
Such gaze, untouched by man, notes the fragments of space and time that can be 
perceived as the post-humanist condition. Vertov’s ‘remembered light’ on the celluloid 
tape is equivalent with those Joyce’s sentences which are nothing but the printed text 
                                                 
38 According to the story, at the dawn of the age of cinema, Manaki brothers tirelessly crisscrossed the 
Balkans and shot a few reels of the film, which unfortunately are never developed. This film is lost, but the 
belief remains that these reels capture ‘the innocent gaze’ that no one has ever seen, not even the authors 
themselves. The search for this mythical ‘innocent gaze’ is depicted by Theodoros Angelopoulos in his film 
Ulysses’ Gaze. 
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deprived of all meaning and logic. The film is perfectly self-sufficient, and it exists 
entirely independent from man.   
 
Man with a Movie Camera observes its author, its viewers, and it even observes the 
process of its own creation. The film simultaneously displays the montage of the very 
scenes and images that we are watching, and in that way it constantly reminds us that all 
this life revealing in front of us is only a celluloid tape, and there is nothing that exists out 
of this tape. The metaphysical framework that unifies all these images and makes one 
whole is the language of the film – the language is the observer, judge, and the only 
reality. We could easily relate this to Heidegger’s motif of the language as the house of 
being: “language is not man’s creation and instrument, it is man who ‘dwells’ in 
language.”39 And if we take one further step, we might say that language does not 
necessarily have to be inhabited by the subject. Although, it ostensibly appears as a 
paradox, the absence of the subject still does not mean that metaphysical framework does 
not exist.  
 
Vertov, in the same manner as many other avant-garde artists40, offers a possible 
experience of the reality without the reasoning subject – a world picture in which man 
will no longer be the ultimate originator of meaning. This post-humanist condition 
introduces a new mental image of the environment that radically differs from the existing. 
Man is decentered from his position of the master of being, and now he is challenged to 
face the world of objects that are deprived of all sense and meaning. The high authority of 
Cartesian dualism is more than disputed and man is no longer protected by his logic and 
ratio. There is no more any certain truth that he can follow, nor the home where he can 
return to. Man’s only relation to this world, the only firm ground on which he can stand, 
is implacable feeling of discomfort – and this is the true generator and vehicle of the new 
paradigm; the new episteme that we are referring to as modernism.  
 
                                                 
39 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject, (London: Verso, 2008), p. xiv.  Žižek here points to Lacan’s 
interpretation of Heidegger’s motif, where Lacan concludes that “psychoanalysis should be the science of 
language inhabited by the subject.” 
40 We could also mention the music of Debussy and Satie (who dehumanized music by depriving it of the 
private sentiments and impressions) and the beginnings of atonal music or experimental electronic music. 
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1.3.  Object In Mirror Is Further Than It Appears 
 
 
„The work of art points man in the direction of new paths and thinks to the future. 
The house thinks of the present. Man loves everything that serves his comfort. He 
hates everything that wants to tear him away from his secure and safe position, and 
is burdensome. And so he loves the house and hates art.“ 1   – Adolf Loos 
 
 
The previous chapter denotes the platform which can be considered as mutual for all arts 
from the beginning of the twentieth century. Although they are formally and aesthetically 
very diverse, all avant-garde movements of this turbulent period, due to its new 
perception of subject/object relation, unambiguously find their place on that platform and 
altogether form one coherent agenda. This agenda might be defined as the spirit of the 
time, or ‘zeitgeist.’ Man is exiled from the center of the world and he reacts instinctively 
in self-defense, and uses art as an instrument by which he constructs his new position and 
forms the coordinates of the spiritual life which would be in accordance with the new 
reality. The necessity and urgency of such transformation is more than obvious in 
intensified manifestation of creativity at the time. Numerous groups, movements, 
programs, manifestos, declarations and one true eruption of imagination are the best 
                                                 
1 Adolf Loos, “Architecture”, from Roberto Schezen, Adolf Loos: Architecture 1903-19032, (New York: 
Monacelli Press, 2009), p. 15 
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evidence of the acute need for the construction of any form of meaning out of the sudden 
chaos to which man is exposed. Mutual denominator of this agenda, as it is already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, is the discomfort, caused by disruption of 
antropocentrism, displacement of subject, and loss of metaphysical shelter provided by 
the centuries of humanism. 
 
However, one thing is to make a painting that causes uneasiness, animosity and repulsion, 
or to write a book that speaks in some unknown and unintelligible language, or to make a 
film that ignores the audience and it is concerned only with its own existence. If man does 
not want to see or hear that, or if it is too much for his taste, he can simply throw the book 
away, leave the gallery or the movie theatre. He is perfectly free in any moment to turn 
back and go home. But what if his own house is also uncomfortable, hostile, and causes 
repulsion? What if this house ignores its own host, and it is not concerned with his 
comfort, and it does not satisfy his demands, but has some better things to do? What if it 
becomes his nightmare, the source of his uneasiness and anxiety? What if the house 
ceases to be an objekt whose primary purpose is to speak about man and instead becomes 
concerned with its own objecthood? And what if the house ceases to be a shelter; ceases 
to be a home? Will man, even then, be able to build that house and dare to live in it? 
  
These, by no means easy questions, are put in front of architecture at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The end of humanism means the radical change in all fields, but no art 
beside architecture has such hard and almost impossible task. In order to find its place on 
the platform of the new paradigm, architecture has to strike man with the most brutal and 
most painful blow. It has to enter into his habitat, into his most intimate chambers, into 
the place where he feels the safest and most comfortable – and then break all this into 
pieces. To be consistent and to truly follow the ‘zeitgeist’ means exactly to deprive man 
of his inherent notion of home, and give him something different instead of that; 
something that will enable him to be prepared for the changes which are inevitable. The 
comfortable and cozy house cannot protect us from the flood of the new and it is 
necessary to replace it with something which is maybe less comfortable, but can withstand 
the rush of the torrent. 
A house and a home shared the same roof for centuries. As early as the fourteenth 
century, after a huge shift in the triadic relationship between God, man, and nature, man 
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assumes a centric role in the cosmogony. Architecture welcomes this change with 
enthusiasm and delight. It immediately starts to evolve spatial conceptions of the 
anthropocentric society. The old Vitruvius’s factual explanation of the conditions in 
architecture presented in his book Ten Books of Architecture – his attempt to catalog what 
he saw around him, within a conception of what is structural, useful and beautiful – was 
no longer sufficient. The objects are no longer subordinated to God, but to man. And it is 
man who has to determine their history and meaning. Architecture has to have a coherent 
and logic narrative. That is exactly what Leon Battista Alberti does in his book On the Art 
of Building in Ten Book. By writing it as a certain critique or an answer to Vitruvius’s 
virtues firmitas, utilitas, and venustas,2 Alberti does not dispute the necessity of these 
virtues, but indicates their insufficiency. A building not only has to be firm – that implies 
without saying, or otherwise it would not stand at all – but it also has to look as if it is 
firm; not only does it have to provide shelter, but it has to look like a good shelter; a 
column not only has to bear the weight of the building, but with its form and proportion 
has to give the impression of the consistency with the function that serves. It is mandatory 
that the objects are addressing man and that they speak the language that he understands. 
They have to be in accordance with the function and the meaning that is assigned by man. 
Alberti introduces an entirely new idea into architecture: the idea of representation.  
 
One of the most striking of Alberti’s projects, basilica Sant’Andrea in Mantova (fig. 1.6), 
is an excellent example of this new understanding of the present of architecture in relation 
with its history. On the front façade of the basilica, Alberti puts the Arch of Septimius 
Severus – a symbol of men’s power and triumph.3 This, until then unthinkable gesture, 
unambiguously announces the true explosion of the anthropocentric world view, which 
reaches its full embodiment with Andrea Palladio. By introducing ‘a villa’ as one 
dominant typology in the architecture of the time, Palladio undeniably and definitely 
turns the house of God into the house of man.4 No more is there a higher or 
incomprehensible force that rules nature and nothing is above man’s reason and logic. 
                                                 
2 Often translated as firmness, commodity and delight. 
3 This example is first introduced by Peter Eisenman in his essay Misreading Peter Eisenman (1987) 
4 If we examine the first villas we can see that while Palladio’s plan of Villa Foscari (1559) still keeps some 
remains of the cruciform, it almost dissolves in his latter plan for Villa La Rotonda,(1566), and finally 
disappears in Scamozzi’s plan of Villa Pisani (1575-78). 
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The Renaissance produces a paradigm that is one universal and fixed body of knowledge, 
grounded in final and unchangeable truths, such as those of mathematics and music 
proportions.  
 
                          
                         1.6 Leon Battista Alberti, Sant’Andrea in Mantova, 1471 
 
Throughout time, architecture changes its formal expression and these changes were 
always defined and submitted by the rules of something what call style. Thus, after the 
Renaissance comes Baroque with its monumentality, drama and dominance of the light; 
after that comes Rococo, full of ornaments, bringing playfulness, intimacy and grace; 
then follows Neoclassicism, proclaiming revival of symmetry, flattering the volume by 
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exchanging it with straight walls and more austere forms, and introducing the notion of 
the autonomy in architecture. 
 
No matter how much are these styles different, and no matter how much they contradict 
or dispute each other, or give impression of radically different world view, they all belong 
to one same paradigm – to this same body of knowledge which only confirms man in its 
centric position. By writing the history of architecture, Alberti defines the framework of 
the metaphysics in which all theses styles are part of the narrative which addresses only 
man. Every change in the formal expression has the role to serve man, to satisfy his needs 
for beauty and comfort – and at the same time, what is most important, to never leave the 
frames of the understandable meaning.   
 
Architecture meets the end of humanism with denial and disbelief, and proceeds with the 
old agenda embodied in Beaux-Arts. The spirit of the new age emerges and tears down 
the old world in pieces. Architecture does not have any instruments or mechanisms to 
confront this change.  It cannot abandon its humanist mission. It cannot resist serving its 
beloved host and persists in satisfying his eye. The academia cannot support or accept the 
changes, because these changes are turned against the academia itself, and they dispute 
the values which it propagates. But the knowledge and experience that academia can offer 
are expired – they suddenly became worthless and unenforceable. They are the truths and 
knowledge of one reality that ceased to exist. This inevitably led to a dead-end street. At 
the end of the nineteenth century architecture bankrupted both as a discipline and 
profession! 
 
One quite different and original approach to architecture has to emerge, one which is not 
burdened with the old rules and canons, and which is initiated outside of the system itself. 
And thus, the new generation of architects comes from the very margins of society, from 
one utterly uncomfortable position. They are the outcasts and homeless, mainly with no 
formal education and out of all academic circles, unrecognized and disputed by 
institutions and establishment. Their most powerful weapon is the courage and 
relentlessness in facing the new. These pioneers of modernism – Le Corbusier, Mies van 
der Rohe, Walter Gropius, and others – are put before the same task as Alberti was 
several centuries earlier: they have to find the place and role for architecture in the new 
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age. They have to deal with the “problem in the demand for totally new methods of 
building, the problem of new plans adapted to modern life, the problem of an aesthetic in 
harmony with the new spirit.“5 But what is most important, they have to position 
architecture on the same platform with all other arts – to define the frames and articulate 
the potential of the discipline within the new paradigm. 
 
From the moment when the first caveman went in the search for the shelter, architecture 
is associated with man’s existence and survival. The minimum of traditionally necessary 
conditions of architecture – shelter, support and enclosure – made of it the ultimate 
humanistic activity. For centuries it was absolutely unthinkable to contradict, challenge, 
or revise these aspects: a true heresy. This would actually mean the annihilation of the 
very essence of architecture. At the beginning of the twentieth century, painting has the 
freedom to be wild and revolutionary, and to confront the problems of the new age. 
Painting can experiment because it is not dependent on the material means and market. 
All it takes is that the artist makes his own sacrifice. Unlike painting, architecture has its 
arms tied. It has no freedom to stand up and recklessly shout the Dadaist slogan: “I don’t 
even want to know if there were people before me.” 6 Architecture cannot that easily 
escape from the role of home-provider – to abandon man and turn itself to its own 
objecthood. 
 
For centuries, architecture prospered from the fact that its client was also the absolute 
center of the universe and the master of all meaning. Now, when this client is not all that 
any more, architecture has to convince him that this new house, which does not treat him 
with expected kindness and attention, is actually the one that he needs. In order to face 
’the zeitgeist’ and become the integral part of the new episteme, but at the same time to 
keep the appreciation and trust of its only client and financier, architecture has to develop 
two parallel and essentially contradictory currents that will be presented under the same 
banner. The first current will deal with the formal and spatial possibilities of the new 
situation, without compromises and regardless of the consequences. The other current 
                                                 
5 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow And Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2000), p. 
xxii 
6 Tristan Tzara, “Manifeste Dada 1918”, Dada 3, from Henri Behar, Michel Carassou, Dada. Istorija jedne 
subverzije, (Novi Sad: Izdavacka knjizarnica Zorana Stojanovica, 1997), p. 81; my translation  
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will proceed in the social agenda inherited from the humanism, and deal with the practical 
problems of the mankind.  
 
It is impossible to please and to challenge one’s position at the same time. The first thing 
serves to joy and comfort, while the second inevitably leads to discomfort. This creates 
the double life, or the schizophrenia of modern architecture. Both sides of this 
schizophrenic cognizance use the same instruments in pursuing their agendas, but the 
interpretation is fundamentally different. One such instrument is tabula rasa. There is a 
big difference between tabula rasa that nullifies everything but man, and the one that 
nullifies everything including man. This difference seems to be overlooked or ignored, 
but it is crucial. It separates two diametrically opposite views. The first tabula rasa is the 
last and desperate attempt to continue humanism, while the other one represents its 
definite end and the authentic encounter with the new. 
 
In order to defend both these programs simultaneously and present them as one single 
concept, modern architecture brings itself into one absurd situation in which advocating 
two opposed positions constantly disputes and disclaims its own ideas and actions. Thus, 
while it propagates the reduction of meaning and intentional separation of signifier and 
signified – and in that way reexamines man’s position as subject and its relation with 
object – modern architecture just formally deserts one sentimental and romantic 
worldview, which obviously ceased to be valid. The ornaments and the symbols of the old 
age are being replaced with the iconography of the machines, cruise liners, and the praise 
of the progress. And while the autonomy of the architectural object which serves only to 
its own objecthood is being announced, architecture is being reduced to a logical 
derivation from the functional and technological facts, whose ultimate purpose is always 
to serve man. The result of all of this is just a cosmetic but by no means a real and radical 
change: the signifier and the signified are slightly separated, but the meaning is still 
present.   
The ambivalent character of the modern architecture at the beginning of the twentieth 
century retains always present social program which never rejects the anthropocentric 
attitude. This alien in the body of the new paradigm sets before architecture the tasks 
which are impossible to accomplish. It forces architecture to step into the realm of the 
utopia, and makes of it the last keeper of the flame of humanism.  
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In its recent works, Anthony Vidler also speaks about two parallel and contradictory 
currents rooted in the very being of modern architecture. Although Vidler does not 
defines them in above presented way, what is important for this thesis is that he suggests 
the possibility of the existence of this dual identity. Vidler emphasizes particularly the 
fact that the main ideologists and protagonists of the modern movement at that time did 
not possess the awareness of the existence of these two currents:  “For, as projected by Le 
Corbusier and others in the 1920s, the modern movement was a double-edged machine. 
On the one hand, it was committed to a modernism of form, embracing all the techniques 
of collage, montage, and formalism in general in the service of ideology of the avant-
garde, whereby a formal strategy should serve a new social order. On the other hand, such 
a modernism sought a ‘timeless’ relationship with society, based on an abstraction of 
traditional, nonarchitectural construction; this was seen to go hand in hand with a 
universalization of the inherited principles of classicism, minus their representation in the 
classical orders. Thus, it was not seen as a contradiction that a villa might find its parti in 
a transformation of a Palladian type, its formal language in the evocation of 
Mediterranean peasant houses, and its iconography in motifs taken from ships, planes, 
and cars. [...] this double vision between the new and eternal, modern and classic, 
technological and traditional was not entirely clear to its protagonists in 1920s (despite 
the majority of Corbusier’s writings in Vers une architecture)...“7 With certain reserve, 
we could understand this Vidler’s reading of modern movement – presented here as one 
double-edged machine unconsciously pursuing both modern and classic – as a confusion 
and disorientation of the new agenda which is torn between modernism and humanism. 
 
The hesitation or inability to make unambiguous and definite break with humanism costs 
dearly the modern architecture in the later period. Due to this dualism of two currents that 
can never meet and never intersect, the first generation of historians of modern 
architecture – lead by Nikolaus Pevsner, Sigfried Giedion, Henry-Russell Hitchcock – are 
not able to determine one coherent and unique agenda of modernism in architecture. Each 
attempt of the comprehensive examination of the activities or the formation of the firm 
platform of modern architecture that could carry all architectural tendencies and include 
                                                 
7 Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: The 
Mit Press, 2008), p. 104 
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creations of all key figures of that period,  always ends with the reduction of the range 
and potential of the movement, and with dangerous simplification of its program and 
objectives. 
 
In relation to this problem, Anthony Vidler makes the analysis of the above mentioned 
historians of modernism. He finds that each of them, in the attempt to present the 
coherent narrative that includes the whole modern movement, forms a theory and a frame 
that, as a rule, lack some of the most important architects or concepts without which that 
period is simply unthinkable: “Thus, Hitchcock, in Romanticism and Reintegration, 
sought the roots of his beloved ’New Tradition’ in the late eighteenth century, and was 
uneasy as well as excited by the work of the ’New Pioneers’, whom he saw as well as at 
once going beyond and disturbing the rationalism of Frank Lloyd Wright, Otto Wagner, 
Peter Behrens, and Auguste Perret. Pevsner, in Pioneers of Modern Movement, focused 
on the relations between Britain and Germany, seeing the origins of Gropius’s rational-
functionalism in the Arts and Crafts movement and conveniently ignoring the French 
contribution, while Giedion failed to include more than a mention of Mies van der Rohe 
in his Space, Time and Architecture, preferring instead to leap from the baroque 
movement to that encapsulated in Le Corbusier’s villas of the 1920s.“8    
 
Each of these books tends to construct the criteria for ‘modernity’, and tells the story of 
its origins and development. The absence of one unifying method or set of undisputed 
priorities turns each of these books into subjective perspectives with tendency to justify or 
glorify their own favorites. Therefore they necessarily produced the extremely partial 
narratives with the gaps impossible to ignore.   
 
One book, however, managed to gather, under the same headline and in same covers, 
almost all important architects and their projects in the period from 1920 to1930. Two 
young historians of art – Henry-Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson – travel the world 
for two years collecting pieces of what they consider to be modern architecture in order to 
make a publication that would accompany the big architectural exhibition in the Museum 
of Modern Art. Their final product, well known book The International Style: 
                                                 
8 Ibid., pp. 6-7 
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Architecture Since 1922, made crucial impact on later defining and understanding of what 
modernism has to offer. 
  
In that book Hitchcock and Johnson present a set of rules that one has to follow in order 
to be included in the framework of what they call a new style. As main determinants of 
that style they define three principles: “There is, first, a new conception of architecture as 
volume rather than as mass. Secondly, regularity rather than axial symmetry serves as the 
chief means of ordering design. These two principles, with a third proscribing arbitrary 
applied decoration, mark the productions of the international style.”9 With these 
principles they managed to establish the link between the formal expression of three new 
leaders – Le Corbusier, Mies, and Gropius – and in that way to create the illusion of one 
unique language of the new age.  
 
What we might say is that by focusing only on formal characteristics of the buildings they 
were considered with the rhetoric, without defining or fundamentally understanding the 
grammar of the language of modernism. The index of their book is the dictionary of that 
language, and what they say is: if you want to be radical, and if you want to be a hero, 
than you have to use this dictionary. The most important words in that dictionary are: roof 
line, pilotis, ribbon windows, white façade, etc. They produced a collection of recipes that 
teach, not what is modern, but rather how to look modern. With this book Hitchcock and 
Johnson degrade the enormous potential of a whole new paradigm to a unified set of 
formal codes that allowed them to label this as a new style. They pacified the exploratory 
content which was very rich and diverse. 
 
This eventually had a great impact on further interpretation and understanding of initial 
intentions of the projects presented in this book and their significance in relation to 
history. In one of his essays Peter Eisenman, considering the writings of Philip Johnson, 
emphasizes Johnson’s contribution to that matter and, in a way, blames him for the 
general trivialization of modern architecture, especially in United States in later period: 
“The reduction of modernism to a discussion of style drained out the ideological 
                                                 
9 Henry-Russell Hitchcock, Philip Johnson, The International Style, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
1997), p. 36 
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implications of the European architecture of the twenties and packaged them neatly into a 
consumable fashion that was to burst rampant onto American scene after World War II. 
Corporate imagery in the guise of modern architecture inevitably became an object for 
consumption.”10  
 
While Corbusier, with his five points and four compositions, examines the possibilities of 
the new conditions and investigate the limits of human behavior in that conditions, what 
follows after global popularization of International Style has little to do with ambitions 
and efforts of first modernists.   Suddenly everybody wants to be a part of the global 
trend. That initiates the true eruption of little white square-like houses made according to 
well known instructions. These new ‘decorated sheds’ had no other ambition but to look 
like the first modernist buildings. Their only agenda was to be the part of the style that 
they understood as the esthetic expression of the moment. In this way they threaten to 
dispute and to relativize the importance of those first heroic projects that tried to confront 
new challenges, and in that way significantly contributed to the critical nature of the 
discipline.  
 
By framing Corbusier, Mies, Gropius and others in the conventions of style, Hitchcock 
and Johnson definitely started a process of the historicizing of modernism. This process is 
turned against everything that these architects stand for and it denies the true nature of 
modernism. Once modern architecture is recognized as a style, it becomes fully 
assimilated into the art historical canon. It becomes part of Alberti’s narrative – 
understood as just another baroque, or rococo, or neoclassicism – and in that sense a form 
of continuation of the ideas of humanism. This brutal displacement of modern 
architecture out of its avant-garde coordinates and imposition of false labels made a huge 
distortion, and architecture needed decades to overcome. 
 
Today generally accepted teaching about architectural creations of the first few decades 
of the twentieth century is established during the 1930s and at the beginning of 1940s by 
                                                 
10 Peter Eisenman, essey ’Behind the Mirror: On the Writings of Philip Johnson’, from Peter Eisenman, 
Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings 1963 – 1988, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2004), p. 96 
68 
 
above mentioned historians. After the World War II modern architecture already had a 
status of “history”, it was understood as a dead project that could be susceptible to 
academicization and reinterpretations.  
 
Anthony Vidler, in his book Histories of the Immediate Present, offers excellent analyses 
of how in the period of 1950s and 1960s is understood and interpreted the architecture 
from the beginning of twentieth century. Vidler points to a new generation of historians 
of modernism that sees modern architecture as the obvious and logical continuation of the 
process which began in some earlier period. They do not consider modernism as one new 
paradigm, but as a style which is firmly rooted in the tradition of humanism. “Whether 
modern architecture was seen to begin with the baroque, classicism, neoclassicism, 
nineteenth-century eclecticism, or Art and Crafts revivalism, the floodgates were now 
opened for a host of competing narratives, a variety of historically based modernisms, and 
several versions of a possible ‘unity’ of style characterizing the ‘modern’.”11 They 
believed that everything has already happened, and that what we experience today is just 
another form of dealing with the old cognitions and the old well known problems. 
 
Thus, the historian Emil Kaufmann cannot imagine modern architecture without the 
period of neoclassicism, and first of all without Claude-Nicolas Ledoux and his 
translation of the ideas of Immanuel Kant into architecture. Kant instituted autonomous 
ethic, and Ledoux laid the foundations of an autonomous architecture. In his work the 
buildings are assembled and not intimately linked. A part is independent within the frame 
of the totality. He introduces the pavilion as a natural formal expression of this 
understanding of architecture. Kaufmann sees Ledoux as a master who set the new 
principles that opened the way for Le Corbusier and others, whose work crowns the 
triumph of these principles. His thesis is that modernism emerged in Claude-Nicolas 
Ledoux in the 1770s and culminated in Le Corbusier. “The resemblance between the 
epoch of Ledoux and our own is not limited to formal and thematic aspects. This 
resemblance does not only rest in the fact that in his epoch as our own one sees the new 
and important problem of the masses emerge as the powerful motive of solutions. 
                                                 
11 Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: 
The Mit Press, 2008), p. 7 
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Independently of the new demands of the real, one discerns now as at that epoch a new 
idealism. It appears in L’archicteture of Ledoux as in the writings of Le Corbusier, in the 
project for the Ideal City as in the Cite Mondiale. It is in the idealism, founded on the new 
ideas of ethics and law, in which is, in the end, rooted, it seems to us, before 1800 even as 
today, the renewal of architecture.”12  
 
It is interesting and symptomatic that Kaufmann never criticizes Ledoux for his distinctly 
anthropocentric positioning of man, what he displays in his projects in more than an 
obvious way. We can find the explicit example of such understanding of man in relation 
to architecture in Ledoux’s project for the theater of Besancon, where he is not satisfied 
with mere rendering of the perspective of the building, but goes further and draws the eye 
of the member of the audience reflecting the interior of the theatre (fig.1.7). In this way 
he imposes a hierarchical order and unambiguously emphasizes of who is the subject and 
the main protagonist. And for Kaufman, that has not changed since the period of 
neoclassicism.  The comfort of the beholder is not threatened in any way. 
 
Another influential historian, Colin Rowe, also develops a model of modern architectural 
history that is not starting with tabula rasa, but has formal precedents in history. Rowe 
understands modernism as the visual index of spiritual crisis, in a same manner as the 
Mannerism four centuries before. He analyses Palladio, Michelangelo, and Vignola and 
sees them as the founders of something that culminates with Corbusier and Mies.  
Anthony Vidler indicates this relation: “The center of ‘Mannerism and Modern 
Architecture’, tough, is an elaborate but succinct reformulation of the history of 
architecture since the Renaissance in terms that pit the rationalism of structure and the 
moral ethic of the program against the visual qualities of the eclectic and the picturesque, 
a tension traced through to the modern movement, split between the demands of reason 
                                                 
12 Emil Kaufmann, Von Ledoux bis Le Corbusier: Ursprung und Entwicklung der autonomen Architektur, 
from Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: 
The Mit Press, 2008), pp. 40-41 
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and the satisfaction of the eye. Rowe finds this entire development, together with its 
tensions, to culminate in Le Corbusier.”13 
 
  
1.7 Claude-Nicolas Ledoux, Theater of Besancon, c. 1800 
 
In his studies Rowe compares Palladio and Corbusier showing that both are based on the 
belief that right proportions may be expressed in mathematical terms. In both of these 
architects he finds strong tendency toward ‘Ideal’ and ‘Utopia,’14, categories that are 
essentially humanists.  For him, the answer to a contemporary practice is the historical 
and modernist ‘mannerism’ of the neo-Palladian Corbusier. While having strong 
admiration and respect toward Corbusier, on the other hand, Rowe mocks the essential 
aspirations and intentions of modernism.  Referring to the modernist’s attempt to deprive 
                                                 
13 Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: 
The Mit Press, 2008), p. 94 
14 At the end of his life Palladio writes a book The Four Books of Architecture, where he presents his 
projects, not as how they are built, but how they should have been built. He presents their ‘ideal’ state. In 
that way, Palladio makes clear distinction between the real and utopian, and even gives certain supremacy 
to the utopian over the real. 
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the architectural object of the meaning, he quite ironically remarks: “When, in late 1940s, 
modern architecture became established and institutionalized, necessarily, it lost 
something of its original meaning. Meaning, of course, it had never been supposed to 
possess.“15 For him architecture always has to possess meaning; it always has to 
represent. Rowe has fragile tolerance for modern architecture and, for that matter, much 
of what can be called the modernist thought. Therefore, he imposes seeing Le Corbusier 
as a late humanist architect – and that image is well received and widely propagated in 
later period. We had to wait for Peter Eisenman to offer a quite different, non-humanist 
understanding of Corbusier, and to analyze his, we might say ‘manifesto’, Maison Dom-
ino, not in the context of history, but as a self-referential sign.16 
 
This ambiguous relation to modern architecture is inherent to another famous historian of 
architecture, Manfredo Tafuri. He also argues that modern architecture is a part of logical 
narrative deeply rooted in humanist perception of the world. For him the avant-garde 
tradition is at least six centuries old.  In his book Theories and History of Architecture he 
claims: “It would be better to trace the process of development synthetically, returning to 
its true origin: to the very revolution of modern art in the work of the Tuscan humanists 
of the fifteenth century.”17 As the main protagonist of the process that started with 
Renaissance he indicates Brunelleschi and Alberti. They made the real break with the 
medieval past in order to construct ‘linguistic code and symbolic system’. 
 
In a similar way as Rowe, Tafuri finds that the representation is something immanent to 
architecture, and therefore to modern architecture as well, and that it cannot be easily 
disputed. Tafuri sees modernism as the displacement of referentiality, rather than the loss. 
He accuses so-called radical or avant-garde experiments to invent “other” architectures, 
which had turned so quickly into regressive utopias or new forms of ideology. According 
to him true modernists – Corbusier, Mies and others – do not reject ‘referent’, but just 
‘displace’ it. He compares Benjamin’s ‘decline of the aura’ with ‘anguish of the referent’ 
                                                 
15 Colin Rowe, ‘Introduction to Five Architects’, from K. Michael Hays, Architecture Theory Since 1968, 
(Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2000), p. 74 
16 See Peter Eisenman’s essey Aspects of Modernism 
17 Manfredo Tafuri, Teorie e storia dell’architettura, from Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate 
Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2008), p. 171 
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in the emergence of abstract art, arguing that “ward off anguish by absorbing its causes”18 
cannot bring a form of liberation, and architecture cannot be reduced to that. Although 
perhaps most radical and complex theoretician of modern architecture, Tafuri essentially 
does not see modernism out of frames of humanism, and in that sense he is in congruence 
whit above mentioned historians, which altogether create certain interpretation and image 
of modern architecture.  
 
It is important to mention that these historians, while strongly criticizing the radicalism 
and certain concepts in program of modernism, at the same time never seriously dispute 
greatness of the first masters. Instead of questioning them, if nothing, for being the main 
protagonists of modern architecture, they rather admired and glorified them, arguing that 
they are, before all, humanists. A symbolic example of this agenda is one of the later texts 
of Reyner Banham on Mies, named The Master of Humane Architecture, where the word 
‘humane’ clearly stands for the word ‘modern’.19 The play of words, in a witty but 
accurate way, depicts the diversion that this generation of historians advocated. 
 
This clear and unambiguous positioning of modern architecture within narrative of 
humanism opens the door for a heavy fire of criticism, in the second part of the twentieth 
century. What follows is a series of almost coordinated attacks from old and some new 
generations of theoreticians and critics, who feel that modernism failed to accomplish 
what they understood as its main objective and mission – and, for that matter, it has to be 
radically changed, or substituted with something new.  Nikolaus Pevsner proposes ‘the 
return of historicism’ and ‘picturesque’ as the solution, Manfredo Tafuri 
‘hypermodernism’, Charles Jenks ‘postmodernism’. What is very important here is that 
all of them attack from the position of humanism. They demand “a new richness and 
differentiation of character, the pursuit of differences rather than sameness, the re-
emergence of monumentality, the cultivation of idiosyncrasy and the development of 
                                                 
18 Manfredo Tafuri, Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1999), p.131 
19 Reyner Banham, ’The Master of Humane Architecture’, in catalog for exibition Mies van der Rohe: 
Architect as Educator, (Chichago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp.13-16 
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those regional dissimilarities that people have always taken a pride in.“20 What they 
actually demand is the humanizing of architecture. For them, the abstract language of 
international modernism has failed to gain popular acceptance, and is essentially 
antihumanist. 
 
It is from this very position that the first generation of modern masters is criticized by 
Team X. Aldo Van Eyck, together with Alison and Peter Smithson, confronts Le 
Corbusier, arguing that man cannot identify himself with abstraction, and that architecture 
has to be more in accordance with human perception and human scale. Architecture has 
to seek more direct contact with human aspirations. Man has to understand the space that 
surrounds him, and he has to feel more comfortable in it. In that sense they criticize 
modernism as not being functional enough; it does not serve man enough.   
 
Denise Scot Brown and Robert Venturi come with even more critical approach. They 
argue that the pure forms, simplicity, and straight lines of modern architecture are 
deprived of life. Architecture should be more vivid, complex, and communicate with man 
in much more direct way. It should amuse, even entertain him. For them modernism is 
bore. “Blatant simplification means bland architecture. Less is bore.”21 Scott Brown and 
Venturi also, with certain dose of irony, attack modern architects for their inconsistency 
in ambition to nullify all meaning. They, very often, point out that lack of references from 
history in works of first modernists is widely compensated with references from 
‘industrial vocabulary’. One ornament is exchanged for another. “Early Modern architects 
appropriated an existing and conventional industrial vocabulary without much adaptation. 
Le Corbusier loved grain elevators and steam ships; the Bauhaus looked like a factory; 
                                                 
20 J.M.Richards, Nikolaus Pevsner, Osbert Lancaster, and Hubert de CroninHastings, editorial, 
’Architectural Review 101, no. 601’, from Anthony Vidler, Histories of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing 
Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2008), p. 84 
21 Rober Venturi, ‘Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture’, from Kate Nesbitt, Theorizing a New 
Agenda for Architecture: An Antology of Architectural Theory 1965 – 1995, (New York: Princeton 
Architectural Press, 1996), p. 75 
74 
 
Mies refined the details of American steel factories for concrete buildings.”22 What is 
interesting here is that Venturi and Brown do not criticize modern architecture for the 
existence of meaning or referentiality as such – even though abstraction should exclude 
every meaning by default – but rather that there is less meaning than it should be, and that 
this meaning that they use is rather naïve, irrelevant, senseless, weak, and in any case 
boring. Instead they ask for a wider and more open use of the old, even clichés as in Pop 
Art, in order to achieve new meanings. Only then architecture will be more connected 
with human. And in that sense Venturi always considered himself to be a mannerist 
architect. 
   
Scott Brown and Venturi made a shift from space, as the primary substance of 
architecture, to the sign. In that way they neglected the program and emphasized the 
visual, which is so well accepted in later postmodern architecture. From that point of 
perspective Charles Jencks writes, a very influential book in that time, Modern 
Movements in Architecture where he summarizes all architectural tendencies in the 
twentieth century. In his diagram Evolutionary Tree 1920-70, from that book, more than 
two thirds of listed categories are visual categories and not programmatic.23 In that 
climate of revival of ornament and clear appeals to the authority of historical architecture 
comes Venice Biennale in 1980, directed by Paolo Portoghesi, where postmodernism 
reaches its peak, and firmly establishes itself as the predominant style in architecture. 
With stress on the visual, communication through signs, constant play of true and false, 
and compulsion to quote, postmodernism depicts itself far more flamboyant and radical 
than Pevsner ever imagined his ‘new historicism’. Nothing could be more in opposition 
with esthetics of pure and rational forms of the first modernists. 
 
This attack on the essence of modernism, and almost aggressive endeavor to put 
architecture once again in the position of the vehicle for human aspirations, showed that 
the idea of humanism is more rooted in the consciousness and perception than early 
modernists could ever predicted. Postmodernist criticism advocated the belief in never 
                                                 
22 Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, ’A Significance for A&P Parking Lots or Learning from Las 
Vegas’, from Kate Nesbitt, Theorizing a New Agenda for Architecture: An Antology of Architectural 
Theory 1965 – 1995, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), pp. 310-311 
23 Charles Jencks, Modern Movements in Architecture, (New York: Anchor Press, 1973), p. 28 
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ending humanism. It is led by the idea that modernism is just an unpleasant period of 
deviation that has to be ended as soon as possible. For theoreticians as Leon Krier and 
others, it is nothing more than a ‘temporary refusal of archetypes’ (fig. 1.8).24 From this 
position, where the highest imperative is to be a humane, it is quite natural and logical to 
criticize ostensibly antihuman character of modern architecture: for, if it is a part of 
humanist tradition, why then it is not humane?  
 
                               
                         1.8 Leon Krier, from Architecture: Choice or Fate, 1997 
 
This dramatic misreading of true importance and comprehensiveness of a venture that 
architecture took at the beginning of the twentieth century brought many distortions and 
confusion into discipline, but more importantly, it significantly initiated a radical 
rethinking and reexamination of fundamental principles and motives within modernism 
                                                 
24 Leon Krier, Architectura – volba nebo osud, (Praha: Academia, 2001), p. 72 
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itself. The whole range of historians and theoreticians (some of which are mentioned 
above) who form something that we can call postmodernist criticism, forced modernism 
to confront its dual character, and redefine itself so that it would be able to construct the 
new paradigm for the new age. The ‘alien’ in the body of modern architecture, that was 
stronger than ever, had to be rejected, in order to gain credible and cogent position in 
confrontation with this criticism. Architecture finally had to face its demons from the 
past, and cease to be the last fortification and guardian of the flame of humanism.  
 
In this light I would like to mention one project that, without a flow, confronts in every 
aspect these newly emerged tasks, and courageously stands as the true bastion of 
modernism –  it is the well known, and in a way controversial Le Corbusier’s chapel 
Notre Dame du Haut in Ronchamp. This project, due to its ambiguous character that 
refuses to be categorized under any of previously established rules, is widely 
misunderstood and accepted mainly with reserves and not without suspicions in almost all 
eminent architectural circles at the time.  From the very start, Notre Dame du Haut 
brought numerous polemics and interpretations that tried to define and position this 
project in relation with current architectural scene. They saw this as the announcement of 
post-Purism; demise of rationalism; symbiotic relationship between art and architecture 
(whatever that means!); translation of poetic elements into the architectural oeuvre; 
formal representation of irrationality of religious and spiritual realms; influence of 
whitewashed tradition of Mediterranean vernacular and folkloric architecture; crab shell, 
hands in pray, bunker with gun-openings, airplane wings, dams, boat, bird, hat... The 
interpretations are many, but all with a common assumption that this represents Le 
Corbusier’s abandonment of principles of high modernism, and the shift to referentiality 
and a narrative with flamboyant play of meanings.  
 
But, it is quite peculiar that this cheerful small chapel, nothing in a manner of rigid and 
sterile box-like forms, initiated a strong and bitter criticism from the very critics that 
propagated desertion from those ‘boxes’. One of such critics is Nikolaus Pevsner, who 
sees Ronchamp as undermining the fundamental principles of the modern movement, and 
labels it as the ’new irationalism’; a building whose exterior ’does not convey a sense of 
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confidence in their well-functioning.’25 Another critic, Charles Jencks, accuses Le 
Corbusier of reducing the potential of architecture after the II World War and that his 
aesthetic considered architecture to be sculpture in plastic means.26 James Stirling goes 
even further and disdains Ronchamp as having little to appeal to the intellect, stimuli or 
analytical context, and rests only upon visual appeal. Although he admits that it is a 
masterpiece, he is very critical of whether the project contributes to the progression of 
modern architecture or whether it is simply a ‘mannerized’ piece of what he terms 
‘conscience imperfectionism’.27 For Stirling, Ronchamp remains a huge enigma. 
 
All this misreading, criticism, undervaluation, and negligence of this project from the side 
of postmodernists certainly cannot be a coincidence. In a way, they all infallibly felt that 
this small chapel actually represents a real danger and fundamentally undermines all their 
endeavors. What I will argue is that Notre Dame du Haut is par excellence heroic revival 
and reinvention of true modernism. What Le Corbusier managed to accomplish is to once 
again – in a way he already did some 40 years before – confront man with his most inner 
fears of the unpredictable and uncertain future, and to challenge his ability to reconsider 
himself and his position in relation to the objects that surround him.  
 
At the very first glance of the chapel, after climbing a steep track to the top of the hill, we 
experience a sudden encounter with an unnatural configuration of elements that put us in 
a state of discomposure that remains long after we leave the village of Ronchamp. While 
standing before Notre Dame du Haut we do not know what to do with this building. It is 
impossible to determine in what way this forms communicate with us; what are they 
telling? And what is the meaning of all this?  We feel as if we are listening to the 
language that we never heard before. Nothing there is like the churches that we used to 
see and from which we know what to expect. Nothing is obvious in this building, nothing 
certain.  We find ourselves confused and unable to understand what is expected from us. 
Should I approach the building? Or should I circle around it? Is this the back or the front? 
Where is the entrance? Or is there any entrance at all? The four façades (fig 1.9), each 
                                                 
25 Nikolaus Pevsner, ‘Pevsner on Art and Architecture: The Radio Talks’, from Anthony Vidler, Histories 
of the Imeddiate Present: Inventing Architectural Modernism, (Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2008), p. 115   
26 Charles Jencks, Le Corbusier and the Tragic View of Architecture, (London: Allen Lane, 1975), p. 137 
27 James Stirling, Ronchamp: Le Corbusier’s Chapel and the Crisis of Rationalism, 1956 
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entirely different from the other, are metamorphosing in the least expected way and 
greatly contribute to the obscurity of the whole. This prevents us to establish the 
minimum of comprehension, even in regard to the most simple matters – such as, is there 
a roof or not;  whether it is a compact solid or fragmented; etc. – constantly controverting 
each our conclusion. Most importantly, we are unable to determine this object in the 
relation to our body. How do I use this building; how do I consume it?  
 
 
1.9 Le Corbusier, Notre Dame du Haut in Ronchamp, 1955, façade: east, north, west, 
south 
 
What we realize is that our hitherto experience is not helpful to us at all, and that there is 
no firm ground on which we can stand, or a familiar sign that we can rely on.  We feel 
disorientated and lost. Confronted with this entirely different world, which is not made 
according to us, according to our rules and our measures, we are in fact being dislocated 
from our comfort habitat to one utterly alien and unknown territory. With Ronchamp Le 
Corbusier managed to escape from everything known; from everything that is distorted 
and depraved by man.  
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In the book/manifest Towards a New Architecture Le Corbusier bitterly claimed: 
“Architecture to-day is no longer conscious of its own beginnings.”28 In his previous 
canonical project, Villa Savoy, Le Corbusier returned to the stilt-house of the Neolithic 
age. But now, he realized that this is not enough. With Notre Dame du Haut he goes even 
further, up to the caves of the upper Paleolithic age. According to him, “a first proof of 
existence is a space that we occupied”29, and a first known occupation of space by man 
are those caves. Only with this return to the most primitive condition of architecture, it is 
possible to experience the true tabula rasa – the condition without the traditional 
narrative of man and without the sense of conformity and functionalism in humanist 
terms. “No caveman ever set out to find a two-bedroom cave.”30  
 
There is another, very important and quite obscure, aspect of this chapel that I would like 
to mention. The whole building is designed and made according to the principles and 
rules of well known Le Corbusier’s Modulor. This tool, which stands for harmonic 
proportions of human body, is embedded in every bit of the chapel. Each ostensible 
randomness or irregularity is a product of tendentious implementation of numerous 
variations of Modulor.  All this foolish dance of windows and openings in the walls; all 
this ‘magnificent play of masses brought together in light’, contains in itself the 
proportion that is coded by one single key. This is quite obvious in Le Corbusier’s 
sketches and drawings, but the visitor of the chapel cannot find that key anywhere. Its 
presence remains hidden from the eyes of the spectator; it is invisible. And while the use 
of the Modulor in the process of design can be justified in Corbusier’s residential 
projects, such as Unité d'Habitation or the convent Sainte-Marie de La Tourette, in 
Ronchamp it has no practical or any other use, whatsoever. We could say that its main 
ambition is to be present and absent at the same time; to be a ’not present presence’. And 
here we see Modulor in its purest essence – it is the code unknown. It appears that 
architecture of Notre Dame du Haut is not designed for man, but rather haunted by him, 
                                                 
28 Le Corbusier, Ka pravoj aarhitekturi, (Beograd: Gradjevinska knjiga, 1999), p. 8, my translation 
29 Le Corbusier, Modulor, (Niksic: Jesen, 2002), p. 25, my translation 
30 Jeffery Kipins, ’Star Wars III: The Bettle in the Center of the Universe’, from Investigations in 
Architecture / Eisenman Studios at the GSD: 1983–85, (Cambridge: Harvard Graduate School of Design, 
1986), p. 46  
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in a similar way as the caves of Altamira or Chauvet Cave. Building treats man not as its 
host but as a specter – a ghost from long forgotten past, or even yet unseen future.  
 
We can see here, quite clear, that Le Corbusier displaces subject from its central position 
of the master of being and puts him in a much more uncertain and obscure place. Forms, 
with no meaning and no narrative behind them, turn into self-referential objects that exist 
beyond commonly accepted frames of perceptions. Ronchamp is the project that more 
than any other explores the limits of the independence of the object from the subject. In 
this way Le Corbusier makes a definite discontinuation with humanism, and once again 
develops the mechanism that accommodates opportunities for the valorization of the 
disappearing individual in the face of the unimaginable future. The ’alien’ in the body of 
modernism is finally rejected. Ronchamp puts architecture out of the humanist discourse, 
and represents the true embodiment of the new metaphysics. 
 
Modern architecture, reduced by the historians and critics to the formal set of rules bound 
by the conventions of style, is once again liberated. What is generally considered as Le 
Corbusier’s irrational aberration and betrayal of the ideals that he alone inaugurated some 
40 years earlier, is actually a heroic escape from the chains of style which is recklessly 
imposed. All those straight lines, right angles, order, regularity, primal shapes, were just 
means in the function of one resolute search for a way of correspondence with demands 
of the new age. When these means became too narrow and limiting, they had to be 
enriched and expanded. Le Corbusier revealed a whole new field of possibilities and 
potential that enabled architecture to step into the world that was previously unreachable 
and forbidden.     
  
After Ronchamp, modernism can no longer be codified as a style. It is firmly established 
as a whole new paradigm, in which the comfort is no longer the ultimate holy goal, and 
where one simple gaze in the mirror may reflect an object which is not that familiar, and 
certainly is not as clear and close as we used to see. 
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2.    Utopia vs. Delirium 
 
 
 
“It seems that utopias are much more easily achieved than we once thought. Today 
we are faced with a different and more agonizing question: How do we prevent them 
from being finally achieved? ... Utopias can be achieved. Life moves on towards 
utopia. And perhaps a new age is beginning, an age when intellectuals and other 
educated people will dream up a way of avoiding utopias, and returning to a society 
that is not utopian, with less ‘perfection’ and more freedom.”1 – Nikolai Berdyaev 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Nikolai Berdyaev, ’Freedom and the Spirit’ (1928), quoted from Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, 
(London: Longman, 1991),  p. 214 
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2.1.  Soaring Ambitions 
 
 
“Let us begin and create in idea a city.”  – Plato, Republic 
 
 
Here I would like to return, once more, to duality or ‘double coded identity’ of modern 
architecture at the beginning of the twentieth century, and try to examine how it 
manifests, even more clearly, in the large scale projects, that we often refer  to as utopian 
avant-garde. These urban projects, better than any other, render the confused and 
contradictory character of architecture, which is unable to break loose from the humanist 
discourse and set an appropriate framework of the discipline that would be able to meet 
all predicaments of the new age.  
  
At the end of the 19th century the dynamite of the steam engine burst asunder all 
conventional notions of the city. For the first time since the ancient period the city with 
more than one million inhabitants emerges, but unfortunately, with its illogical structure, 
to a great extent incomparable with well organized ancient cities. Over-measured 
migration of people from the country to the city results in wild accumulation of 
inhabitants. Civic milieu mutates in unbearable congestion with no basic needs for living. 
Industrialization demands working power, but it cannot provide them home. A man is 
forced to make a radical turn in understanding and planning of his environment.  
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Numerous studies that mainly propagate abandonment of the old cities and building of the 
new ones spread all over Europe.  One of the first solutions comes from Artur Soria y 
Mate with Linear city (La Ciudad Lineal) from 1882, and Ebenezer Howard with The 
Garden City from 1898. These projects offer a model of decentralized city with limited 
growth of inhabitants, and with the accent on transport and green areas in urban zones. 
After them comes Tony Granier with his Industrial City (Une cité industrielle), where he 
developed the zoning concept, dividing the city into four main functions: work, housing, 
health, leisure. He clearly separates the industrial area from the rest of the city, and tries 
to develop conditions for exercise, health, and physical well-being of inhabitants, leaving 
large public area for sports and spectacles in his city. 
 
In the first years after the World War I, several groups of artists in Germany are forming 
the movements with strong and radical concepts. One of the firsts, Bruno Taut, presents 
his ideas in theoretical works – at the beginning in very utopian The Dissolution of the 
City (Die Auflosung der Stadte), and later in more realistic The City Crown (Die 
Stadtkrone). To him, the cities, that ‘great spiders’, are dead. The ultimate destination of 
the dissolution of the city would be the idyll of the self-contained neighborhood. 
 
Without any doubt the Soviet Union, or Moscow to be exact, gives the most fertile soil 
for uprising of the avant-garde in between-war period. Under the euphoria of the recently 
ended revolution, this area is becoming the true juncture of talents and new ideas. 
Numerous art schools are being founded.  The artists try to impose very skillfully their 
utopian vision of an ideal world as the ultimate goal of newly-founded state. One of the 
characteristics of the Soviet architecture from its earliest days was ingenious urban 
planning. A whole series of projects follows at that time: Anton Lavinsky’s City on 
Springs from 1921, Lazar Khidekel’s City on Columns from 1925 (made by the principles 
of Malevich’s Suprematism), Moisei Ginzburg’s Green City from 1930, etc. This period 
in Russia is marked by the big conflict between urbanists and deurbanists. Both of these 
groups proclaim their theories as dogmas. According to the urbanists the city is a net of 
huge buildings for collective living with public services. On the other hand, following the 
opinion of deurbanists the problem is based on making ‘the communes of dwelling 
houses’ – light prefabricated buildings, scattered in space.   
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Coming on the scene at the end of twenties, Ivan Ilich Leonidov presents the unique 
episode in the history of the modern architecture. By its originality, not only in formal 
expression, but also in philosophy on which he bases that expression, he brings to 
question all adopted methods and ideas of urban planning. His concept of urban structure 
is in strong contrast with models inherited from the past. At the same time he never pops 
into the later exaggeration of urbanists and deurbanists. Leonidov proposes a model of the 
linear city that is, although with urban character, at the same time the city in green, and in 
harmony with its natural surroundings. That is the project for Magnitogorsk – Socialist 
City, from 1930. In this solution there are no tendencies to settle people in vast 
formicaries. His city is ‘the city of man’, the man for whom the collectivism is a natural 
choice.  
 
Although, all these projects are innovative and avant-garde in its solutions and formal 
expression, and with a strong intention to be absolute modern and new, all of them are 
essentially based on one quite old idea of an ideal city. This idea is first introduced by 
Plato in his Republic, around 380 BC. Plato offers a possible strategy for thinking, for a 
dialectical construction of models and their intellectual testing. The quest for an ideal 
city, based on this Plato’s model, becomes highly important in Renaissance, starting with 
Filarete, Alberti, Leonardo and others, and later continuing with Thomas More and 
Tommaso Camponella,1 up to the famous project of Claude-Nicolas Ledaux.  
 
The urban projects from the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century are the last chapter of the narrative that started with Plato. And while they 
advocate a different norms and different concepts of human living, all projects in that 
narrative are based on one mutual utopian premise. They are all led by a strong belief that 
social reforms and most profound ideas of social justice could be achieved by city 
planning. The utopian cities of the avant-garde offer the architecture as a solution to 
political problems and economic crises. They are a social thought in three dimensions. 
These new cities are carefully composed spatial organizations that search for the ideal 
conditions for man – the conditions that would perfectly accommodate his needs and 
serve his commodity. In that sense they are, without any doubt, the integral part of the 
                                                 
11 Thomas More, Utopia (1516); Tommaso Camponella, The City of the Sun (1602) 
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metaphysics of humanism. Heaving said that, at the same time, almost each of these 
projects contains in itself a certain immanent mechanisms that fundamentally contradict 
humanist nature and, paradoxically and maybe even unintentionally, dislocates these 
projects out of previously defined perspective. 
 
As a perfect example of this ambiguous and contradictory character of the urban concepts 
of avant-garde I will take a closer look into the two, by all means, extraordinary and 
highly controversial projects that had a dramatic impact on whole twentieth century. The 
first one is Le Corbusier’s Plan ‘Voisin’, from 1925 (fig. 2.1), and the other is Ludwig 
Hilberseimer’s Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung, from 1928 (fig. 2.2). There are a lot of 
similarities in approach, philosophy and strategy between Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer, 
and that is most obvious in comparison of these two urban planes. Both projects emanate 
from previously developed plans for a gigantic cities – Le Corbusier’s Contemporary City 
for Three Million Inhabitants (Ville contemporaine pour trois millions d'habitants) of 
1922, and Hilberseimer’s Highrise City (Hochhausstadt) of 1924 – that are intend to be 
built on a clear site, without any limitations and independent of  historical context or 
existing conditions.  Plan ‘Voisin’ and Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung are just parts, almost 
random fragments, of these utopian metropolises, thrown into the center of two most 
congested and densest cities of the time: Paris and Berlin. 
 
Plan ‘Voisin’ proposes a total demolition of a frowzy business quarter, with the area of 
more than five square kilometers on the right bank of Seine, in the heart of Paris. At that 
place it is meant to be built 28 ‘cartesian’ skyscrapers (commercial city) and blocks of 
dwellings with ‘set-backs’(residential city), surrounded with vast green areas and 
gardens, and bisected by a ‘speedway’. The plan accomplishes Le Corbusier’s four basic 
principles for a future city-planning, promoted in the report made to the Town Planning 
Congress of Strasbourg in 1923: to de-congest the centers of cities, to increase the density 
of the centers of cities, to increase the means whereby traffic can circulate, to increase the 
green and open spaces.2 
 
                                                 
2 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 
100 
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 2.1 Le Corbusier, Plan ‘Voisin’, 1925, (fragment) 
      
 
       2.2 Ludwig Hilberseimer, Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung, 1928 
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In a similar way as Le Corbusier in Paris, Hilberseimer with his Vorschlag zur City-
Bebauung makes a frontal attack on the most important district in Berlin, the area 
between Tiergarten and Museumsinsel. In his proposal Hilberseimer relates the 
residential and commercial functions by superimposing apartment slabs on commercial 
volumes in a 600 meter by 100 meter city blocks and coordinating the pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic specific to each in separate levels. What is interesting is that 
Hilberseimer starts from the single room as the constituent element of habitation, and then 
turns it into the block which in its endless repetition forms a city. The result is 18 
residential slabs on the top of 3 giant commercial blocks that create a monolithic 
monotony, without any possibility of irregularity, and without a single tree or grassy area. 
Hilberseimer’s regardless repetitions of basic unite promotes the room into the decisive 
factor of urban configuration. 
 
Both these projects essentially belong to the same tradition and share the same 
‘weltanschauung’. Their differences are not fundamental, but rather technical. 3  The aim 
of all their endeavors is to overcome the uncontrolled contingency of existing condition 
that promise nothing but uncertain future, and to create environment that will give a firm 
ground, a sense of security, reliability and joy, as well as satisfaction of all basic material 
needs. “A form of town planning which preoccupied itself with our happiness or our 
misery and which attempted to create happiness and expel misery would be a noble 
service in this age of confusion.”4 The final goal is to provide comfort for man in every 
possible way. For Le Corbusier “the human scale must always be the ultimate factor in 
mind of the architect who has to design the immense blocks of buildings which are 
necessitated by the practical and financial considerations. There must never come a time 
when people can be bored in our city.”5 He claims that the old cities are not just 
dysfunctional but also, and maybe even more importantly, a “depressing elements in our 
lives.”6 Hilberseimer goes even further and, in his writings, he much more explicitly 
propagates anthropocentric perception of reality: “Plan we must, not only economically, 
                                                 
3 Hilberseimer criticizes Le Corbusier’s project only for mistake in calculation of possible density of the 
residential areas and inadequate traffic solution.  
4 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 59 
5 Ibid., p. 238 
6 Ibid., p. 240 
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but always and primarily for the benefit of man. We should always bear in mind that at 
the center of all things is man – man who creates everything and for whom everything is 
created. Our real problem is life itself. [...] Life has cultural as well as material aims. 
Planning can be one of the means for their realization.”7  
 
Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer propose, “...architecture which is direct and free from all 
romantic reminiscences, in agreement with present daily life, not subjective and 
individualistic, but objective and universal... Clarity, logic, thoughtfulness will lead to 
unification.”8 But, at the same time, they deliberately maintain a high level of idealism 
and abstraction that practically insures that their projects will permanently stay in the 
realm of imagination and fantasy. It is as if they are afraid, maybe even subconsciously, 
that with realizations of their projects they would lose something that they cannot afford 
to lose, something that is an urgent necessity – the utopia itself. 
  
This considerably corresponds with Karl Mannheim’s theory, who claims that in the 
conditions of no utopia – utopia as an ideal place of perfect control and order – man 
dramatically endangers his self-proclaimed position of the ultimate subject. 
“The disappearance of utopia brings about a static state of affairs in which man himself 
becomes no more than a thing. [...] with the relinquishment of utopias, man would lose 
his will to shape history, and therewith his ability to understand it.” 9 In this way the 
utopia becomes the guarantee that man remains the determinate agent in the world 
processes. 
 
It is clear that both architects develop and use the same formal language in endeavor to 
formulate their programs. Both projects, Plan ‘Voisin’ and Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung, 
are conceived by the strict rules of geometry, regularity, right angles, straight lines, 
precision, calculations, statistics and measurement. They rely only on the sure paths of 
reason. In almost obsessive urge to escape from confusion, randomness and irrationality, 
                                                 
7 Ludwig Hilberseimer, The New City: Principles of Planning, (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1944), p. 166 
8 Ludwig Hilberseimer, ’Berlin School of Architecture of the Twenties’, from K. Michael Hays, Modernism 
and Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1995),  p. 255 
9 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, (London: Routledge, 1960), p. 236 
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Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer use simple solid bodies – the cube, the sphere, the prism, 
the cylinder, the pyramid, the cone. The pure compositional elements produce formal 
clarity that imposes order on chaos, in the most concrete ways. And the chaos is their 
worst nightmare. “Chaos surrounds us, unformed, but certain to push into form, [...] 
chaos, the attendant of civilization that brings all manner of frustration to figural 
formation.”10 According to them this chaos is a ‘modern slavery’ and freedom could be 
attained only through order. “I built up an ordered system [...] as would replace with 
advantage the present chaos to which we are subjected.”11  
 
K. Michael Hays sees this exaggerated tendency towards order and unification as a kind 
of paranoia. In his book Modernism and the Posthumanist Subject, which examines 
Hilberseimer’s work, he writes: “what seems to structure Hilberseimer’s punctually felt 
urge to totalize is a kind of paranoia: a paranoia that is all too cognizant of distraction as 
the fundamental condition of everyday life, all too aware of a world out of control, and 
that consequently tries to fend off the threatening and destructive identification between 
the discursive formations of architecture and social reality in favor of some more 
affirmational construction of the same.”12 However, what they create is not just an order 
and pragmatic functionality, as we could easily conclude. What we see in Le Corbusier’s 
and even more Hilberseimer’s perspective drawings of their urban projects (fig. 2.3 and 
fig 2.4) is a metropolis as s gigantic molar machine involving large-scale social, technical, 
and economic systems intercommunicating with architectural elements. But the endless 
repetition of the same cellular blocks without any climax, without any form of direction, 
without subjectivity, and even without any trace of error or illogicality, produces an 
environment that is primarily defined by the absence – the absence of self identity, the 
absence of closure, the absence of determinate meaning, and what is most important, the 
absence of subjective interiority of creator or viewer.  
                                                 
10 Ludwig Hilberseimer, ’Schopfung und Entwicklung’, from K. Michael Hays, Modernism and 
Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1995),  p. 210 
11 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 
212 
12 K. Michael Hays, Modernism and Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig 
Hilberseimer, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995),  p. 274 
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 2.3 Le Corbusier, Contemporary City, 1922 
 
   
 2.4 Ludwig Hilberseimer, Hochhausstadt, 1924 
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What Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer present is not a neutral context, but rather an 
explicit manifestation of a value judgment. Instead of a healing process, they imply an 
urban surgery that amputates not just urgent practical problems of the metropolis, but also 
the very subject that generates these problems. In order to prevent any possible error or 
malfunction of the system they create the environment that is deliberately deprived of 
human touch – a self-referential mechanism concerned only with its own objecthood.   
 
In these two projects both architects use architecture not just in a Marxist sense, as a keen 
edged weapon in the class struggle13, but even in a more radical way: they are delineating 
the new position of subject and producing new categories of experience that might led to 
the construction of a new consciousness. K. Michael Hays indicates two basic methods in 
Hilberseimer’s construction of the new metropolitan subject: “First, banality, triviality, 
and everydayness are now the proper material for a theory of art and architectural 
production. This much Hilberseimer gathered from dada. A rarefied and autonomous 
aesthetic is no longer possible in the modern city, whether for pleasurable aloofness or for 
resistance; instead a practice enmeshed in the everyday lifeworld is demanded. Second, 
the subject itself, to the extent of its relation with the structure of the everyday, cannot be 
thought of as autonomous. Objectively structured like a mode of production, the subject is 
not so much an abstraction as a ‘neutrum’. The character of the subject is given from the 
outside, and contradictorily.”14 
 
In this new metropolis the paternal fiction of humanist thought does no longer exist. In a 
same way as Joyce tells the story of one object in a course of one day– and in the case of 
Ulysses that object is a human body that happens to be named Mr. Bloom – Le Corbusier 
and Hilberseimer create a scenario for a movement of a human body in a large urban 
system. That body is practically an object, which does not have its own free will and only 
fulfils previously defined program. It is not just that ‘the house is a machine for living 
in’15, but a man is also a machine; one that performs a function of living. The ideal 
                                                 
13 Both, Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer, openly inclined to the leftist and Marxist worldview. 
14 K. Michael Hays, Modernism and Posthumanist Subject: The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig 
Hilberseimer, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995),  p. 244 
15 Le Corbusier, Ka pravoj aarhitekturi, (Beograd: Gradjevinska knjiga, 1999), p. XLV, my translation 
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resident of their cities is – to describe it in Antonin Artaud’s words – “a walking 
automaton.”16 Only in this way the mechanism is really functional and complete.  
 
Even Hilberseimer himself, later in his life, admits that Hochhausstadt is, in fact, 
radically dehumanized urban environment: “result was more a necropolis than a 
metropolis, sterile landscape of asphalt and cement, inhuman in every respect.”17 There is 
no place for a Cartesian subject in these cities. This new metropolis constructs a condition 
with a zero ground of identity; a system in which each person could be a double instead 
of itself.  It reduces a man to the most basic and the most primitive mode of existence, 
and inaugurates alienation as a necessity; the only possible way of dealing with reality. 
To put it in a Peter Sloterdijk’s words: “Alienation is simply the mode of being of 
Anyone.”18 The post-humanist subject that inhabits these cities is precisely that ‘Anyone’. 
It is just a repetition of a pattern of certain behavior. It is a faceless man, as depicted in 
George Grosz paintings (fig.2.5), that like a ghost mindlessly roams through the streets of 
the cities, and becomes a mere fragment of the quotidian metropolis experience. We 
could say that here a man is a ‘living dead’; a specter from the metaphysics that no longer 
exists. 
 
This is what makes Le Corbusier’s and Hilberseimer’s projects truly modernists. They 
offer ingenious glance into an entirely new world – a world that, although provides all 
material necessities, does not provide one simple and ostensibly implicit thing – the 
home.  That is an image of a new metaphysics, daringly waiting for a man to confront it. 
 
  
                                                 
16 In 1924 Antonin Artaud wrote: ’I am a walking automaton’, quoted from Jean Baudrillard, The 
Conspiracy of Art, (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), p.236 
17 Ludwig Hilberseimer, ’Entfaltung einer Planungsidee’, from K. Michael Hays, Modernism and 
Posthumanist Subject:    The Architecture of Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1995),  p. 270 
18 Peter Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical Reason, (Minneapolis: Uinversity of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 385 
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                    2.5 George Grosz, Untitled, 1920 
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2.2.  How can so much ‘badness’ sometimes lead to a kind of    
intelligence? 
 
 
“It is in such space that the pure architectural object is born, an object beyond the 
control of architects, which roundly repudiates the city and its uses, repudiates the 
interests of the collectivity and individuals and persists in its own madness. That 
object has no equivalent, except perhaps the arrogance of the cities of the 
Renaissance.” 1  – Jean Baudrillard 
 
 
The projects that were discussed in the previous chapter could be put under the term 
‘heroic avant-garde’ – heroic because architects daringly take the responsibility, and by 
entering into unknown they see the architecture as the solution of the social crisis. They 
disclaim the possibility of graduate improvement of the old cities and they demand a total 
transformation of the urban environment. Their common motto could be expressed in Le 
Corbusier’s well known slogan – “Architecture or revolution.”2 The revolution could be 
avoided by inventing of a new architecture.  
 
                                                 
1 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 17 
2 Le Corbusier, Ka pravoj aarhitekturi, (Beograd: Gradjevinska knjiga, 1999), p. 225, my translation 
96 
 
What is inherent almost for all European architects at the time is that they consistently 
reject the idea that the imagination of one planner must work within the existing system. 
They believe that the world in which they live is expired, and that it should be replaced 
with a new one, which is radically different and better. They are not subordinating to the 
reality, neither accepting the conditions of that reality, they are constructing completely 
new systems. This is radical criticism based on transcendent principles and it implies the 
solutions only from the outside. These architects’ attitude toward architecture is 
intellectual and idealistic. Their cities are completely alternative societies, intended as a 
revolution in the politics and economics as well as in the architecture. They represent the 
triumph of order and rationality over the chaos, despair and delirium. 
 
The vast majority of these projects were never realized. They stayed in a realm of fantasy 
and far away from reality. There is, however, one urban concept from the same period, 
which reacts on the same social conditions and it attempts to solve the same problems, but 
in a radically different way than the above-mentioned. And unlike the European avant-
garde projects, it is very real and alive. It is a plan for New York City – or Manhattan, to 
be more precise. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Manhattan 
becomes an incubator of the new culture of Industrial age, with the architecture as a 
collective experiment of metropolitan life. 
 
It is quite paradigmatic that precisely this city is perceived by the most eminent European 
architects as a true embodiment of a pure enemy. New York presents everything what 
they stand against, and what they fear the most. Here I will once again return to Le 
Corbusier and Ludwing Hilberseimer, as the harshest critics of this city. For them, New 
York is not only the continuation of the agony of a contemporary city, but it is the 
ultimate stage of that agony. Hilberseimer sees Manhattan as nothing but ‘disorder and 
chaos’ (fig 2.6). He believes that the main purpose of planning is to provide a framework 
for life; something that acutely lacks in that city. “One wonders how life in all its ways 
can be maintained in such an over-congested area as Manhattan has become.”3  
 
                                                 
3 Ludwig Hilberseimer, The New City: Principles of Planning, (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1944), p. 157 
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                 2.6 New York, illustration from Ludwig Hilberseimer, The New City:  
                 Principles of Planning 4 
 
                  
                 2.7 New York, illustration from Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow  
                 and Its Planning 5 
                                                 
4 Ludwig Hilberseimer, The New City: Principles of Planning, (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1944), p. 53 
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Le Corbusier is even more critical of New York, considering it a “despairing city”, even a 
“cataclysm.”6 For him, there is only ‘confusion, chaos and upheaval’ (fig. 2.7). “New 
York is exciting and upsetting. [...] New York is not beautiful, and if it stimulates our 
practical activities, it also wounds our sense of happiness.”7 Manhattan is “a sort of 
intensely active form of capital for the mad speculation of private enterprise.”8 Although 
he admits that New York has provided some inevitable means, such as the skyscraper 
(that noble instrument), it still is, in essence, a “barbarian city.”9 It still wears the clothes 
of pre-mechanical humanity. Le Corbusier’s obsession with Manhattan goes so far that he 
constantly compares it with his own projects (fig.2.8). Manhattan is always a reference of 
the exact opposite of what a contemporary city should be and what kind of life it should 
provide. The main and unforgivable problem of Manhattan is that it is not rational 
enough; it lacks order and harmony – and with that consequently, what is most important, 
it lacks freedom. According to Le Corbusier, freedom could only be achieved through 
order10, and only then cities will become beautiful and bring happiness.   
 
This harsh criticism towards Manhattan indicates, in a certain way, the significance of the 
processes that were taking place there at the time. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century this island becomes the center of the turmoil, but also the laboratory of yet 
unprecedented explosion of creativity and imagination. Numerous inventions that are 
produced in that environment dramatically change not only physical image of the city, but 
also the man himself, his priorities, habits and affinities.  
                                                                                                                                                  
5 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 45 
6 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 63 
7 Ibid., p. 60 
8 Ibid., p. 96 
9 Ibid., p. 76 
10 Ibid., p. 214 
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                2.8 New York and Contemporary City, illustration from Le Corbusier,  
               The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning 11 
 
The most valuable product of this laboratory is, without any doubt, the skyscraper – the 
embodiment of the perfect intersection of, by that time, entirely incompatible elements: 
the ultimate pragmatism and the aesthetic of spectacle. The skyscraper becomes a stage 
for intellectual and emotional adventure that, by sequence of ingenious solutions, creates 
‘the culture of congestion’ – the only possible model of life in the metropolis. This brings 
an entirely new mode of behavior in which, paradoxically, congestion ceases to be a 
negativity and flaw, and becomes a kind of a quality, when exceeds a certain limit. To put 
it in Jean Baudrillard words: “Why do people live in New York? [...] there is no human 
reason to be here, except for the sheer ecstasy of being crowded together.”12 This 
condition does not offers comfort or joy, in the literal sense of the word, but provides the 
setting required for a readjustment and reconciliation of man’s consciousness with new-
emerging reality. Walter Benjamin speaks of the congestion as a necessity of modern man 
– “a man who plunges into the crowd as into a reservoir of electric energy.”13 In crowd 
people are put in a “position of having to stare at one another for minutes or even hours 
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 173 
12 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 15 
13 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken books, 2007), p. 175 
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on end without exchanging a word.”14 The culture of congestion creates a mechanism of 
alienation that enables a man to become a faceless object, deprived of personal identity, 
and in the same time a part of some abstract whole which now takes the role of the 
subject.  
 
But it is not the skyscraper alone that made all these radical changes in a perceiving and 
consuming a world of metropolis. Rem Koolhaas in his theoretical work Delirious New 
York recognizes, through very detailed analyses, the three main elements that crucially 
influence the development of Manhattan: grid, lobotomy and schism. 15  
 
Manhattan’s Grid (fig. 2.9) is proposed at the beginning of the 19th century. In spite of its 
apparent neutrality it implies very rigid intellectual program for the island. In the words 
of Koolhaas, “it claims superiority of metal construction over reality”16. The two-
dimensional discipline of the Grid creates absolute freedom for three-dimensional 
anarchy. The whole city is turned into the archipelago of islands, each with equally 
limited conditions, and each with undreamt potential. Manhattan becomes the Venice of 
the future – a block becomes an island, a city for itself, which is in the same way as 
ancient Greek Polis’ always in potential war with its own surrounding. That 
competitiveness and inner rivalry of completely autonomous units leads to real expansion 
and delirious development. The Grid makes all previous lessons of urbanism irrelevant. 
Instead of ‘by order bring about freedom’17, Manhattan generates countless amount of 
small chaoses, completely independent of each other, and which infallibly obtain an 
illusion of freedom by pursuing in its own madness. Suddenly, everything is allowed and 
possible. It turns Manhattan in a perfect playground for capitalistic adventures. Capital 
needs architecture as a meaningful discourse. The Grid provides condition for an endless 
specter of various meanings, as long as the supreme meaningless structure itself is 
respected and unthreatened.  
  
                                                 
14 Georg Simmel, quote from Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (New York: Schocken books, 2007), p. 191 
15 Delirious New York is first published in 1978, by Thames & Hudson 
16 Rem Koolhass, Delirious New York, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1994), p. 20 
17 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 
214 
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 2.9 Manhattan’s Grid, 1807 
 
The second element that had a dramatic impact on a development of the metropolitan 
architecture is the lobotomy. In the medical sense of the word, the lobotomy is a surgical 
interruption of nerve tracts to and from the frontal lobe of the brain that often results, 
among the other, with the inability of expressing the emotions on the face. Precisely that 
is happening with New York’s skyscrapers. Due to the size of the building, less and less 
square meters of façade represent more and more cube meters of inner space. The 
exaggerated disproportion of container and content leads to a brutal severance between 
the exterior and the interior which now represent two totally separated architectures. One 
refers to the city and contributes to its visual image, and the other, by the use of modern 
technology, fabricates and transforms the memories and iconography, and in that way 
creates the new culture of metropolitan life. This state of architectural lobotomy Jean 
Baudrillard sees as a perfect environment for a contemporary man, who suffers from the 
same symptoms as his architecture.  “All around, the tinted glass facades of the buildings 
are like faces: frosted surfaces. It is as though there were no one inside the buildings, as if 
there were no one behind the faces. And there really is no one. This is what ideal city is 
like.”18 The city becomes a place of encounter of buildings as well as of people; they live 
their lives, both buildings and people, almost independent of each other. A skyscraper and 
a man are fellow citizens; fragments contributing to the same spectacle.  
 
The third element, crucial in the cultural development of the skyscraper, is ‘the Vertical 
Schism’. Koolhaas defines it as “a systematic exploitation of the deliberate disconnection 
                                                 
18 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 63 
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between stories”.19  The interior, entirely autonomous due to the lobotomy, becomes 
vertically separated in fragments that do not depend from one another, and each of them 
is evolving according to its own needs, regardless of the whole. Now, the exterior of the 
building can finally be completely dedicated only to formalism. Eventually, that leads to 
the skyscraper’s ultimate goal – the maximum congestion in combination with the 
maximum of light and space, and the beauty in accordance with the maximum income 
that should be developed. This formula becomes the holy law for all metropolitan 
architecture in the twentieth century. 
 
These strategies created a prototype of the modern metropolis that stands as a parallel to 
the abstract European utopias. Instead of the spectacle of surgical cuts, which we can find 
in projects of Le Corbusier and Hilberseimer, we have here “the aesthetic form of 
mutation.”20 Its instruments are not necessarily architectural masterpieces, but rather an 
apparatus for inventing the city life. This fabric of experience reacts on every problem 
impulsively; utterly pragmatically; in a delirium of improvisation on the stage and in front 
of everybody; without a clear concept or a vision of the ultimate result. The creators of 
Manhattan do not disqualify the reality; they are accepting it with all its imperfections, 
and very devotedly (sometimes even to the point of absurdity) examine its potential. They 
are acting strictly within already existing system, and they do not tend toward ‘the ideal 
future’, but rather to ‘the satisfying now’. That random and subconscious immanent 
criticism of society – relying only on the laws of the market – brought to one unexpected 
but precious quality. Who could predict that so many mediocre buildings together can 
generate such a fantastic architectural spectacle? 
 
This city inaugurates an alternative to the traditional way of thinking where everything is 
subordinated to that beloved subject called man. The mechanisms which are here 
invented produce a new urban environment that is deprived of any form of 
anthropocentrism and therefore it is not captivated by the old demons of humanism, and 
does not suffer of sympathy, solace, or remorse. What we are witnessing is a harsh 
confrontation with a new paradigm, which designs man in a way that he can fit into this 
new condition and find his place different than the center of being. Architecture of this 
                                                 
19 Rem Koolhass, Delirious New York, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1994), p. 105 
20 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 23 
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city is not necessarily human; it even does not pretend to be. It extends beyond the 
borders of humanism, and opens the realm of possibilities; it enters into an unknown 
territory, a no man’s land. As Jean Baudrillard has written, describing New York 
architecture: “No, architecture should not be humanized. Anti-architecture, the true sort, 
the wild, inhuman type that is beyond the measure of man was made here – made itself 
here – in New York, without considerations of setting, well-being, or ideal ecology. It 
opted for hard technologies, exaggerated all dimensions, gambled on heaven and hell...” 21 
 
The new metropolis is a place where we certainly cannot find a cozy, warm home that 
will provide us security, comfort and joy. Instead, it is a drafty place of uncertainties; a 
provisional shelter; a terminal and a point of departure; a getaway; an exile... It might as 
well be Joyce’s metaphysical Dublin, furnished with the millions of people in the streets, 
wandering, carefree, violent, as if they had nothing better to do – and doubtless they have 
nothing else to do – than to produce the permanent scenario of the city. It is a place for 
nomads, drifters, vagabonds, flâneurs, orphans, abandoned, homeless and lost; all the 
fugitives from the old world. 
 
And it is quite prophetic and well fitting that on the southern extreme of the island stands 
the memorial stone carved with the words:  The impoverished and suffering, the helpless 
and exiled, let them come to me. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 17 
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2.3.  Brobdingnagian Playground 
 
 
“We all complain that we are confronted by urban environments that are completely 
similar. We say we want to create beauty, identity, quality, singularity. And yet, 
maybe in truth these cities that we have are desired. Maybe their very 
caracterlessness provides the best context for living.”1 – Rem Koolhaas 
 
 
The two previous chapters present two different and essentially opposed models of how 
the modernism explored the possibilities of its large-scale embodiment, in the first half of 
twentieth century. The strategies that both models produce are the mechanisms for 
shaping the reality and examining of its potential. But the world that we experience today 
is not strictly based on either of these two models. None of the models without 
considering the other one could be taken as an ultimate pattern for a contemporary 
metropolis. A city that we now have is rather an unexpected and strange encounter of 
these concepts that results in a kind of a mutation, which is not easy to fully perceive or 
theorize. 
 
Despite the contradictory elements in its origin – one utopian and ordered, and the other 
pragmatic and chaotic – what the modern metropolis unmistakably takes from each of 
                                                 
1 ‘From Bauhaus to Koolhaas’, interview with Rem Koolhaas, Wired Magazine, Issue 4.07, (July 1996) 
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these elements and faithfully maintains is the attitude toward the man and distinctive 
treatment of subject – from which the discontinuation with humanism is more than 
obvious.  This we may consider as the main substance of Modernism; its true nature, 
which now manifests itself in unimaginable and even obscene fashion.  
 
The new metropolis plays with the instruments inherited from utopian avant-garde and 
Manhattan, and in that way establishes the coherent narrative of Modernism, which 
ingeniously proceeds in its autopoiesis. As the example of continuation of this narrative I 
would like to mention one project, which plays a quite controversial role in recent history 
of architecture by being labeled as the end of Modernism. It is the Pruitt-Igoe mass 
housing project in St. Louis (fig 2.10).   
 
Designed by architect Minory Yamasaki it was built in 1954, during a period of urban 
renewal in the U.S., during which slums were cleared and replaced by high-density tower 
blocks. The complex housed 15,000 people in 2,700 units. By the 1970 it was considered 
one of the most dangerous housing projects and was slated for demolition. After 
demolition, that started in 1972 and finished in 1976, complex is widely used as a symbol 
for the failure of Modernism. Charles Jencks went so far and claimed that this demolition, 
with its big ‘Boom’, symbolically declared the death of modern architecture: “Modern 
Architecture died in St. Louis, Missouri on July 15, 1972 at 3.32 pm (or thereabouts) 
when the infamous Pruitt Igoe scheme, or rather several of its slab blocks, were given the 
final coup de grâce by dynamite.”2  
 
Postmodernist critics took Pruitt-Igoe as a symbol of modernism not because it is a par 
excellence great achievement of modern architecture, for obviously it is not, but rather 
because of its irresistible, but purely formal, resemblance with iconic projects of 
European avant-garde that played with tabula rasa as its main instrument. One of the 
obvious doubles of Pruitt-Igoe is certainly a project that is already mentioned here, 
Hilberseimer’s Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung (fig. 2.11), where the visual appearance, at 
the first glance, seems almost identical. They needed a strong gesture, a big explosion that 
in a spectacular way points to the erasure of the image that everybody have of modern 
                                                 
2 Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1977), p. 9 
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architecture. They raise the meaning of this event to the level of the exact time and place 
when and where one era ends and other begins. 
 
      
     2.10 Minoru Yamasaki, Pruitt-Igoe, St. Louis, 1954 
 
      
     2.11 Ludwig Hilberseimer, Vorschlag zur City-Bebauung, 1928 
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But what Jencks and other postmodernists could not know is that even 40 years after 
demolition of the complex the site will still be vacant and abundant. Today a visitor of the 
Pruitt-Igoe will find a wild urban forest born from decades of neglect. The housing 
complex is demolished, and now what? What should take place of the episteme that 
ceases to exist? Certainly, it should be the new one, or at least some previous one. So, 
where is it?  
 
Precisely this vacancy of site tells us much more about our current condition than we 
could naively assume. It gently reviles a kind of an obscure quality that indicates how 
modernism actually functions.  
 
The old cities of the Renaissance had a strong identity and, what Walter Benjamin would 
called, an   alluring aura, because they perfectly combined two fullnesses of being – a city 
as such and its monuments, where the monuments produced a mental image that 
integrated the rest of the city in one unique whole. As Anthony Vidler said, “...it was 
neither the ‘reality’ of the city nor a purely imaginary ‘utopia’ but rather the complex 
mental map of significance by which the city might be recognized as ‘home’, as 
something not foreign, and as constituting a (more or less) moral and protected 
environment for actual daily life. [...] Brunelleschi’s dome was, in this sense, a metaphor, 
whose physical presence constantly reminded the population of their metaphysical bonds. 
It took its place at the centre of a ‘memory map’...”3  
 
The modern metropolis produces the exact opposite. It uses a tabula rasa as an 
instrument for dislocation of the memory from the city. First, it literally demolishes the 
old city and then replaces it with an endless repetition of the one same pattern that by its 
monotonousness actually disables any possibility of memory. It purifies the signs of any 
meaning, as Baudrillard says, “For the sign to be pure, it has to duplicate itself: it is 
duplication of the sign which destroys meaning.”4 This is a form of erasure, literal and 
figural, of the city itself, in favor of an entirely new condition that does not belong to the 
                                                 
3 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992), pp. 177-178 
4 Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983), p. 136 
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narrative of humanism. The man, who normally has an expectation within a world that 
potentially exhibits the fullness of being, now suddenly realizes that it turns out to be 
haunted by absence instead. To quote Vidler again, “the figure-ground city of modernism 
was founded on the erasure of two fullnesses of being, that is to say on what Peter 
Eisenman has termed ‘the presence of absence’.”5 
 
Postmodernists took demolition of Yamasaki’s Pruitt-Igoe and turned it into a desperate 
attempt to retrieve fullness of being. However, the reality is that now the site is empty; 
there is nothing except for the specters of once-present but unfulfilled future. A true irony 
of the Pruitt-Igoe project is that when the complex was built it was a mediocre 
architecture, generally insignificant and just one of many, but now when the buildings are 
gone it become a literal representation of something that is one of the most essential 
characteristics of modernism – ’a not present presence’. This vacant site allowed for 
modernism to fully materialize its most inner desire: to substitute the memories from the 
past with the memories from the future. And, if we want to be a little bit cynical, it 
managed to be nostalgic for the events that actually never happened. This is a clear 
example of how tabula rasa is not just a label for a brutal demolition of everything 
existing, but it is turned into a dangerous and very sophisticated weapon of Modernism. It 
enables for the metropolis to freely generate not just its physical body, but even more 
importantly its own memory, which now is no longer necessarily dependent of human 
ontology.  
 
This profoundly destabilizing mechanism of forgetting, implemented in the general idea 
of memory, opened the whole range of possibilities for the large-scale development of the 
new urban structure, which Koolhaas defines as the Generic cities. Suddenly, the city 
starts to emerge in a pure formal play of repetition of a simple structural module, beyond 
the control, or even consciousness, of its own creators. Fragment by fragment the forms 
are composing the reality that is no longer charged with meaning, or interaction of values. 
As Baudrillard says, “Only form can cancel out value. [...] only form can oppose the 
exchange of values. Form is unthinkable without the idea of metamorphosis. 
                                                 
5 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992), p. 182 
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Metamorphosis moves from form to form without the intervention of value. No meaning, 
either ideological or aesthetic, can be drawn from it. It enters the play of illusion: a form 
only refers to the other forms with no circulation of meaning.”6  
 
The reality appears to be only a collection of fragmented images independent of man and 
indifferent to his tendency to interpret and rationalize. In this new city man could not be 
more further from the Alberti’s world of Renaissance, where everything was subordinated 
to him, and only him. Now the man is dispossessed of its privilege and is no longer the 
origin of the coordinates, but one point among the others. In this sense Koolhaas defines 
the Generic city as “the city liberated from the captivity of center, from the straightjacket 
of identity”7, in which we are “...second class citizens in our own civilization, 
disenfranchised by the dumb coincidence of our collective exile from the centre.”8 It 
seems that the utopia as we once knew is gone and it is relevant to ask if it is still possible 
at all to orchestrate a coherent (to say nothing of a dignified) civic milieu? „It would 
require a second innocence to believe, at the end of the twentieth century, that the urban - 
the built - can be planned and mastered. Too many architects’ ’visions’ have bitten the 
dust to propose new additions to this chimeral battalion“.9 The man is no longer in charge 
of the critical apparatus; he is no longer in a riding seat in terms of steering or 
conceptualizing its urban environment. 
 
The place of the most important and dramatic outburst of this new development at the end 
of the twentieth and the beginning of twenty-first century is certainly China. The cities 
like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chongqing, and others, became gigantic 
experimental laboratories of social and urban processes. We might say that they took over 
the role that Manhattan had some hundred years earlier, but in the scale and volume that 
is incomparable and  yet unprecedented.  
 
China re-examines the validity of tabula rasa in a way and a range that is unimaginable 
for U.S. or Europe.  It can do what others could not. The well known God-like hand of Le 
                                                 
6 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art, (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), p. 73 
7 Rem Koolhaas, SMLXL, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995), p. 1250 
8 Ibid., p. 1249 
9 Rem Koolhaas, SMLXL, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995), p. 974 
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Corbusier hovering over Paris, and threatening to wipe aside the entire district and replace 
it with glass towers (fig. 2.12), has turned into a mighty hand of Deng Xiaoping above 
China. Only unlike Le Corbusier, who was just a lucid visionary without a means or 
conditions to materialize his plans in their fullness, Xiaoping has all the power in the 
world to execute the biggest urban surgery that the world has ever seen.  The words of 
Louis XIV “We wish it” and “Such is our pleasure” that Le Corbusier often quoted as the 
ultimate mantra necessary for the radical and uncompromising revolution of the city10, 
now in China become the undeniable arguments of capital and power. 
                                                 
                      
                     2.12 Le Corbusier’s hand above the model of Plan ’Voisin’ 
 
The Olympic Games 2008, in Beijing, were one of the key moments of the most rapid and 
convulsive urban demolition. By the year of 2005, some 300 000 people had lost their 
homes to Olympic-related construction.11  The destruction of the city’s vernacular hutong 
fabric, with its narrow lanes and alleys (some of them dating back to the Ming Dynasty), 
entirely changed not just the face of the city to the point that it became unrecognizable, 
but also amputated the unique generator of mentality of the people that lived in that city. 
As Thomas J. Campanella says, “Beijing’s hutong were a superlative example of 
                                                 
10 Le Corbusier, The City of To-Morrow and Its Planning, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2000), p. 
302 
11 Data and numbers are taken from Thomas J. Campanella, The Concrete Dragon: China’s Urban 
Revolution and What It Means for the World, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), p.129 
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humanistic urbanism, the very antithesis of the sprawling high-rise housing that has 
blanketed vast areas of urban China in recent years.”12 In the last few decades 90 per cent 
of Beijing’s buildings have been razed and replaced.  
 
Urban renewal was equally radical and extensive in Shanghai, where more than half a 
million people were tossed out of the inner city districts. Their homes are replaced with 
slabs or towers, designed to meet the demands of the current market forces, regardless of 
the context or historical heritage (fig. 2.13). More recently the whole Minhang District 
was cleared, and residents relocated, only to make a way in the city center for the main 
site of the 2010 World Exposition. This expeditious exchange of the city’s historical 
fabric with the temporal pavilions that are meant to serve for one exhibition, one show 
only, perfectly exemplifies the agenda of the new urban mechanism. The expo site can be 
reasonably  linked to a miniature city;  it arises and dissipates like a dream, has no settled  
 
 
2.13 Typical block in Shangai, emerged in the place of demolished city’s historical fabric, 
2010 
                                                 
12 Thomas J. Campanella, The Concrete Dragon: China’s Urban Revolution and What It Means for the 
World, (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2008), pp.148-149 
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inhabitants, and is populated almost entirely by passersby. The restless, ceaseless change 
of metropolitan life finds itself reflected in the expo, in exaggerated form. Nothing is 
certain and nothing can be taken for granted or trustworthy. 
 
Chinese urban renewal and the consequently followed migration of the people have the 
magnitude of the world war, a colossal exodus, unequaled in the peace time in the human 
history. In the new world of modernity, the homelessness is the ultimate and inevitable 
state, an axiom – if you do not leave your home, the home will leave you, and most likely 
in a quite literal way. 
 
This new condition of no-home, a tabula rasa of identity as well as the material habitat, 
conjoint with the accelerated development, quite unexpectedly opened a whole range of 
possibilities of modern metropolitan experiences. Freed from regular urban-design 
conventions and charged with vast pool of cheap construction labor, Chinese cities 
became an incredible empty canvas for innovations and a flood tide of lucrative 
commissions for design and planning professionals around the world. But, as Koolhaas 
remarks, “the absence, on the one hand, of plausible, universal doctrins and the presence, 
on the other, of an unprecedented intensity of production have created a unique, wrecking 
conditions: the urban seems to be least understood at the very moment of its 
apotheosis.“13  
 
Subordinated only to its own logic, the new metropolis becomes capable to combine and 
juxtapose absolute oppositions and contradictions, and bring them in coexistence in a 
single system, without any critical thinking or value judgment (fig. 2.14). Koolhaas 
defines this phenomenon as the ‘Photoshop’. “PHOTOSHOP© is a metaphor of what 
architectural production is becoming: something strictly mechanical, reproducible without 
thinking, unlimited in terms of all the options that can be combined in a single image, the 
most decisive way of conceiving the city.“14 “The city of exacerbated difference”, as 
Koolhaas calls it, “is not the methodological creation of ideal, but the opportunistic 
                                                 
13 Rem Koolhaas, Great Leap Forward: Harvard Design School Project on the City, (Koln: Taschen 
GmbH, 2001), p. 27 
14 Rem Koolhaas, Mutations, (Barcelona: Actar, 2001), p. 320 
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exploitation of flukes, accidents, and imperfections.“15 These unexpected encounters, 
randomly combined layers of forms and structures, where a glass skyscraper can be 
stocked in the middle of vernacular settlements, or a dense high rise dwelling put next to 
rice fields, without any intermediate condition, enables for residence of these cities to 
experience contrasts and diversities unimaginable in previous times. What was once 
separated by time and space now is merged and agglutinated in a single image. One can 
be in the middle of wild nature, but at a same time in a centre of metropolis; 
simultaneously everywhere and nowhere.  
 
  
 2.14 Shanghai, 2010  – unexpected enconters  
                 
The hipper-fabrication of the city, which generates itself in a manic manner, succeeded to 
reprogram the quality of archetypal urban elements and spaces. The best example is one 
of the greatest and most famous squares in China, Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. In the last 
few decades this public space experienced an absolute metaphysical transformation. What 
was once a city’s social heart, a place where you would see people playing cards and 
                                                 
15 Rem Koolhaas, Great Leap Forward: Harvard Design School Project on the City, (Koln: Taschen 
GmbH, 2001), p. 29 
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flying kites, after the period of frenzy erasing and resetting of urban milieu and collective 
memory, it turned into a no man’s land, a void, an open space that could be anywhere, 
with no articulated meaning, or nostalgia whatsoever. If we are standing or walking in the 
middle of that vast solemn square we feel as if we are lost in one of Malevich’s paintings. 
We find ourselves in an artificial desert with scattered objects drained of its genuine 
character and with one obscure twist of aura. It is not that the aura does not exist, but it is 
dislocated out of our perception, or at least out of the place that it used to be. It exists, 
only not for us, but for the objects themselves; for their internal discourse. We are the 
aliens in that space, unable to conceive any form of meaningful or coherent narrative. 
 
Guy Debord defines the spectacle as “capital accumulated to the point where it becomes 
image.”16 The image of metropolis is undeniably one evident and inevitable consequence 
of the play of the capital. But to reduce the objects which emerge in these new cities up to 
the enormous measures only to the spectacle – to some photogenic monumentality 
intended to impress – would be too easy and incautious. The grandiose size of the 
buildings, which is rapidly increasing, has its own inner agenda independent of human 
demands, and even of demands of the market and capital. The bigness is a state that 
provides autonomy and, what is most important, in that way guarantee existence. It is as if 
the objects want to escape from the man, to be safe of destruction.  They try to provide 
themselves the life of their own.  
 
“Objects should not touch”, says Sartre’s hero in Nausea, “I am afraid of being in contact 
with them as though they were living beasts.”17 What we are witnessing here is a 
magnified manifestation of fulfillment of these fears. The inconsistency of inanimate 
objects culminated up to the undreamt proportions. They are conquering their own 
freedom, their own ‘self-consciousness.’ Objects are becoming almost legitimate 
residents of the cities, usurping their rights and living their own reality parallel to man. 
The architecture of metropolis is not a part of man’s historical representational narrative, 
but just a self-referential ‘printed text’ deprived of all origins. The man, sentenced to 
coexist with these new objects, does not utilize them in a traditional way and does not 
                                                 
16 Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, (New York: Zone Books, 1995), p. 24 
17 Paul Sartre, Nausea, (New York: New Directions Publishing, 1964), p. 10 
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develop a sort of intimacy, but rather treats them almost in a way he would treat some 
displayed items or models at the exhibition – passing beside them, with curiosity, 
suspicion and restraint, and always taking good care not to touch (fig. 2.15). “Objects are 
not made to be touched. It is better to slip between them, avoiding them as much as 
possible.”18 (fig. 2.16)  
 
The man is destined to a continuous dérive,19 a labyrinthine wanderings through the city 
that for him has now turned into a gigantic model, a testing ground. We might understand 
this as a fulfillment of his secret and maybe even subconscious desires. Modernism has 
challenged man to confront with his most intimate fears and discomfort. All our reality 
has become experimental, and as Baudrillard says, “modern man is left to limitless 
experimentation on himself.”20 This is a generator of the quest for a new meaning and 
profundity, and a challenge to city and culture. 
 
                         
                        2.15 Model of the city of Shanghai, Shanghai Urban 
Planning Exposition Center, 2010 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 122 
19 “One of the basic situationist practices is the dérive, a technique of rapid passage through varied 
ambiances. Dérives involve playful-constructive behavior and awareness of psychogeographical effects, 
and are thus quite different from the classic notions of journey or stroll.”, Guy Debord, ‘Theory of the 
Dérive’, from Situationist International: Anthology, (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006), p. 62 
20 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art, (New York: Semiotext(e), 2005), p. 181 
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2.16 Pudong district, Shanghai, 2010. People are walking on the elevated paths, 
slipping between the objects, entirely deprived of any possibility of the physical 
contact, as if they are parts of two separate and independent realities. 
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3.   Reinventing Modernism 
 
 
 
“Il faut être absolument modern”1 – Arthur Rimbaud 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 “One must be absolutely modern” – Arthur Rimbaud, Une Saison en Enfer, 1873 
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3.1.  Tilted Arc 
 
 
“The relief and design of structures appears more clearly when content, which is the 
living energy of meaning, is neutralized, somewhat like the architecture of an 
uninhabited or deserted city, reduced to its skeleton by some catastrophe of nature 
or art.”1 – Jacques Derrida 
 
 
In this last part I would like to point out and, in regard with analyses made in previous 
two parts, reinterpret theoretical strategies and design processes in some of the most 
interesting projects of few contemporary architects, of a different generation, that in one 
innovative and daring way explore and render the hidden and obscure agendas of the 
modern society. We can find that these projects, all produced in relatively recent period, 
reveal some essential and constituent elements of the new paradigm, and in that way 
position the contemporary architecture on one common platform with other modern arts, 
making the unique and meaningful cognizance of modernism. Peter Eisenman is the first 
of the architects whose projects are considered.  
 
While still studying at Cambridge, under the tutelage of Colin Rowe, Eisenman perceives 
the Modern Movement as one not fully realized project, and sets itself a goal to carry out 
                                                 
1 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 5 
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the objectives of the movement and bring modern architecture to its fullness. His mission 
becomes to find again for architecture the ideals of modernity; or as Rafael Moneo puts it: 
„Modern architecture had never been fully executed, it had never come to incarnate the 
true spirit of modernity, because of distractions with questions of style and because it had 
made functionalism its banner. True to an attitude toward life that I won’t hesitate to call 
messianic, Eisenman embarked on the intellectual adventure of rescuing from oblivion 
the true spirit of modernity.“ 2 
 
Peter Eisenman speaks on this subject in several of his essays, especially in Post-
Functionalism, first published as editorial in the 6th issue of Oppositions magazine, in 
1976. He brings in question, or rather denies, a leading role of the functionalism in 
modern movement, and defines it as the remains of the metaphysics of humanism that is 
on its deathbed. In this essay Eisenman says, “...functionalism is really no more than a 
late phase of humanism, rather than an alternate to it. And in this sense, it cannot continue 
to be taken as a direct manifestation of that which has been called ‘the modernist 
sensibility.’”3 In that way he sheds a new light on interpretation of architecture of that 
period. His rejection of functionalism derives from more essential thought that 
architecture is not there to provide function or serve in strict utilitarian sense, but, in a 
same way as all other arts, it is a vehicle of man’s exploration and understanding of the 
world that surrounds him. Architecture does not design for bodies, it design bodies. It is a 
quest for cognition of what is the object; that unclear and obscure neighbor. 
 
But what is that ’modernist sensibility’ that Eisenman sees as a new episteme? Before I 
turn to some of his projects I would like to introduce one highly controversial and avant-
garde piece of art that, in my opinion, perfectly exemplifies ’modernist sensibility’, and 
that we can use here as a didactic model for reading of some of Eisenman’s work. It is a 
Richard Serra’s urban sculpture Tilted Arc. Designed and constructed for Federal Plaza, 
New York, in 1981, only to be brutally and barbarically destroyed and removed by United 
States government, in 1989, after a long trial (that started almost immediately after the 
                                                 
2 Rafael Moneo, Theoretical Anxiety and Design Strategies in the Work of Eight Contemporary Architects, 
(Cambridge: The Mit Press, 2004), p. 147 
3 Peter Eisenman, ’Post-Functionalism’, Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings 1963 – 1988, (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 85 
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sculpture is made) and harsh insults and degradation of the author and his work (fig. 3.1). 
One ostensibly simple gesture of a steel curve placed at ordinary public plaza made 
tremendous change in perception and understanding of this space, impossible for anyone 
to ignore. Comfortable centric square suddenly became unclear, uncertain. Center is 
dislocated from the physical center, and as you walk around you are able to locate a 
multiplicity of centers with no predefined hierarchical order. The space and objects are 
not constant, but change as you change. As Serra says, “...the viewer does not simply 
become the subject in relation to the object (the form of most on-going theatre), but 
instead experiences the time and place of subject and object simultaneously.”4 You 
(viewer) are brought into the sculpture; you are sharing the volume of the same space, 
where the sculpture and you are the content.  
 
 
3.1 Richard Serra, Tilted Arc, 1981                     ...after destruction, 1989 
 
                                                 
4 Richard Serra, Writings and Interviews, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
9 
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This deletion of a clear line between the subject (viewer) and the object (piece of art), and 
their merge into one interactive and interdependent unity, where they would have almost 
equal rights, is a quality that makes fundamental distinction between the modern 
sculpture and the one that has been known for centuries. And to enable this quality to 
occur it was necessary that both subject and object are physically brought onto the same 
level; to share the same reality. In regard to this, Serra claims: “The biggest break in the 
history of sculpture in the twentieth century was to remove the pedestal. The historical 
concept of placing sculpture on a pedestal was to establish a separation [of the object] 
from the behavioral space of the viewer. Pedestalized sculpture invariably transfers the 
effect of power by subjugating the viewer to the idealized, memorialized or elegized 
theme. As soon as art is forced or persuaded to serve alien values it ceases to serve its 
own needs.”5 For Serra, the pedestal conventionalizes metaphors of content and puts the 
objects in a discourse of meaning that is out of the concern of art, and makes of them 
something other than art. Once the pedestal is removed the game of immediate 
confrontation and introduction with objects is open. 
 
Serra’s sculpture has no utilitarian or pragmatic value; no assumptions of humanistic 
values that art needs to serve; no considerations about indigenous community and of what 
‘they’ consider to be adequate, appropriate solutions; and it is out of any political or 
ideological agendas. In Serra’s words ’any use is misuse’.6  And precisely this sculpture, 
this modest gesture, which does not represent or mean anything, initiated and mobilized a 
horrifying orchestrated chase, a witch-hunt with most bizarre and senseless accusations, 
and with the strong demand of immediate removal from the plaza. The group of judges, 
state administrators, critics, media, fall upon the sculpture calling it: “rusted steel barrier”, 
“the ugliest outdoor work of art in the city”, “responsible for the plaza’s accumulation of 
graffiti, waste, and litter”, “hostile to the plaza and its context”, “destructive effects on 
social functions in the plaza”, “the piece of nonsense or garbage”, “an arrogant, nose-
thumbing gesture”, “the Berlin Wall”, “the Iron Curtain”, “a scar on the plaza”, “arrogant 
disregard for the mental well-being and physical convenience of the people”, “a cause of 
                                                 
5 Richard Serra, Writings and Interviews, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
170-171 
6 Richard Serra, Writings and Interviews, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 
100 
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the rat problem.” They went so far labeling the sculpture “a terrorist device”!7 But the 
bottom line is that even if any of the above quoted accusations is not really true – and we 
can be perfectly sure that it is not – what this sculpture did do is that it forced a man to 
walk around it, and by that jeopardized his god-given comfort and, even worse, forced 
him to re-value or, at least, to re-think. This was Tilted Arc’s biggest crime and the 
reason, more than good enough, to be destroyed.  
 
Now, if we look at Eisenman’s projects we can find an undeniable similarity in pursuance 
toward non-utilitarian, non-representational object, which stands autonomous, without 
any obligations or responsibility to anybody and it is concerned only with its own 
existence. There is a clear and absolute divorce of form from all reference to association, 
use, and even materiality. It is not any more that the object (house) has to make an effort 
to adjust itself to man, to accommodate his needs and satisfy his demands, but a man has 
to use his power to understand the object and find a model of coexistence.  
 
Eisenman’s buildings only ostensibly aspire to achieve monumentality, firmness and 
certainty. But in closer inspection, as we approach to the building, we realize that the 
things are not exactly as they appear. We find out that it is nearly impossible to figure out 
how to enter the building, because the entrance is not where it seems to be 8; the columns 
and the beams form a grid that sometimes does not support the structure but it is a 
structure of its own, independent of the building; a spatial enclosure does not necessarily 
provide a shelter but completes some self-contained entity that remains unclear or hidden 
to us; we find unexpected column in the middle of a bedroom or dining room, a slot in the 
floor, etc. It looks like all this autonomous fragments participate in one complex play of 
contingency, in which man’s presence is not necessarily required. Buildings become self-
referential and, in a same way as Joyce’s non-narrative texts, they remove the imposition 
of the author between the viewer (reader) and the object.  
 
                                                 
7 All these accusations are quoted by Richard Serra in his book, Richard Serra, Writings and Interviews, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 195-217 
8 Most radical example of this is Eisenman’s Wexner Center, Ohio State University, in Columbus 
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It is important to mention that Eisenman’s work is highly influenced by French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida. Derrida teaches us that there is no fixed relationship 
between the sign and the object. And there is no such thing as an object before all other 
signs; a transcendental object where signs refer to; the one thing that is before all others 
and that is more important than all others. In the words of Derrida, “in the absence of a 
center or origin everything became discourse [...], everything became a system where the 
central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present 
outside a system of differences.”9 This idea is actually a perfect weapon for an infinite 
recreation or reinventing of tabula rasa. Everything is allowed, and with that knowing 
Eisenman strikes at the very nucleus and origin of architecture – the house. As Anthony 
Vidler says, Eisenman destabilizes the house “by attacking all its elements of structure 
and signification systematically, from roof to the basement, leaving no functional or 
mental assumptions untouched and striping, finally, the house of houseness and 
nostalgia.”10  
 
Eisenman designs the whole series of houses, which he calls ‘cardboard architecture’, that 
are made as experiments of translating concepts into physical environment. They are 
conceived as a kind of disturbance or a break in smoothness. The ironic and provocative 
term ‘cardboard architecture’ is used to “question the nature of our perception of 
reality.”11 Certainly, one of the most interesting pieces from this series is House II, 
designed for Mr. and Mrs. Richard Falk, in Hardwick, Vermont, in 1970.  The first 
disturbance comes even from a distance, when one is not being able to understand 
whether this is a real house or just a cardboard model (fig. 3.2). Although made entirely 
out of the simple elements – columns, beams, slabs, and stairs – and composed in a 
rational grid, due to its two autonomous but equally important structural systems that 
create ambiguity of which of them really holds the structure, the object remains unclear, 
confusing, and perceived as an irregular Gestalt. The house repeatedly produces the 
conflict in the mapping of the real. None of the elements stands for a mining and do not 
                                                 
9 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 280 
10 Anthony Vidler, The Architectural Uncanny: Essays in the Modern Unhomely, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1992), p. 119 
11 Peter Eisenman, ’Carboard Architecture’, Eisenman Inside Out: Selected Writings 1963 – 1988, (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 28 
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contribute to representational narrative. Man is forced to constantly question space that he 
occupies and forms that he confronts. If these objects are not what I think they are, what 
are they? And why are they where they are? Sentenced to this permanent struggle, one 
finds himself notably lacking in comfort.  
 
    
   3.2 Peter Eisenman, House II, 1970 
 
It is quite interesting and paradigmatic the first encounter of the House II with his owner, 
Mr. Falk. Seeing the house, on his return from Vietnam, he realized that that was by no 
means what he wanted – and he wanted a cozy ‘Heidi’ house. He realized that he is not at 
all that radical and open minded he thought he was. The house was too oppressive, too 
uncomfortable for him.  Nonetheless, Mr. and Mrs. Falk did not leave this house, even 
though they were not lacking money, but instead they did do something radical after all. 
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They adapted the basement of the house, moved into that basement, and continued to live 
there for two years, only out of the protest! The house was not subordinated to their needs 
and treated them as intruders, so they denied to use the house, and therefore lived, not in, 
but with the house, as if it is its own entity, autonomous and self conscious, with its own 
integrity and will. They were in a conflict with the object, as if it is a living being. 
 
In one of the conversations between Richard Serra and Peter Eisenman, regarding the 
ostensible instability and exploration of the limits of the gravity of Serra’s sculptures, 
Eisenman remarks: “Whether or not the pieces actually fall down, they create the anxiety 
of the maker and the viewer not being in control. These pieces are interesting to me 
because they control. The objects have their own power.”12 The House II is the absolute 
master of its own space. Even the owners, Mr. and Mrs. Falk, are actually trespassers, 
unable to control and really own the space. Paradoxically, the house treats them as 
objects; they are aliens caught in a foreign territory, subjected to unknown rules and will.  
 
We could compare this with Jacques Lacan’s variation of Heidegger’s motif of language 
as a house of being, where, for Lacan, man is actually caught in and tortured by language. 
Slavoj Žižek develops this idea further, saying that: “Man does not dwell in a mere 
‘prison-house of language’, he dwells in torture-house of language: the entire range of 
psychopathologies deployed by Freud, from conversion-symptoms inscribed into the 
body up to total psychotic breakdowns, are the scars of this permanent torture, so many 
signs of an original and irremediable gap between the subject and language, so many 
signs that man can never be at home in his own home.”13 What for Lacan and Žižek is a 
metaphysical category, Eisenman turns into a literal torture-house; a real physical 
experience.  
 
In one of his recent lectures Eisenman more openly and directly describes his agenda as a 
disruption with traditional and conventional understanding of architecture, and an attempt 
                                                 
12 Peter Eisenman, ’Interwiew by Peter Eisenman’, from Richard Serra,  Writings and Interviews, (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 144 
13 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subjec: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 2008), p. 
xv 
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to put man out of his comfortable idleness and make him to acknowledge a new reality. “I 
do believe that one of the ways to get people pay attention to their environments is to 
disturb them. I do believe that. And I do believe that architecture is not about putting 
people in a cozy cocoon, but to make them more aware of their physical surroundings. 
There is nothing worse, for me, than a cozy little suburban house. It drives me out of my 
mind. I think that architecture, as opposed to practice, is about disturbing status quo; that 
is not giving the client what they want, but giving them something other than what they 
want. [...] Architecture is a disturbance.”14 
 
Another project of the same architect that I would like to mention is of a more recent date 
and of entirely different scale. It is the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, in 
Berlin. Even though Eisenman does not consider that project as being reflective or 
representative of his work15, this extraordinary piece of architecture, or rather the public 
sculpture if you will, is an ultimate statement of the new consciousness and ‘modernist 
sensibility’, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
 
Positioned in the very heart of Berlin, next to the Brandenburg Gate, and occupying one 
whole block, this project already casts the shadow of intrigue and inquisitiveness. 
Memorial is designed as a system of narrow alleys in orthogonal grid, composed out of 
2711 gray stone slabs, with the same dimensions in layout (2.38m x 0.95m) but each of a 
different height, entirely blank with no markings such as names or dates. The whole city-
block is turned into the two parallel but different waving fields, one at the surface formed 
by the tops of the slabs, and the other beneath it, hidden at the bottom, forming the 
undulate ground level (fig. 3.3). 
 
 Once again, as in many other Eisenman projects, the grid plays crucial role, being 
understood as the conceptual framework in which the physical experience occurs. As K. 
Michael Hayes says, the grid “systematically reduce the architectural raw material and 
perceptual data of an organizational scheme to degree zero – the point grid being 
                                                 
14 Peter Eisenman, lecture at New York Institute of Technology, New York, 25.10.2011, 
http://www.nyit.edu/index.php/videos/viewer/peter_eisenman/ 
15 Peter Eisenman, lecture at Architectural Association School of Architecture, London, 18.10.2010, 
http://www.aaschool.ac.uk//VIDEO/lecture.php?ID=1274 
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understood as the minimum limit for a work to be called architecture – and [...] generate a 
limitlessly interpretable, radically contingent, and heterogeneous set of experiences and 
associations. The grid announces and insists on architectural autonomy and authority, 
establishing as it does a different spatial order, a distinction, and a separation from the 
contexts in which it appears.” 16  We can draw the analogy between this grid and the 
Manhattan’s grid. Both are impaling an ideal and artificial order over the reality, but 
unlike Manhattan’s grid that serves as accommodation for an infinite amount of the 
otherness, Eisenman’s grid, offers an exact opposite – the sameness, or rather the 
unending return of the ‘differently same’. Here the order is pushed to the extreme and it is 
almost out of the touch with the human reason. It aims to achieve the reduced meaning of 
the experience that can be paralleled with the meaninglessness of the concentration camps 
and their systematic and impeccably punctual order. It is a reason brought to the absurd, 
where it becomes madness. 
 
But regardless of the apparent formal and visual sterility of the concept, the project 
generates an unexpected range of possibilities and models of how to behave or experience 
the space. Standing before the Memorial one feels an irresistible magnetic force seducing 
him to enter; to dive into the gray sea of blocks and start wandering through its obscure 
and mysterious corridors. And the very second one steps in this maze, the connection with 
the real world is over. Submerged into artificial environment, one finds himself suddenly 
lost, alone, unable to predict or control what will occur right before him, and feels 
disorientated, vulnerable and fragile.  Deserted alleys, where people occasionally appear 
just for a split second like specters, and echoing voices and sounds from undefined 
direction and distance, create the atmosphere of anxiety, uneasiness and discomfort. It is 
imposable to find anything remotely like a central point. One is free to go anywhere, but 
everything looks alike and leads nowhere. It is like experiencing the space of 
Hilberseimer’s Hochhausstadt (fig. 2.4), but condensed and purified up to its ultimate 
absurd state. Or, like being caught in one of George Grosz’s paintings (fig. 2.5), 
mindlessly circling in the labyrinth of some abstract and haunted metropolis, and with 
each step slowly turning into a faceless object. 
                                                 
16 K. Michael Hays, Architecture’s Desire: Reading the Late Avant-Garde, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 
2010), pp. 157-160 
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The gray slabs stand like the ruins of some former or future cognizance. They seem like 
houses but they are not habitable. In the same way as houses of Pompeii or Herculaneum, 
they appear abandoned and turned into ghosts, or tombs, simply by virtue of some 
catastrophic event. They form a haunted ground, but it is never really clear does it belong 
to something long forgotten, or something that is yet to come. What we are looking for in 
space and time is to complete the narrative. But the meaning always remains out of our 
reach, somewhere beyond our consciousness. To paraphrase Žižek, the things seem to be 
‘pregnant’ with meaning, but every birth of meaning is an abortion.17 
 
After visiting the Memorial, Richard Serra called Eisenman, and briefly commented, 
“Your best work Peter! You know why? No plumbing!”18 Eisenman managed to create a 
pure architectural object, which is entirely without function in utilitarian sense, and which 
produces an internal necessity that is outside of use. The Memorial to the Murdered Jews 
of Europe is ingenious critique of a humanist subject, exposed to a kind of estrangement 
and alienation. It challenges a man and ‘teaches’ him to understand the space and forms 
around him, in a situation where he is not the ultimate determinator of meaning – the 
center to which everything is subordinated.  
 
 
 
_______ 
Derrida: “There are no benches in this park! How can people sit down?” 
Eisenman: “Jacques, there is no benches to sit down in your text. It is very difficult to 
ever sit down in your texts, why do you worry in sitting down in my park?” 19 
  
 
  
                                                 
17 Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subjec: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, (London: Verso, 2008), p.66 
18 Peter Eisenman often quote this in his lectures, one of such is conversation with Jacques Herzog, 
moderated by Jeffrey Kipnis, at Harvard School of Design, 12.4.2007 
19 Peter Eisenman, lecture at Institute for Advanced Architecture of Catalonia, Barcelona, 10.2.2010, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsV1axPJpLY. Eisenman is paraphrasing his old conversation with 
Derrida about his competition project for Parc de la Villette. 
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      3.3 Peter Eisenman, Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Berlin, 2005  
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3.2.  Imponderabilia 
 
“And I would like somehow to find a system so the performance would become life. 
That is actually becomes just timeless. I don’t want an audience to spent time with 
me looking at my work; I want them to be with me and forget about time. Open up 
the space and just that moment of here and now, of nothing, there is no future and 
there is no past. In that way you can extend eternity. It is about being present.”1  
                                                                                                        – Marina Abramović 
 
Another architect that I would like to introduce as a dominant contemporary protagonist 
and successor of true modernist agenda is Rem Koolhaas. For the past several decades, 
this sworn avant-gardist is always at the forefront of turbulent processes and turmoil, and 
plays a crucial role in redefining and revaluing the essential modernist doctrines, and 
revealing their significance for contemporary society. His work had a dramatic impact on 
the architectural practice as well as on the theory by introducing many inventive 
strategies and contagious ideas. But here, I will not try to analyze or get engaged with his 
entire oeuvre, not even its most prominent and commonly stated qualities. Rather, I would 
like to consider the one particular aspect in his work, which is less mentioned, 
emphasized or elaborated, but which I find  to be one of the backbones of his body of 
work; a silent unifier that indisputably keeps all his endeavors in the discourse of 
modernism. That aspect is ‘the performance’. In the light of previous analyses in this 
                                                 
1 Marina Abramović, Artist is Present, (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2010), p. 211 
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thesis, I consider of great importance to introduce and acknowledge this aspect as the 
symptom or manifestation of the new paradigm. 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century Marcel Duchamp signals the end of the 
aesthetic principle in art. He takes random ‘readymade’ objects of no aesthetic merit and 
by simply adding the usual attributes of a work of art – title, name of the author, date of 
execution, and viewing public or owner – he turns them into art. Duchamp teaches us that 
any object can be a piece of art. Performance art goes a step further and tells us something 
much more provoking and upsetting: those ‘readymade’ objects can also be the human 
bodies. 
 
Koolhaas often describes himself as the child of the sixties. This was exactly the period 
when performance art fully emerged and made a huge disturbance, not only in the art 
world but in much broader field.2 However, before entering into Koolhaas’s disclosure 
and exploration of the performance in architecture, I will introduce a couple of interesting 
pieces of this art that can be used as a didactic model in reading of the performance 
strategies. In this way they can be more clearly indentified and reflected in the 
architectural works. I will use the examples taken from the work of one of the greatest 
living performance artists, Marina Abramović.  
 
In one of the very first and less known Abramović’s pieces called Come Wash With Me, 
from 1969, she proposes the gallery space transformed into a laundry with sinks placed 
around the walls. Before entering into the gallery/laundry, the public is asked to take all 
their clothes off and give them to the artist. While they are standing and waiting 
completely naked the artist will wash, dry, and iron their clothes and when they are ready 
the public can dress again and leave. Unfortunately, the proposal was too offensive and 
radical for the then public opinion, so it was refused by the authorities and Come Wash 
With Me never came to its realization. Nonetheless, what still makes this piece crucially 
important is that Abramović attempted to involve the audience into the performance. It 
                                                 
2 In the documentary film Rem Koolhaas: A Kind of Architect, from 2008, Koolhaas said that the first 
influence on him from the world of contemporary art came from Yves Klein, even before film directors 
such as Michelangelo Antonioni and Pier Paolo Pasolini 
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was not enough that just the artist performs while the viewers remain passive. She invited 
those passive viewers to intervene and not just anyhow. They are asked to even take the 
initiative role in the act of performance. They are those who have to publicly expose their 
bodies and stand naked before everybody, while the artist himself is doing quite boring 
and most ordinary everyday job (washing, drying, and ironing). In that way the audience 
becomes the integral part of the piece; a part without which that piece of art does not even 
exists. Nothing remains outside of the piece; everything is here and now; everything 
participates in the discourse and confirms the presence.   
 
In another, even more interesting piece, called Imponderabilia from 1977, Marina 
Abramović and Ulay go a step further. This piece consists of two artists, male and female, 
standing naked in the main entrance of the museum, facing each other. The public 
entering the museum is invited to pass through. The space between the performers is 
narrow and each person entering the museum must move sideways, choosing whether to 
face the male or female performer (fig. 3.4). The physical contact with the naked body of 
the artist is inevitable. Inside of the museum there was a text on the exibition wall: 
'Imponderable. Such imponderable human factors as one’s aesthetic sensitivity / the 
overriding importance of imponderables in determining human conduct'. 3 The text refers 
directly to the visitor’s behaviour on entry. This performance supposed to last for a six 
hours but it was interrupted and stopped by the police only after 90 minutes. The police 
deemed it as too obscene.  
 
The performance is requested from the audience in both of Abramović’s pieces. But while 
in Come And Wash With Me the visitor is brought to an uncanny and vulnerable state by 
exposing his body in the most literal way, in Imponderabilia a bit more is expected. The 
narrow void between the artists demands from the visitor to act in a most intimate way. 
He has to make a decision whether he will turn his body to the man or woman and, in a 
way, to declare himself. In this ostensibly simple and harmless piece one is forced to 
expose and publicly present his consciousness, and even go beyond that and confront 
himself with the subconscious self. The motionlessness and passivity is not an option.   
                                                 
3 Text from the wall is quoted from James Westcott, When Marina Abramović Dies: A Biography, 
(Cambridge: The MIT  Press, 2010), p. 122  
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3.4 Marina Abramović and Ulay, Imponderabilia, Bologna, 1977 
 
In the work of Rem Koolhaas we can find the strategies and processes that greatly 
correspond with the above presented agendas of the performance art. Coming from the 
film background, Koolhaas’s first involvement in architecture is initiated by his 
fascination with Russian Constructivism and its quite inventive approach to the 
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architectural practice.4 Constructivists claim that the real issue of architecture is not about 
form but about organization of daily life. Their urban block is like a script for a movie, 
imagining how society could live. What Koolhaas learns from architecture of the 
constructivists is the sense that more than a visual outcome is to be expected. This idea 
was quite opposed to then ruling postmodernist’s mainly visual and picturesque approach 
to architecture.  
 
Another important moment is his Manhattan research and the analysis of the Downtown 
Athletic Club which became a kind of manifesto itself. In the vertical section of this 
skyscraper, Koolhaas discovers that interdependence between form and use is not 
necessary. Each platform of the building is entirely different; a world of its own, 
regardless of what is happening above or below. This concept implies a discontinuity in 
traditional functional adjacency relationships, and offers a rich variety of experiences 
juxtaposed in a random manner. As Koolhaas says, “In the Downtown Athletic Club each 
‘plan’ is an abstract composition of activities that describes, on each of the synthetic 
platforms, a different ‘performance’ that is only a fragment of the larger spectacle of the 
Metropolis.”5 The building itself becomes the generator of diverse and even unexpected 
activities, rather than the provider of the certain functions.  
 
Koolhaas turned the ‘free section’ of the Downtown Athletic Club into the design method 
that he used in many of his later projects. One such project is the competition entry for the 
Parc de la Villette, from 1982. Here, the park is depicted as a series of horizontal 
programmatic strips, 50 meters wide, which contain different types of gardens and 
amusements. What Koolhaas actually did is that he took the model of the ‘free section’ 
and by laying it down he made out of it the plan of the park, where each strip acts as a 
different floor in the building, unique and independent of the others. In that way he 
eliminated the third-dimension and reduced the project only to pure program. In 
Koolhaas’s words, it is a “density without architecture, a culture of ‘invisible’ 
                                                 
4 In 1966, at the seminar on cinema and architecture at the TU in Delft, Koolhaas met Gerrit Oorthuys, a 
professor of history and expert on constructivism. Later, they together conducted the research on Ivan 
Leonidov. 
5 Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1994), p. 157 
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congestion”.6 As in one performance, the form disappears and what remains is a dense 
conceptual framework that generates the infinite amount of possible adventures analogous 
to contemporary daily life. Activities unexpectedly encounter and interconnect, creating 
chaotic and confusing spatial relations. The visitor of the park, unable to find a 
perspective axis and orientate in this space of the congested void, is impelled to move. 
And as he starts his dérive through these strips he experiences the permanent state of the 
landscape change. Diverse and unstable identities of fragmented space constitute a stage 
for the performance in which the visitor participates as its inseparable element.  
 
The strategy of the performance is even more immanent in OMA’s competition project 
for Très Grande Bibliothèque de France, from 1989. “The ambition of this project” – 
writes Koolhaas – “is to rid architecture of responsibilities it can no longer sustain and to 
explore this new freedom aggressively.”7 Once again Koolhaas attacks the two most 
essential entities of the traditional architecture: form and function. The building is 
conceived as colossal prism (roughly 75x87m in base and 100m high), made out of one 
solid (a block of information with all the books, disks and databases) and voids (open 
public spaces) that are carved out of the solid. These voids play the crucial part in the 
project, declaring the absence of something inherent and indispensable. The missing part, 
or rather ‘non-present presence’, becomes the structural element; the implied armature 
that keeps the unity of the whole, in one quite unexpected way. The voids are the 
dematerialized formless architecture, uncanny specters, oddly wandering through the 
building and generating the situations, which provoke unexpected and even unconscious 
behaviors. One such behavior is voyeurism. Peter Eisenman finds this as one of the 
essential features of the building, in which the voided space both blocks direct vision and 
reveals supposedly hidden elements. “The modulation of section creates condition in 
which space can be occupied by subject who may become a voyeur while hidden from the 
view of another subject and vice versa. The resultant coup d’oeil and peripheral views 
shift the focus of opticality from the physical object to the subject, who looks through, 
around, beneath, above, and at spaces, becoming part of a different kind of spatial 
relationship between subject and object. This imitation of a voyeuristic space is what 
                                                 
6 Rem Koolhaas, SMLXL, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995), p. 937 
7 Rem Koolhaas, SMLXL, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1995), p. 604 
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Jeffrey Kipnis calls a performative discourse.”8 Koolhaas’s ‘strategy of the void’ is a 
mechanism that creates the fragments in the building in which nobody has full control; 
parts that have no practical purpose or use, and where no one knows what to expect. 
These are the places where neither the form nor the function is needed in order for 
architecture to occur. Precisely the acute absence of these elements and the accidental 
presence of the drifting visitor makes perfect framework for the performance. 
 
The function is always subordinated to man, it always serves. On the other hand, the 
performance serves no one. It is essentially independent and free, and it can easily be 
superior even to man. For Koolhaas functionality is something boring, and he is always 
very eager to explore what role the building really plays, what kind of scenes it triggers, 
and what it stimulates. There is one building that generously offers opportunity for this 
kind of adventures, and daringly explores the limits of the architecture in every possible 
way. It is one of OMA’s recent masterpieces: China Central Television Headquarters, in 
Beijing.  
 
This weird skyscraper instead of aiming toward the sky like all the other decent 
skyscrapers suddenly decides to twist and starts to chase its own tail. In this way it creates 
one gigantic loop in the very heart of the former hutong fabric. “The essence of the 
building” – writes Koolhaas – “is to take the high out of high-rise and to redirect the 
evolution of the tower to its potential for a social interface.”9 But this unusual form is not 
just limited to the search for new patterns in the social and programmatic relations within 
the content of the building. The loop, in a rather absurd way, continues once existing 
hutong’s labyrinthine alleys and redirects them into the sky. It has no beginning or end. 
The building acts like an odd Möbius strip enabling for one if walking in one direction to 
pass throughout the whole building, going up and down, left and right, above and 
beneath, only to return to the point where he started. It provokes an endless and aimless 
journey, analogous to one that could have been experienced in the now destroyed maze of 
                                                 
8 Peter Eisenman, Ten Canonical Buildings 1950 – 2000, (New York: Rizzoli International Publications, 
Inc., 2008), p. 205 
9 Rem Koolhaas, ’Skyscraper: A Typology of Public and Private’, from Bernard Tschumi (edited by) and 
Irene Cheng (edited by), The State of Architecture at the Beginning of the 21st Century, (New York: The 
Monacelli Press, Inc., 2003), p. 75 
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the old city. We could say that Koolhaas here wittily plays with his old paradoxical theory 
learned from Manhattan that “destruction is another word for preservation.”10 The once 
existing context reappears in an utterly unexpected and bizarre way. 
  
CCTV plays even more interesting role in a wider urban setting. One of the greatest 
qualities and most important virtues of this building is its unstable identity. CCTV creates 
a vast panorama of radically different impressions dependent on the point of view of the 
beholder – a true ‘rashomonian’ adventure of uncertainty, relativity, and doubt (fig. 3.5). 
It is almost impossible to get a fix on the building’s scale. Seen from the distance, among 
the generic glass and steal towers, it seems like a child’s toy. From closer range, however, 
it becomes a giant, fighting with enormous strain to support the weight of the cantilevered 
body. This erratic character of the building – which from some angles seems week, 
unstable, and fragile and from the others triumphal, dominant, and strong – is repeatedly 
rejecting the logical assumptions and denies to be reduced to one single interpretation or 
image. There is no datum, no ideal spot, from where the building should be observed; 
each viewpoint is equally important as any other. It is as if the building does not accept 
the role of a simple object, made only to be observed by some reasoning subject. Instead, 
it acts independently of our expectations or needs, and establishes a different kind of 
attitude toward man; one new relation that goes beyond the old Cartesian duality. If you 
are standing before the building the form provokes you to move, to walk around. A 
change in your position provides a change of the identity of the object. You are realizing 
that both of you are occupying the same space. In that sense, the building acts like some 
external force that initiates your activity. Suddenly, you are caught and participate in one 
big performance where the rules or the outcome are never known in advance. CCTV is an 
inconsistent inanimate object par excellence.   
                                                 
10 Rem Koolhaas, Delirious New York, (New York: The Monacelli Press, 1994), p. 151 
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3.5 Rem Koolhaas/OMA, China Central Television Headquarters, Beijing, 2008  
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Another thing that we should not overlook in this project is again Koolhaas’s exploration 
of ‘the strategy of the void’. The form of the building is represented as a kind of cutout 
from some quondam solid, an unknown whole. It is impossible to neglect the conspicuous 
and disturbing absence of something inherent and substantial that once was there, and 
now is forever lost. We perceive this missing part as a still integral element inseparable 
from the body of the building. Looking throughout the hole of the loop this ‘ghost 
building’ almost becomes visible and real. What we see is equally important as what is 
missing. Both unexpected presence and absence count. What we actually experience is, 
again, the ‘non-present presence’. The building does not end with the borders of its shape, 
but it continues, spreads into space, beyond measure or comprehension – by its 
imponderable parts. Koolhaas makes a kind of diversion. He acts as a performance artist 
who uses architecture instead of his own body.  
 
Speaking of CCTV, I would like to conclude this chapter with a small digression, which 
can also reveal a certain performative aspect in Koolhaas’s work and even more embed 
his position in the realm of the modernist tradition. From the earliest times, back in 1970s 
while still writing his Delirious New York, Koolhaas was very interested in Salvador 
Dalí’s paranoid critical method (PCM), and its relevance to architecture. The PCM is a 
surrealist technique that enables one to gain knowledge out of his spontaneous and 
delirious associations and interpretations. The main ambition of the method is “to 
discredit the world of reality.”11 Dalí uses the PCM in reading of famous Jean François 
Millet’s painting L’Angelus (fig. 3.6). The praying couple modestly standing on a barren 
field is interpreted by Dalí as a moment of sexual tension and desire that could, any 
second, culminate and turn into the action. After his arrival to New York, impressed by 
the primordial and violent poetry of the city, he implements the PCM into architecture 
and continuing with the reference to Millet he treats buildings as the figures from this 
painting (fig 3.7). “Each evening the skyscrapers of New York assume the 
anthropomorphic shapes of multiple gigantic Millet’s Angeluses of the tertiary period, 
motionless and ready to perform the sexual act and to devour one another, like swarms of 
                                                 
11 Rem Koolhaas, ’Dalí, the Critical Method & Le Corbusier’, from Peter Eisenman & Rem Koolhaas with 
Jeffrey Kipnis & Robert Somol, Supercritical, (London: Architectural Association Publications, 2010), p.92 
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praying mantes before copulation.”12 Inspired with this Dalí’s idea, Koolhaas makes the 
whole scenario of episodes from the love life of these skyscrapers. There is one less 
known but beautiful drawing by Madelon Vriesendorp where the Empire State Building 
and Chrysler Building are standing in a similar manner as Millet’s couple, but now 
charged with Dalí’s paranoid vision (fig. 3.8). The skyscrapers are bending towards each 
other, as if they want to touch, or kiss...  
 
Following Dalí’s PCM and pursuing the delirium of interpretations we could assume that 
while in New York these two skyscrapers were too distant, too narrowed by the 
conventions and tied by the imperative of the bachelor culture, so they could not be 
together. They had to wait for a whole century and travel half the globe, all the way to 
China, to finally encounter and embrace each other. CCTV could be perceived as the last 
chapter of this 150 years long saga, which begins somewhere on the empty fields of 
Netherlands, wanders throughout Paris and Manhattan, and ends in one of the greatest 
metropolis, in the very heart of Beijing – always unmistakably picking the current center 
of the world as the stage of its delirious performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Salvador Dalí, The Secret Life of Salvador Dalí, (New York: Dial Press, 1942), p. 334 
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3.6 Jean François Millet, L’Angelus , 1859     
 
 
3.7 Salvador Dalí, New York?, 1938 (one of many PCM variations of Millet’s painting) 
 
 
3.8 Madelon Vriesendorp, Manhattan Angelus, 1976 
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3.3.  Primitive Future House 
 
 
“The images of caves and vegetation, of clouds and waves which are evoked at the 
beginning of this second sonnet rise from the warm vapor of tears, tears 
of homesickness.“1 – Walter Benjamin  
 
 
In the previous two chapters I tried to illuminate and depict some of the less obvious but 
nonetheless essential modernist strategies in the work of two well acclaimed and most 
influential architects of today. In this last chapter, however, I would like to point to the 
work of one less known architect, from the younger generation, which in a strikingly 
inventive and rather venturous way explores the potential of the modernism, and with that 
reveals and renders its possible domain of action for the future. This rising figure, which 
time is yet to come, is Japanese architect Sou Fujimoto.  
 
At the beginning of his career, even before he started making actual buildings, Fujimoto 
establishes and defines for himself a theoretical framework which becomes an 
experimental playground and a generator for all of his future practice. In order to explore 
the basic relations between the human body and space he returns to the very beginnings 
                                                 
1 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, (New York: Schocken books, 2007), p. 182.  (Benjamin is referring to 
Charles Baudelarie’s La Vie antérieure, the second sonnet in Fleurs du mal) 
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of architecture and juxtaposes two essentially opposite archetypal models that he calls the 
nest and the cave.  
 
The nest is a place designed by the people and for the people. It is subordinated to 
people’s needs and unconditionally responds to their demands. The only purpose of the 
nest is to accommodate man. Its existence is entirely dependent and conditioned by the 
existence of man. The nest is something that we may define as a functional architecture. 
On the other hand, the cave is something neither designed by the people nor for the 
people. It is a place existing prior to man and absolutely independently of him. A man is 
free to occupy this space, but in order to use it, he has to adjust himself to existing 
conditions. He is forced to invent a function in it. In the words of Fujimoto, “a cave is 
there regardless of people. It is a place that occurs naturally irrespective of whether it is 
hospitable or inhospitable for person to inhabit.  [...] a cave is not functional but it is 
heuristic. Rather than coercive functionalism, it is a stimulating place in which various 
activities are enabled. Each day people will discover new usage for the place.”2 Fujimoto 
does not consider the functional architecture as necessarily bad, but he finds that a cave-
like space is much more interesting. It offers a whole range of creative relationships that 
produce an incomparably richer experience. This not-designed, not-predefined space 
encourages a man to explore his environment. It challenges his ability to coexist with the 
objects that are out of his cognizance and indifferent to his presence.  
 
The first Fujimoto’s attempt to translate the cave-like space into the real architecture is 
his conceptual project from 2001, later known as Primitive Future House (fig. 3.8).  
Fujimoto made this project not as a commission but actually for himself, as a kind of his 
own starting point; a personal manifest and a prototype for all of his later works. Here we 
can use Primitive Future House as a didactic model for understanding of one design 
strategy which meets some of the fundamental objectives of the modernism in a quite 
inventive and entirely new way. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Sou Fujimoto, ’Primitive Future’, 2G N.50 Sou Fujimoto, (Barcelona: Editorial Gustavo Gili, 30 Jun 
2009), p.130 
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                  3.8 Sou Fujimoto, Primitive Future House, 2001                            
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The house is composed of slabs layered at 35 cm intervals. These slabs are forming a 
cloud-like playful landscape with a variety of places where one can walk up and down, to 
sit or lie, in an absolutely free manner. There is no any predefined function. However, if 
one reacts to the space and makes a certain relation to it a specific function may occur. 
All of a sudden, each step of these huge and meaningless stairs can be easily turned into a 
floor, chair, table, bed, shelve, garden, roof, or any other purpose that at a certain moment 
seems appropriate. We can go even further and say that this game of assigning of 
functions is not necessarily something exclusively intended for man. As we can see at the 
diagram (fig. 3.8), the animals, plants, or even some natural phenomena (as wind, rain, 
sunlight, etc.), are equally invited to explore the space and find a kind of connection with 
it.  
 
“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”3, says 
one of those beautiful loony characters from Alice in Wonderland. Almost in the same 
lucid and irrational manner Fujimoto treats the elements of which he composes his 
architecture. Nothing is previously established or imposed as a rule. Nothing has a 
determined meaning. A slab becomes a chair only if one chooses to sit on it, and it is a 
chair as long as he is sitting. The very moment one stands up and leaves – the meaning 
leaves with him. In Fujimoto’s architecture the meaning emerges only through some 
concrete situations and actions, and exists only in the presence, as long as these actions 
last. There is no meaning that is inherited from the past, nor can it be projected into the 
future. In the world of Fujimoto the meaning is not a permanent category; not fixed, not 
reliable, not clear. It is a space full of vagueness and impurity. Architecture exists only as 
an active interaction between two (or more) elements or bodies, and it can be experienced 
only through certain behavior. The space is not defined as a whole – which is commonly 
accepted understanding of architecture – but rather by local relationships. This kind of 
space cannot be measured, drawn, or perceived. It has no clear and visible boundaries or 
limits. One can never be sure when is the exact moment of entering in and exiting from 
this space – it just appears and disappears as a mist. It is an imponderable ‘in-between’ 
space, beyond human reason or knowledge.  
                                                 
3 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through The Looking-Glass, (Herdfordshire: 
Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2001), p. 223 
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Fujimoto conceives the house that is not designed for man! Any eventual discomfort that 
one might feel is gladly welcomed and treated as a tool for the fabrication of the new 
adventures. This kind of architecture is a radical and ultimate opposition to the 
functionalism. The Primitive Future House can be perceived as a model of unambiguous 
and definite disruption of all connections with the humanism. The uncanny alien – those 
hidden remains of the humanism which tortured the modern architecture (in one form or 
another) for a whole century – is finally removed. What makes this project exceptional 
and truly modernist is the fact that it offers a possible experience of one world, regardless 
of, or at least not necessarily dependent on, anything human: pure language without 
subject. 
 
In the search for the cave–like architecture, Fujimoto invents the house which is not a 
solid object but rather a translucent territory with the blurred boundaries: a cloud, a mist, 
a landscape, a forest...  And the very idea of the forest as architecture is the motif that 
Fujimoto repeatedly examines in his more recent projects. He tries to learn from this pre-
human condition and see if there is the possibility for man to not just passively coexist 
with this self-referential external world but also to take an active role and participate in its 
creation. The project which perfectly exemplifies such kind of thinking and design 
strategy is Fujimoto’s Forest of Science, the second prize awarded competition entry for 
the Centre for the Promotion of Science in Belgrade, in 2010 (fig. 3.9). 
 
Fujimoto introduces the forest as a model for rethinking the architecture. In the book 
Primitive Future, he says,  “People can discover a new coordinate system with a space 
impregnated by chaotic and uncertain elements analogous to, though not to purely imitate, 
trees and forest. “4 The forest is a space with utterly ambiguous notion of interiority and 
exteriority. There is no clear distinction of what is outside or inside. It creates an infinite 
spectrum of radically diverse spaces and fragments that have no hierarchy or any other 
established and defined order. The forest also offers the protection in the most primitive 
and archetypal way. It is a hiding place, a sheltered ground, but at the same time it creates 
no barriers or restraints. It gives the absolute freedom for one to go in any direction he 
chooses.   There is no right or  wrong  way;  any way is as good as  any  other.  The forest  
                                                 
4 Sou Fujimoto, Primitive Future, (Tokyo: INAX-Shuppan, 2008), p. 67 
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          3.9 Sou Fujimoto, Forest of Science, 2010  
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generates a kind of highly complex but essentially neutral condition which does not 
impose nor suggest any program or function which has to be executed. Man can endlessly 
wander in this complex space surrounded by all sides with a flood of information, the vast 
majority of which does not even make any sense or significance to him. These 
information are not addressed to man; he cannot understand their relations or meanings, 
and they are entirely independent of him. One is free to use them, examine and look for 
the meaning, or simply ignore them. But the bottom line is that the forest is a world for 
itself. 
 
These characteristics and qualities of the forest are exactly what Fujimoto tries to create 
in architecture. And the project Forest of Science is one that successfully responds to the 
challenge. Fujimoto starts from the simple assumption that “architecture is a garden with 
a roof.”5 The whole building is conceived as one garden space covered by a big roof 
levitating fifteen meters above the ground. The façade of the building is made by 
transparent glass on all faces, visually open to the user and the passerby. The space is 
divided by the multiple glass patios encased with trees inside. The glass walls have a 
double role: firstly, they make the whole building completely transparent, and by that 
dissolve the clear line between interior and exterior and make imposable for one to 
perceive and understand with certainty the form of the building; secondly, at the same 
time they mirror the surrounding greenery and the trees from the patios creating a 
confusing and delusive merge of the reflection and reality.  
 
The whole concept of the building is actually based on one vivid and striking encounter 
of two forests. One is the natural forest, gently occupying the interior and making the 
continuance and the whole with the surrounding park. The other is the artificial forest of 
information related to the science, the real purpose and content of the building, perfectly 
analogous with the current global condition, in which we are flooded with the confusingly 
and non-hierarchically arranged vast spectrum of information, predominantly provided by 
the means of the electronic medias. Both natural and artificial forest are reflected in the 
mirror-like surface of the big roof which treats them both equally and creates an illusion 
of the infinite progression of the processes on which man seems to has no control or 
                                                 
5 Sou Fujimoto, Primitive Future, (Tokyo: INAX-Shuppan, 2008), p. 101 
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influence, whatsoever. It is the clash of the two worlds, one primitive and wild, and the 
other “the absolute simulacrum.”6 Everything appears to be impregnate with meaning, but 
in reality it reveals nothing but its own pure and raw existence. The meaning or the sense 
of the whole always remains somewhere beyond reason or cognition, entirely 
unreachable. There are no clear or recognizable objects. Architecture exists only ‘in-
between’, as the field of relations between artifice and nature.  
 
Project Forest of Science explores a possible condition of a primitive world; the one 
before, or maybe even after, the existence of human consciousness. Man cannot find any 
instructions or guidance on how to use this space and how to behave in it. There is no 
reliable cognitive map that would save him from discomfort and uncertainty. It is a space 
preceding the very construction of the psyche or the subject itself, the ego, personality 
and the like – a space of pre–individualistic; a pre-subject condition. Fujimoto’s 
architecture is a part of, and contributes to, a greater cultural restart – an ultimate tabula 
rasa – which is the zero degree of human existence per se, wherefrom starts a quest for a 
new convergence of values and a new constitution of priorities, enabling an elementary 
accordance with the reality. 
 
This kind of architecture could be identified with the endeavors of James Joyce, whose 
texts are the embodiment of the world which does not necessarily imply the presence of 
man (whether that man is a reader, an author, a viewer, or any other subject). This is the 
exploration of the radically different conditions of human existence and the creation of 
the methods, which, as Hermann Broch puts it, ”forces man to descend into the meta-
logical regions of the unconscious and irrational, to track down the primal moving 
elements of being.”7 By returning to the primitive cave-like forms, Fujimoto tends to 
recover the long ago lost remembrance of some previous life; of the world in which man 
coexists with the nature in a more corresponding and respectful way and where he once 
founded his first home. 
 
                                                 
6 Jean Baudrillard, America, (New York: Verso, 1990), p. 114 
7 Hermann Broch, Geits and Zeitgeist: The Spirit in an Unspirituaal Age, (New York: Counterpoint, 2002), 
p. 80 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation presents modernism as one coherent narrative that spreads throughout 
the entire last century up to the present day, and manifests itself in various forms and 
aspects, but always with the same inner agenda. This agenda of modernism is conceived 
and defined by the obscure nature of post-humanist subject/object relationship which 
displaces man out of the center of the world and considers him to be no longer the master 
of being.   
 
In order to clarify and understand what modernism in architecture is, what does it do, and 
how it manifest itself, the above presented thesis analyzes and explores this new relation 
between subject and object (that is, the relation between man and objects around him) and 
indentifies several potent instruments, or rather weapons, which are used to radically 
oppose the long-ruling humanism, and to express and materialize the cognizance and 
poetry of the new paradigm. The true agenda of modernism becomes more perceivable 
and emphasized when these instruments are put and displayed against the conventional 
instruments of humanism. Thus, the history and tradition, which are some of the 
fundamental devices of humanism, can be put versus modernist’s tabula rasa and 
immediate present; cultural heritage vs. primitive ‘pre-subject’ condition; representative 
narrative vs. abstraction, self-referentiality and non-representativeness; solid form vs. 
‘non-present presence’ and ‘strategy of the void’; function vs. performance; scientific 
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exactness and logic vs. imponderable and haunted space; ratio vs. delirium; comfort and 
coziness vs. disturbance, ‘torture-house’, and cave-like space.  
 
By following and analyzing these instruments of modernist architecture, the thesis tries to 
render and define the territory of the new metaphysics which is generated by man’s 
implacable feeling of discomfort. At the same time, it detects some of the ‘aliens’ in this 
territory: the remains of humanist anthropocentrism, manifested through functionalism, 
utopian idealism, and the imposition of the formal rules canonized as style. The thesis 
also argues that armed with these instruments, in the same way as architecture of Le 
Corbusier and Hilberseimer, the contemporary architecture – represented here by the 
works of Peter Eisenma, Rem Koolhaas, and Sou Fujimoto, as well as by the rapid 
development of the new Chinese cities – is the ultimate embodiment of this very same 
new metaphysics.  
 
If we closely observe how these instruments are used in architecture, we can clearly 
perceive and learn what man had to do, what predicaments he had to encounter, and in 
what way he had to adjust and change himself to be able to construct the ontology of this 
new reality. Here, I would like once more to return to the allegory from Louis Buñuel 
film The Exterminating Angel, mentioned in the introduction of this paper. The group of 
high-class people at the lavish mansion is imprisoned in one room by the metaphysical 
force of the old world of humanism, isolating them and preventing to participate in the 
outer reality. The people consume what little water and food is left from the previous 
night's party. Days pass, and they become less and less polite and generous, and more and 
more quarrelsome, careless, and hostile. Slowly, the false civilized conventions disappear; 
the phony masks of courtesy fall, and what is left is the bare and raw existence. The 
luxurious bourgeois room is turned into the Upper Paleolithic cave – the first known 
dwelling of man – and they, like real cavemen, slaughter the animals with bare hands and 
roast them on fires made from floorboards and broken furniture. This group of people 
performs one cultural restart, the nullification of all imposed values and priorities. They 
reach the zero degree of history and start fresh all over again, from the very beginning. 
Only then, after they break all the postulates of the old world into pieces, the 
metaphysical barriers disappear and they are free to leave the room and experience the 
reality of one new paradigm.  
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The process identical to the one depicted in this Bunuel’s film is inherent to modernist 
architecture. Man, once the decisive originator of all meaning, has to abandon the high 
authority of Cartesian dualism and confront with one strange, unfamiliar, and hostile 
world with no cozy and warm home that provides security and comfort. He constructs the 
condition with the zero ground of identity; a system which reduces man to the most basic 
and the most primitive mode of existence. It is the new urban environment that is 
deprived of any form of anthropocentrism and therefore it is not captivated by the old 
demons of humanism. It is one drafty place of uncertainties; provisional shelter, gateway, 
exile... Modernism is the state where homelessness is an axiom: if you do not leave your 
home, the home will leave you, and most likely in a quite literal way. Man becomes 
treated as an object, as an alien caught in the foreign territory and subjected to the 
unknown rules and will. There is no reliable cognitive map that would help him and save 
him from discomfort. Man returns to space preceding the very construction of the psyche 
or the subject itself, the ego, personality and the like, in order to find the new values and 
invent the new modes of behavior that would enable an elementary accordance with the 
reality.  
 
This thesis can be read as a brief journey through the twentieth century architecture. 
However, unlike regular journeys that usually follow one chronological narrative, this one 
is constructed of ostensibly random illustrations, connected as dots in a connect-the-dots 
puzzle, to delineate the silhouette of the paradigm of modernism. The thesis aims 
primarily at solving not a practical problem but a ‘conceptual one’, and it is motivated by 
the flawed understanding and misreading of the modernist architecture.  
 
Therefore, this dissertation can be little more than one introduction, one point of reference 
from which the understanding of this problem may be evolved. Although, it cannot offer 
the comprehensive knowledge of this immense subject, it can at least serve to denote 
some relevant issues, and thus make the contribution to thinking and developing the 
discourse of the modernist architecture and the contemporary art in general. 
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